“Fearism”: A Critical Analysis of Uses and Discourses in Global Migration Studies

R. Michael Fisher

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Technical Paper No. 64

In Search of Fearlessness Research Institute
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First Edition 2017

Cover and layout by R. Michael Fisher
ISOF Logo (original 1989) designed by RMF

Printed in USA

The In Search of Fearlessness Institute is dedicated to research and publishing on fear, fearlessness and emotions and motivational forces, in general, as well as critical reviews of such works. Preference is given to works with an integral theoretical perspective.
Fearism: A Critical Analysis of Uses and Discourses in Global Migration Studies

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Abstract

Although terrorism was coined in the French Revolution over 200 years ago, fearism has emerged in scholarly and popular culture in the past 25 years, articulating a new critical perspective on the nature and role of fear. This is the first review study of scholars using “fearism” overall but with a focus on uses and misuses within the fields of global Migration, Ethnic and Citizenship Studies (MECS). The 13 MECS’s publications reviewed, with the first use of fearism in 2009, indicate discourses conform closely, yet with differences which require conceptual and theoretical clarification. MEC’s discourses suggest we ought to think critically about fearism as a postmodern complex concept, phenomena, analytic framework, discourse, rhetoric, ideology, imaginary and matrix, with historical, traumatic, socio-political and cultural implications for migration problematics in the 21st century. Nearly 80% of the MECS’s authors, more or less, quoted and/or cited the same excerpt, that is, a 24-word definition of fearism (Fisher, 2006, 51). Unfortunately, the excerpt is a truncated definition, when the original definition is more complex and radical as contextualized by Fisher. This author recommends how to correct this truncated, often inaccurate, reading of Fisher’s original definition, which MECS’s discourses tend to rely upon.

Keyword: fearism, fear, fear management, hidden curriculum, migration
Introduction

_Fear_ is like Proteus—assuming a thousand different forms.

- Assagioli (1991, 169)

_Fearism_ – a process and discourse hegemony [which] creates an experience of fear that is normalized... keeping the cultural matrix of ‘fear’ operative and relatively invisible.

- Fisher (2006, 51)

Global Migration Studies and its related fields of inquiry are being drawn increasingly into strange postmodern affective territories with newly emerging vocabularies. The above 24 words defining _fearism_ are historically relevant as a beginning point for why this current article was initiated. The story behind this quote and its relationship to Global Migration Studies and its discourses (2009-2016) is one that illuminates a pivotal postmodern (and/or post-9/11 era) challenge for recontextualizing, if not radicalizing, the way we think about _fear_ and _fearlessness_ in our societies.

One starting point, ought to be an aim for reducing, if not eliminating, the way excessive fear has and continues to impact negatively the lives of so many people, especially those living with what Raven-Ellison (2013) called the ‘precarity’ of migration politics. Another mutual starting point, ought to be a re-visioning and creation of a (r)evolutionary imaginary, which is capable of embracing the transformation of conceptualizing _fear_ to conceptualizing _fearism_—with analogous implications (but very different paths) to conceptualizing _terror_ and its complexification _via_ the familiar _terrorism_ of hegemonic political discourses of the day.¹ Fisher concluded,

> It has always struck me as more than a little odd that the word _terrorism_ has received an incredible amount of scholarly attention, with its own journals and centers of research but _fearism_ has been invisible. (Fisher 2006, 51)

Something is wrong in the field of fear management. (Fisher 2010, xxvii)

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¹ ‘[T]here is an urgent call for re-thinking the nature and role of terrorism according to not merely the traditional counter-terrorist hegemony of W. thinking but rather, with a new paradigm, birthed forth from the roots of a philosophy of fearism’ (Fisher and Subba 2016b, 3).
As the story unfolds, there is a long and rather tired Western modernist tradition of critique regarding the politics of fear in general, specifically, in relation to security issues—and, in particular with its undermining impact on reason at the core of the integrity of strong democracies. One characteristic liberal (American) example is the opening of Al Gore’s (2007) book The Assault on Reason,

The truth is that American democracy is now in danger—not from any one set of ideas, but from unprecedented changes in the environment within which ideas either live and spread, or wither and die.... I mean what is called the public sphere, or the marketplace of ideas [2].... I know I am not alone in feeling that something has gone fundamentally wrong.... [then, he begins Chapter One: “The Politics of Fear”] Fear is the most powerful enemy of reason. Both fear and reason are essential to human survival, but the relationship between them is [now dangerously] unbalanced [23].... The single most surprising new element in America’s national conversation is the prominence and intensity of constant fear.... we seem to be having unusual difficulty in distinguishing between illusory [trumped-up] threats and legitimate ones. (25) [italics added for emphasis]

Gore’s emphasis on the role of the ‘environment’ and/or political and cultural medium for transmission of ideas is pregnant with creative prompts for investigating why fearism may be important. For example, what if the very medium of postmodern migration discourses are being overly constructed and restricted along an environmental conduit of limiting factors such as global ‘capitalized fear’ (Massumi 1993a, ix), a ‘climate of fear’ and/or fearism itself?

2 For a good critical historical/political analysis see Robin (2004). For this article, the generic term ‘politics of fear’ also includes many other disciplinary territories re: fearism (e.g., ‘architectures of fear,’ ‘geographies of fear,’ ‘pedagogies of fear’), and ‘economies of fear’ that reinforce the ‘enemy-Other’ constructions and accompanying ‘powerful affective borders’ (e.g., Zembylas 2009, 191-95).

3 See Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Arndt (2011) for a good summary of the psychosocial (identity) dynamics behind the discourses of the politics of fear.

4 Climate of fear is an interesting construct/imaginary for our times, for a lot of different reasons. It is also very popular in academic and popular culture; however, that widespread common use has also limited it’s richness in theoretical construction. For these reasons, this author has preferred the conception of culture of fear (defined later), which embraces and transcends what is generally meant by the climate of fear.
With the troublesome U.S. Presidential election of 2016 embodying a growing climate of fear, with President Donald Trump’s xenophobic policies leading the way, perhaps it is appropriate to reinvigorate a critical upgraded dialogue on the nature and role of fear again. What unique offering might Migration Studies scholarship bring to this debate and dialogue? One immigration political policy scholar in the UK, Balch (2016), suggested that the politics of fear and politics of immigration have been intertwined ‘ever since laws to regulate international movement were implemented’ in the 18-19th centuries in the West, and nothing much has changed since in the 20th-21st centuries, where it remains evident that ‘fear has become central to the story of immigration’ (177) on many levels. Balch summarized this interrelationship:

The role of fear in the politics of immigration has long been seen as a concern for liberal commentators in the USA and Europe. For every article and book published in the USA about immigration threats (Brimelow 1995; Huntington 2004), there is another, or indeed many others, that see dark, illiberal forces at play behind the choice to raise or air those threats (Johnson 1995; Waldschmidt-Nelson 2004). Likewise, in Europe, it is now commonplace for academics to assert that “fear of immigration, which rewards fear-mongering politicians, represents the greatest problem for European democracies today” (Bosetti 2011: 374). There is a broad consensus among these commentators that the liberalism of liberal democracies is tragically undermined by the way that fear can dominate the public debate and thereby political reactions to immigration as a policy issue. This is a rather vague assertion. How can we be more precise about the risk or danger which is being claimed [above].... While there is general agreement that ‘fearism’ devalues or even threatens liberal democratic ideas, there needs to be [more] clarity.... (178) [italics added for emphasis]

The ‘environment’ of a healthy public sphere/debate and associated public pedagogies is an issue taken up by Michalinos Zembylas, a key figure and provocateur from Cyprus, in our story. Zembylas (2009) also noted there is

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For example, see “As Trump dodge question of when US can ‘Get rid of’ Muslims, [Ralph] Nader asks: ‘What if it had been Jews?’” Retrieved from https://www.democracynow.org/2015/9/18/ralph_nader_on_donald_trump_bernie
a recent wave of new scholarship⁶ ‘across a variety of disciplines [that] have begun to study fear and its implications on various aspects of life such as the economy, politics, urban planning, architecture, criminology and everyday life’ (187). In the past eight years, as part of the postmodern scholarship on fear, the concept of fearism is attracting attention within global Migration, Ethnic and Citizenship Studies (MECS)⁷—as a more complex ideological assemblage of fear-based motivations and outcomes (e.g., xenophobia). Kalir (2016), an anthropologist at the University of Amsterdam, who researches on current ethnic and migration problems, has suggested ‘the concept of fearism is a very insightful and a timely one to grasp much of what is happening around us in the geo-political, psychological and anthropological sense’ (pers. comm., February 11, 2016).

This new postmodern scholarship on fear and the Anthropocene era⁸ context are challenging us to expand our ideas and imaginary about what the human-fear relationship involves. Within a unique historical and evolutionary context, sociologist Barber (2005) contended, in a post-9/11 traumatic assessment of global war, terrorism and politics: ‘Fear’s not just a factor, it’s a major player.’ He concluded, ‘Fear’s Empire leaves no room

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⁶ This claim was first synthesized, in part, by Brisset (2003) and developed as a largely academic movement via postmodern ‘fear’ research/writing/teaching (Fisher 2006, 44-47).

⁷ For purposes of this review, MECS implies diverse “critical” studies approaches that challenge status quo (if not hegemonic) approaches and, it also includes Deportation Studies and related fields of inquiry. Zembylas’ four articles plus Coulson are included in MECS, although they are all decidedly in the field of Education yet with focus on MECS’s content; similarly Raven-Ellison is situated in Geography, Vasquez in Religion Studies, Masumbe in Law, Kalir in Anthropology and Marino in Digital Studies. Point is, the MECS’s focus takes precedent over academic discipline for their inclusion in the MECS’s discourse(s) analyzed here.

⁸ Many have defined this era somewhat differently in geological terms, but generally it is accepted that it represents the era of geological history where human impact is pivotal in shaping future geological change—e.g., mass species extinctions and global warming are two examples—both of which are having enormous critical negative impacts on geology, soils, etc., and thus, on life-sustainability overall. These changes bring about vast negative impacts also on food production, linked then with poverty, wars, and migrations. It would take another article to delineate this Anthropocene context in terms of Migration Studies. This author has recently begun to conceptualize Anthropocene Fear as a theoretical concept, which goes beyond but includes notions of “liquid fear” and “postmodern fear” (e.g., see Bauman 2007).
for democracy’ (Barber, 2003, 32). In an America context, like other leading nations, Barber asserted, we are ‘at risk of becoming at once a willing colony and the capital of fear’s spreading empire’ (19)—of which the Latin American poet-activist Galápagos (2000) believes is casting a shadow of inescapable millenial ‘Global Fear’ with catastrophic results (78)—of which, the UK feminist human geography scholar (Pain, 2009) categorized as ‘globalized fear.’ All of which casts our re-orientation to fear/terror within contexts of a bloody murderous [20th] ‘century of fear’ (Camus 1946), “post-traumatic century” (Felman 1991, 1), “post-traumatic culture” (Ferré 1998) or ‘climax age of fear’ (Subba 2014, 225). What the 21st century will bring are great challenges beyond what we have already seen in Fear’s Empire and its hegemonic struggle to persist or collapse under counterhegemonic efforts, like those of MECS and others.

Riding the wave of the ‘affective turn’ in philosophy and politics, it seems all these re-contextualizations of individual and merely psychological fear, are creating a new postmodern collective sensibility and political radicalization of fear itself (and/or ‘fear’) beyond what is common/habitual in modernist discourse(s) on fear and/or emotions management. This author has often used ‘fear’ with (’) marks to indicate the term is under deconstruction and reconstruction, with an open-ended agenda as to defining its nature and role and demanding a re-visioning of our very methodologies of knowing fear (e.g., Fisher, 1995/2012, 2016).

Part of the theoretical rationale for fearism as a concept, phenomena, ideology, climate, and critical analytical framework, is to guide us to more subtle discourses and impacts than those hegemonically intertwined with terror(ism) and its overt traumatic impacts across all dimensions of human societies. Fear(ism) when fully understood, calls for a re-visioning of the very nature and role of fear beyond only an individual emotional and psychological perspective—that is, beyond hegemonic psychologism with its individualizing reductionistic emotion discourses (especially, but not only) in the West.

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9 A psychological perspective on fear (e.g., as an emotion) is valid but when it becomes ideological and hegemonic by dominating the entire discourse on a phenomena (like fear), then we have psychologism, with political intentions that, more or less, dismiss all other perspectives. See critiques by Lazier and Plamper (2012, 1) and Scruton (1986). This problematic has been also argued as a critical epistemological issue (re: a postmodern epistemology of fear) (e.g., Fisher 2016).
Recent critical postmodern commentators on fear and the growing *culture of fear* are many and diverse (e.g., Fisher 1998/2012; Glassner 2009; Furedi 2006; Giroux 2003; Zembylas 2009, 187-89). For 27 years this author has focused a post-postmodern transdisciplinary research agenda on this phenomena and contends we are now well-advised to assert the ‘Fear Problem’ (e.g., Fisher 2010, 91) and ‘Fear’ Studies (Fisher 2006) as postmodern meta-contextual framing(s) for research, education and critical analysis of virtually everything in human societies to do with fear (and fearlessness). The suggested holistic unit of study ought to be *fear management/education* (i.e., power/fear/knowledge *a la* Foucault) because it is argued that all interest in fear is ultimately an interest in how to better manage it to gain power/knowledge—and, to accomplish the latter, we have to educate about fear, and (ideally) to do so beyond a restrictive traditional imaginary where fear is an emotion or feeling only (Fisher 2010). Thus, ‘Fear’ Studies provides the expanded framework.

A major concept and critical theoretical perspective for understanding the Fear Problem is *fearism* or what can be called an *ideology of fear(ism)* and/or *fear/ism* (e.g., Fisher 2006, 51-52; Fisher 2010; 80; Fisher 2016; Fisher and Subba 2016a). The opening excerpted quote from Fisher (2006, 51) defining fearism, uses both *fear* and ‘*fear*’ as interrelated but distinct phenomena. This is an issue we shall return to because Fisher’s fearism concept is meaningful only originally under the contextual and radical umbrella of ‘Fear’ Studies; rather, than under a normal and/or hegemonic umbrella by which fear or fearism is typically understood.

‘Fear’ Studies presents new analytic and ethical questions, for example: How is fear but also knowledge about fear used and misused?; and, How is fear management/education constructed as educative or as propaganda? How do we know ‘fear’ outside of hegemonic discourses and their methodologies? These are political and epistemological issues that are ultimately ethical ones—especially, in the particular meta-contextual framing applied in this article. Although, not a central theme that can be addressed in this article, we as researchers/educators face the ethical dilemma of scaring people with our critical discourses on fear and/or fearism, even while we challenge others we disagree with, arguing they are the ones fear-mongering.

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10 Ultimately, this is a holistic-integral perspective of fear (and ‘fear’) (*a la* Ken Wilber and other integral theorists). See also Note 17.
In general, it is intuitive and well known that people do not want to talk self-critically about fear, be reminded of it, nor even read the word fear. F. D. Roosevelt’s oft-cited speech ‘The only thing we have to fear is fear itself,’ reminds us of the surface of this deeper ethical problem—that is, how ‘we are scaring ourselves to death.’ Casting a rather dark postmodern, post-traumatic meta-context, as this author has done in this introduction, also can frighten, if not terrify, people more than is useful. A similar problem comes with trauma work and how we always slide along the risk of re-traumatization and further fear-based withdrawal from the truths of traumatic histories. Two counter-movements initially can best be offered in regard to such vulnerabilities and general precarity:

(a) a reminder and ethical imperative of care, as Sardello (1999) wrote, ‘One of the greatest challenges in [teaching and] writing about fear is to avoid generating more fear by doing so’ (xvi),

(b) a reminder and ethical imperative of fearlessness as a dialectic with fear; which, simplified, is based on the theory (dictum): ‘When fear appears, so then does fearlessness.’;12 we’re socialized and trained to look at the former and ignore the latter but this can be ‘balanced’ in awareness through learning and healing

The purpose of this article, constructed within this meta-contextual frame, is an attempt to critically and comparatively investigate uses and discourses of the concept fearism per se, as in the quote from Balch (2016) in MECS’s discourses. This author is most curious that (‘) marks are placed around fearism in the two times Balch used the term in his new book (177-78) and by some others,13 as this has not been applied in its original con-

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11 Many critics have made this disturbing observation of (at least) contemporary culture and its pathology; especially, in the West. See for example, Cohl (1997) and many of the culture of fear theorists and critics (e.g., Furedi) and terror management theorists (e.g., Pyszczynski et al.).

12 This dictum is part of a much larger evolutionary fear management systems theory (and fearlessness theory) involving Defense Intelligence as a system-regulation process in all living organisms (e.g, Fisher 2010, xv).

13 Others in this study who used ‘fearism’ include: Drothohm and Hasselberg (2015), Harrison (2016, 5), Kalir (2015, 580, 583), Raven-Ellison (2013, 29). One reason for this use of (‘) instead of (“), is because the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (JEMS) style requirement is to use (‘) when quoting another author even if it is one word being quoted—for example from Fisher’s and/or Zembylas’s
ception or way of writing the term in Fisher (2006, 51)—the latter, as a source citation, which the vast majority of MECS’s authors relied on (see below). Questions arise: Why use (’) scare-marks? Certainly, this is not the standard case when writing the term terrorism. Why use the term fearism at all? What does it mean? Who best ought to construct it’s meaning or define it? The questions are many, although, this introductory review study of MECS’s discourse will only address these tangentially.

It appears several authors, in or outside of MECS’s circles, are recently using fearism as a critical construct in some form or other. Indeed, as Balch (above) reproaches researchers and theorists in MECS, we do require more “clarity.” This study examined all published English-based uses of fearism in MECS per se, and offers an expanded contextualization for fearism via understanding its original history, theory and uses as a concept for ideological and philosophical critical analysis.

Brief History of Uses of Fearism in General and in MECS’s Discourses

Below is a summary of citations and uses of fearism per se as a critical concept in MECS’s discourses since it first was used in an adjacent field of critical studies in education in 2009 (Zembylas 2009, 191). There is a rapidly growing, small circle, of scholarly interest in the concept within MECS’s discourses. This welcomed engagement with fearism is far beyond any other studies/disciplines or fields of scholarly work. This begs the question of why this is so? Characteristically in MECS, fearism is only meagerly defined (if it is), nuanced, and underutilized. Various assumptions are floating with and/or hidden in its use. The term awaits further theoretical scrutiny and practical applications to which this article points. A brief history and comparative analysis of fearism and its uses is due so future writing on the topic can be enriched.

Outside of, but tangential and interrelated to, MECS’s discourses, a marginal yet vigorous agenda to raise attention to the phenomena and critical analytical notion of fearism has been led by Canadian independent scholar and education curricularist, Fisher (1997). He coined the term independent-

excerpts on the definition of fearism—but, this is only a problem known likely to be the case with Drobohm and Hasselberg (2015) and Kalir (2015) because they published in JEMS. This distinction is complicated unfortunately, overall, due to different meanings (and publication styles) in Europe/UK for use of (’) and in North America, where this author is familiar.
ly, and yet similarly, to White’s (1997) book. White quoted the term’s first use known, in 1992, referring to the insidious affect-shaping politics of the Cold War. White wrote (quoting Tony Hiss), ‘Terrorism has a horrible effect on countries, but so, in its own way, does a kind of low-grade [chronic, normalized] fearism’¹⁴ (74). White’s use, unknown to Fisher’s first use, carried the same general negative connotation as Fisher’s, whereby fearism (the subtle) was the underbelly shadow and root source of terrorism (the dramatic)¹⁵ and all other oppressive isms—which he referred to, not unlike Erich Fromm’s conception of ‘social pathology,’ as a ‘social dis-ease’ (Fisher, 1997, 263). Again independently, a novelist, poet and budding amateur philosopher from Nepal, Subba in 1999, next coined fearism, with a positive connotation, while writing in a fiction genre (Fisher and Subba, 2016a, 83).

Subba has since led a global project to develop his coined term philosophy of fearism (e.g., Subba, 2014), of which Fisher has collaborated with since 2014, co-authoring the second major text (in English) on primarily epistemological issues regarding a philosophy of fearism as an East-West dialogue (Fisher and Subba, 2016a). Subba’s focus and conceptualization of fearism, and/or ‘fearist perspective’ (11) is less politically overt or ideological compared to Fisher’s—the former preferring a more psychological, anthropological and philosophical orientation, while casting the term and fear itself in positive light, claiming fear as foundational to human motivation, survival and civilization’s progress. Later in the Discussion, the overlapping perspectives of this work with the uses of fearism in MECS’s discourses are briefly compared.

¹⁴ Technically, White (1997, 74) had not coined the term but had only once quoted Hiss (1992), who wrote a piece in The New Yorker (Nov. 16, 1992, 106). White (1997) wrote, “[President] Reagan’s action earned him the enmity of Hiss’s son, Tony, who wrote in 1992: ‘Terrorism has a horrible effect on countries, but so, in its own way, does a kind of low-grade [chronic] fearism.’” Accordingly, this is the first known published use of the term fearism in the world.

¹⁵ “Erich Fromm was speaking of the radical-humanist movement he envisioned. Jean Paul Sartre was speaking of the shadow-side of ‘progress’ in the modern world that instead of leading to less fear, as the promise of progress claimed, it increased fear. And for Bonaro Overstreet [1951/71], she was convinced that we had as a species not yet tackled the human fear problem and instead were resisting solving it, of which I heartily agree. I have called that resistance fearism, as the more subtle problem, the more intransigent and destructive problem underneath the belly of terrorism. Yet, most people don’t have any idea of what fearism is” (Fisher 2012a, 3).
The kick-starter article mentioning fearism (a truncated excerpt) was within education (Zembylas, 2009, 191). Zembylas, a critical adult educator, professor of Education at Open University of Cyprus, with a long interest in ethnic conflicts, peace education, trauma, oppression, affect/emotions (e.g., Greeks and Turks in Cyprus; see Zembylas, 2006), sought to explore in an in depth article a postcolonial, global cultural and political perspective regarding how ‘affective politics of fear’ and ‘global economies of fear’ influence education. This has ‘implications for educational policy, theory and practice’ (Zembylas, 2009, 187). His interests in critical education merged then and later into his second more substantial and popular citing of fearism relevant to Agamben’s critical theory of biopower and notions of immigrants/asylum-seekers and discourses of citizenship generally (Zembylas, 2010, 31); thus, locating this curricular exploration firmly within MECS’s discourses per se for the first time. Then followed one more citation (his last) using fearism, in Zembylas (2013) as part of his development of ‘critical emotional praxis’ in reconciliation and critical peace education studies.16

Each of Zembylas’ fearism citations are repeated excerpts (paraphrasing and/or quotes most often) from Fisher (2006, 51) the same original source. Zembylas (2009) relied on Fisher’s extensive two decades of research on fear and fearlessness, of which fearism arose and was coined originally (Fisher 1997). In his first use of fearism per se, this 2009 article makes a compelling argument for the intimate interrelationship between politics of fear, affect, discourse of fear, and terrorism and immigration—which, are reciprocally entwined with the problematic of fearism (190-91). Zembylas (2010), with a focus on critical analysis of discourses of citizenship and curriculum theorizing, brings forth the first important linkage of several concepts and phenomena relevant to MECS’s discourses:

While the contemporary hidden curriculum of fear (Marshall, Sears, & Schubert, 1999) constitutes immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers as the symbolic figures of fearism—that is, ‘the systematic (often unconscious) production and perpetration of fear on others’ (Fisher, 2006, p. 51)—citizenship education curricula grounded in liberal and humanitarian discourses attempt to generate forms of recog-

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16 Earlier, Zembylas (2011) published on his critical emotional praxis for “reconciliation education” in traumatized societies, and continued to cite Fisher (2006) but not for fearism per se; rather, he utilized Fisher’s critical theoretical concept of ‘fear’ with (’) marks to indicate a distinction from common fear conceptualization and discourses (5); (see also Notes 17 and 21).
nition that work against identification of these groups as fearsome. But how is fearism interrelated with liberal and humanitarian dis-
courses of citizenship...? (31)

This brief quote from Fisher above is hereafter referred to in this article as Part A definition of fearism. Part B definition excerpt from Fisher totally dominates MECS’s discourses (as follows). Recently, commenting on his overall use of fearism, Zembylas noted he has,

[U]sed it [“fearism” per se] occasionally in my classroom ... [be-
tween] (2009-2013). ... and used it recently again (2016) to com-
ment on the Trump [US] election.... bear in mind that my immediate interests have moved away from the migration scholarship in education to that of peace and conflict studies. (pers. comm., Dec. 5, 2016).

The next rush of scholars committed to MECS began to cite Zembylas’ publications (i.e., as secondary source for a short definition— that is, Part B definition, see the start of this article), inadvertently and sometimes ignoring and/or marginalizing in a footnote the original source. The fact is that Zembylas was all along citing, rather simply and inadequately, Fisher’s (2006) more complex notion of fearism; which, had since been somewhat elaborated in Fisher (2010, 80) and re-translated into fearism-t, an ideology of fear(ism) and/or fearism in Fisher (2014, 2016) and Fisher and Subba (2016a). Beyond 2006, these latter upgraded sources on fearism have all remained un-cited within the 13 articles included in this review.

Before turning to a critical comparative analysis of uses of fearism per se (i.e., Fisher, Zembylas and others), the following chronologically documents the way it is characteristically used in MECS’s discourses. Outside of Zembylas’ (2010) use of fearism within critical education and peace education studies as the kick-starter, the next citation comes from a postmodern feminist critical geographer’s dissertation (Raven-Ellison, 2013), University of London. After discussing Agamben’s notion of biopower detention centres, states of exception and emergency in international Migration Studies, Raven-Ellison asserts,

Indeed, asylum-seekers and refugees are instrumental in a global [de-
humanizing and state-driven] imaginary which contributes to what Fisher (2006: 51) calls ‘fearism’ when fear becomes normalised and operative yet relatively invisible. In
this way, fear ‘produces fearful subjects in relation to [constructed] fearsome others and secures the very boundaries between us and [object] them’ (Zembylas, 2010: 33). (29)

Curiously again, like Balch (2016) cited earlier, Raven-Ellison (2013), who has read Zembylas’ work, used (‘) marks on fearism, of which Fisher (original source) had not ever used on this term17 (see Results). Notable as well, Raven-Ellison is only paraphrasing very simply Fisher’s (2006) more complex definition of fearism (51-52) and quite likely arrived at it through Zembylas’s (2010, 32) quoting Fisher, rather than going to the source definition.18 Interestingly, Raven-Ellison did immediately cite Rachel Pain’s work on geopolitics of fear and geography of fear, where Pain (2009) ‘argues that the centrality of fear in geopolitics must be re-evaluated’ (29); yet, she did not cite Shirlow and Pain (2003), UK geopolitical and human geography scholars, who are the first academics, independent of White (1997) or Fisher (1997), to coin and use a somewhat complex notion of fearism to label and address ‘the manufactured and contested nature and use of fear of crime’ negative fear-mongering discourses by media and the state (15).

With only one MECS’s article in 2013, there are two in 2014. One by a Latin American religion scholar in the U.S., Vasquez (2014), in a post-9/11 framing, wrote on neo-liberal capitalism and biopolitics regarding and Latino/a immigrants in America, cited Zembylas on Agamben’s ‘theory of biopower’:

Zembylas (2010) argues that immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers have become key figures in a new “fearism” that enables

17 Although, Fisher has since the mid-1990s used fear and ‘fear’ with (’) marks—the latter, to show the term is under ongoing deconstruction and reconstruction in terms of definition(s) and meaning(s)—and possible morphing into new species of fear (see McLaren 1995, 2016). The uses of ‘fearism’ by Balch, Raven-Ellison, Kalir or Harrison do not at all indicate that is why (’) marks are being used on fearism. It seems they are more showing the term is problematic, strange or questionable, populist, if not un-definable and/or simply not yet acceptable to the canons of the academy. Shirlow and Pain (2003, 17), among other scholars, also sometimes write it this way for some undisclosed reason. Zembylas has not. Although he has erred in configuring Fisher’s specific explicated correct use of (’) marks—a topic, with ontological, epistemological and theoretical importance, perhaps a topic for another time (see also Note 21).

18 Further evidence for this is in her References cited in which she exactly reproduces the same error that Zembylas (2010) does in citing Fisher (2006).
their complete de-humanization as a way to deny them any right to dwell among juridicial citizens. (87)

Vasquez footnoted the term fearism above: ‘Zembylas borrows the term from Fisher, who defines it as “a process and a discourse hegemony [which] creates the experience of fear that is normalized.... keeping the cultural matrix of ‘fear’ operative and relatively visible.’ See R. M. Fisher...” (87). Again, there is only Vasquez repeating Zembylas’ truncated (Part B) definition from Fisher (2006)—followed by no other use of the term per se, until he wrote, ‘In response to fearism, we observe pervasive processes of “rebordering,” especially in the U.S. and Europe’ (88).

The other is Sadozai and Ali (2014), with a focus on identity re: Afghan refugees in Pakistan. They wrote, ‘The premise of this paper is that the Afghan identity in Pakistan is constructed through the Pakistani State discourse(s) of fearism, international development agencies and the larger geo-political context’ as opposed to narratives and discourses from the Afghan diaspora (minorities) themselves (109). This is the first time MECS’s scholars explicitly use ‘discourse(s) of fearism,’ although it is implicitly meant in other authors’ works largely because most are citing Zembylas (2010, 32), who is citing Fisher (2006, 51), whereby fearism is defined as ‘a process and discourse hegemony.’ Sadozai and Ali repeated the pattern with the same definition quoted, though more than others, they utilize the term discourse(s) of fearism (e.g., vs. humanitarianism) a fair amount with a subsection of their paper entitled ‘The Hegemony of Fearism: Conduits, Amplifiers and the Construction of the Other.’ This subtitle refers to the construction of discourses of fear of the Other (minorities, migrants in the diaspora)—and they give examples of discourses and classify them as ‘discourses of fearism’ that infiltrate the “popular imaginaire” in Pakistan (116-17, 120).

In 2015, three publications used fearism, two (Drotbohm and Hasselberg; Kalir) of which were published in the same issue of the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 41(4). The breakthrough MECS’s article where fearism was used in the title for the first and only time to date, is Kalir (2015). Kalir, an Anthropology scholar at University of Amsterdam, with focus on the Jewish State (Israel), contrasted the choices we have to make between ‘moral obligation’ (i.e., humanitarian) for

19 Although the footnote on the definition of fearism quote reads Fisher (2006) in Zembylas (2010, 32) the authors do not include the original source Fisher (2006) in the Reference section.
refugees and asylum seekers versus fearism. This is a relatively popular article to cite in MECS. Kalir’s abstract reads:

A hegemonic ideology of ‘fearism’ — which brands the Israeli national narrative [especially, re: African asylum seekers in Israel] and informs the notion of citizenship among Jewish Israelis — leads to the construction of asylum seekers as abject Others, who pose a threat to the Jewish state and to Jews’ own right for secured citizenship. (580)

At this point, we can see a slight shift in MECS’s discourses in regard to linking the hegemonic condition/ideology — that is, ‘the production of fearism’ (585) in general, as fear-mongering, through to greater complexification to discourse(s) in Sadozai and Ali, to Kalir’s explicit ideology conceptualization — in the latter case, because he finds it useful to understanding (among other things) ‘how the production of fear’ [and/or ‘anxiety,’20 (585)] in the first place permeates and legitimises the construction of asylum seekers as deportable abject Others by the receiving nation and state’ (582). Kalir, characteristically, cited the secondary source for a fearism definition (i.e., Zembylas 2010, 32) but added a lead sentence also from Zembylas (2010, 32) in that ‘there is a new kind of global imaginary [that] is being shaped by the fear of the Other or what Fisher (2006) has termed fearism’ (585). Implicitly, Kalir (and Masumbe, and Harrison) link the hegemonic condition/ideology to include fearism in further conceptual complexification as an identifiable important imaginary itself in MECS’s discourses. Fisher’s definition in 2006 never stated fearism was a global imaginary. Equally, Kalir freely associates fearism, as does Fisher (2006, 51) with a ‘cultural matrix of fear,’ which he argued is ‘at the core of the Zionism-cum-security mind-set’ (585). Unfortunately, Kalir mis-quotes this by leaving out the (‘) marks in this phrase (definition component), which Fisher distinctly placed on ‘fear’ in this context of a cultural matrix, within a ‘Fear’ Studies perspective. This particular distinction in Fisher’s work is not central to this article review, yet it is interrelated to how fearism is (mis)used or mis-written by several MECS’s authors relative to Fisher’s use.

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20 It is important, in later studies, to critically analyze the discourses in MECS regarding the uses of “fear” compared to “anxiety.” Drotbohm and Hasselberg (2015) and Kalir (2015) were the only two articles to place anxiety in the article title.
Drothoehm and Hasselberg (2015) summarized a series of articles in a journal issue of which one paper dealing with detention centres for deportable migrants, raised similar concerns to Kalir’s work. They wrote,

A comparable struggle between humanitarian concerns and xenophobic tensions is examined... Kalir [2015] argues that a specific Jewish-Israeli ideology of ‘fearism,’... underlie[s] the construction of the non-Jewish immigrant Other.... these tensions are used by policymakers for justifying the exclusion and deportation.... (556)

In Masumbe’s (2015) dissertation, problematizing the process of naturalisation of refugees in S. Africa regarding human rights, wrote,

Excluding refugees and their children from naturalisation and birthright citizenship is not peculiar to South Africa or to other Western Democracies.... It is a global phenomenon informed not by justice, human rights or constitutionalism but by the imaginary and unjustified fear of the invading ‘other.’ It is perceived as a kind of invisible but provable naïve kind of collective private dislike or something close or akin to what Fisher [2006] termed fearism. (272)

Masumbe, like Kalir, mentions the imaginary fear is constructing, then proceeded to quote the same standard (truncated) definition found in all the MECS’s discourses in this study, taken from Fisher (2006, p. 51), of which he (atypically) footnoted from the primary source and not from Zembylas.

Writing from a critical education perspective on the problem of “undocumented” immigrants in the USA, a grad student (Coulson 2016) analyzed two articles and their discourses in popular media of ‘fearmongering’ (1). He wrote, ‘Both articles exemplify fearism—“a discourse hegemony [which] creates an experience of fear that is normalized... keeping the cultural matrix of ‘fear’ operatively and relatively invisible” (Fisher, 2006, p. 51)’ (1). Characteristic of MECS’s discourses on fearism, he likely took this definition from Zembylas (2010) whom he cited also but without examining the source reference (i.e., Fisher).²¹

²¹ Evidence for this prediction of copying is found in Coulson’s References (see the same in Harrison 2016) where he reproduces the same citation error (re: Fisher 2006) as Zembylas (2010), by putting (“) marks, in the References, for “Fear” Studies which are in the original designated (’) marks on ‘Fear’ Studies. In Zembylas (2009) References, (’) marks are used but the term is written with small
Most (four) MECS related publications are in 2016. Balch (2016), Department of Politics at University of Liverpool, UK, already mentioned earlier focused on fear and uses fearism a few times with no reference to Fisher or Zembylas. Harrison (2016), a doctoral candidate in International Law, Queen Mary University of London, analyzed ‘fortress Europe’ mentality and neo-/re-colonizing Western discourses in media, and after one particular ‘crass scaremongering’ (6) styled article on Syrian asylum seekers, he critiqued it in the following way:

Such sentiments fall in line with a new kind of global imaginary that has taken hold of the Western public imagination, especially since the 9/11 attacks upon US landmarks; characterized by a fear of the Other, or what Michael Fisher (2006) terms ‘fearism,’ it signifies ‘a process and discourse hegemony... (Fisher, 2006, 51). (5-6)

Harrison (2016) implicitly then proceeded to link this use of fearism with post-9/11 ‘culture of fear’ dynamics (6, 14) and cited, among others, Zembylas (2010) at the end of the paragraph and into the next. It is predictable, as the next paragraphs unfold, Harrison is heavily lifting secondary letters. This author (in a personal communication on Aug. 22, 2009) had sent Zembylas the correct way to Reference the article. Zembylas (2010) did thereby correct to caps but used (“), but in Zembylas (2011) he returns to the 2009 incorrect version; and further, in Zembylas (2013, 2015) he uses another incorrect version (“) plus small letters. For various reasons, the errors here (more than mere typos) appear insignificant to Zembylas, despite the fact they are explicitly stated as not so in Fisher (2006) and all his other writing thereafter, and before 2006. In fact the ever-quoted definition of fearism (24 words) has fear written with and without (’) marks for a good reason, of which not one of the 13 authors in this review makes mention—and, worse, Masumbe (2015) leaves the (‘) off fear in mis-copying the quote (271). This is an issue not central to this article but requires more investigation in terms of how a discourse hegemony regarding one’s conceptualization of fear may (e.g., Zembylas’s discourse, rather unconsciously, perhaps) produce significant contradictions and even resistances to revision and/or a chosen (perhaps) improved change of ways of representing/expressing fear in texts and discourse, based on meta-contextual changes in which fear is situated, especially in a postmodern world. This detailed forensic work is part of an ongoing general and/or specific critical fearanalysis methodology/project (e.g., Fisher 2015).

Despite the evidence Fisher (2006) was not examined (see Note 21). Harrison most peculiarly mentioned this author’s first name in the quotation. No other MECS’s authors do this and set such a precedent. It suggests Harrison looked up this author’s name and/or the original Fisher (2006) article, whereby he would quickly see “R. Michael Fisher” as author.
references on the ‘culture of fear’ and ‘politics of fear’ (e.g., fear of the Other) using Zembylas (2010, 32-33) and less so Fisher’s definition to support his case. No other substantive discussion or nuancing of fearism *per se* is offered. The editors (Marino and Dawes, 2016), Department of Digital Humanities at King’s College London, of a special issue on ‘Fortress Europe’ and the global migration crises; note: Harrison’s (2016) article (above) focused ‘on the politics of fearism [discourse] behind the representation of refugees as hate figures, and the counter-narrative that encourages sympathy with them as victims’ (3).

Results of How Fearism is Being Used in MECS’s Discourses

Discourses of migration and discourses of fear are problematically engaged in the 13 publications of this review study. Fear is important in the discourse but it is by no means the dominant emphasis. Overall, in conceiving of *fearism* the Migration, Ethnic and Citizenship Studies’ (MECS) discourses are very consistent in portraying a phenomena that has a strong negative connotation and insidious real impact on human beings, especially, in the cases of migration challenges.

From the 13 articles/chapters/dissertations qualified in this study of how *fearism* is used *per se* in MECS’s discourses, the 13 diverse authors involved are from UK (31%), Cyprus (23%), USA (15%), Pakistan/Australia (8%), Netherlands (8%), S. Africa (8%) and Germany (8%). There has been a slow but sure increase in uses per/yr. from only one in 2009, 2010, (by Zembylas), to two each in 2013, 2014, with three in 2015 with a significant jump to four in 2016 (31%). There is a relative majority of uses of fearism (70%) in the geopolitical region of UK/European located scholars. This frequency and geographic bias indicates some likely correlation with the largely front-line European-constructed ‘refugee crisis’ that burst-out in Western media in the summer of 2015.24

Relatively, the overall number is low in any year and only once was fearism chosen in the title of the article (Kalir, 2016). Three times it appeared in sub-titles: ‘Fearism and the Liberal/Humanitarian Response in Citizenship Education’ (Zembylas 2010, 31); ‘The Hegemony of Fearism: Conduits, Amplifiers and the Construction of the Other’ (Sadozai & Ali 2014, 116); ‘Compassion & Rights: How ‘Fearism’ Curtails Political

23 Eight journal articles (mostly peer-reviewed), three book chapters, and two dissertations.
24 According to Harrison (2016, 1).
Recognition of Others’ (Kalir 2015, 583). Equally low is the number of uses of the term per publication at a total of 40 with a range of 1 to 8 with the following: 1 time (46%), 2 times (23%)—(gap)—7 times (15%), 8 times (15%). The gap here indicates 4 of 13 publications gave the term more than a simple brief mention and definition (i.e., Kalir 2015; Sadozai & Ali 2014; Zembylas 2010, 2013).

In terms of coining and definition offered for fearism in the 13 publications, 10 (77%) explicitly cited Fisher (2006) as the primary source, which is consistent with Zembylas’ publications (2009-13), as he is the first to do so in MECS’s discourses. After that, nearly every author cited Zembylas (2010) as secondary source acknowledging Fisher in the text usually or some in footnotes, and only rarely excluding Fisher (2006) from the References. Three publications (23%) cited neither Zembylas nor Fisher and used fearism in their own way (Balch 2016; Drotbohm and Hasselberg 2015; Marino and Dawes 2016). Recently, Balch explained his use:

I am not completely sure where I found the word fearism but I wouldn’t claim it as my own invention…. perhaps it is simply a word I cam across and [it] stuck in my head. In any case, I did not use it for any specific purpose—it was more of a throwaway to highlight the centrality of fear to a number of explanatory accounts of immigration policies…. (pers. comm., Jan. 6, 2017)

The three 2015-16 publications here, being the furthest removed in time from Zembylas’ publications, suggests that later MECS’s authors may begin dropping-off in their texts any citation(s) of the original Fisher (2006) coinage, definition and larger complex-ification of fearism as it was first intended. Thus, the future use of the term could become a popularized ‘throwaway’ without any depth or connection to its brief history since 1992.

A more significant current concern is indicated in two areas: (i) inconsistency and inaccuracy of citing the original form/convention of how to use fearism and, (ii) use of only truncated fragments of the original form of definition and conceptualization of fearism. First problem, is that Fisher (2006, 51-52) coined the term as fearism without any (’) marks. Zembylas (2009-13) consistently honored this convention. However, once others began using it, typically based on having read and thus copied from Zembylas (2010), and beginning with Raven-Ellison (2013), 50% of the others use ‘fearism’ with (’) marks with no explanation offered why they did so.
(see Discussion). Drotbohm and Hasselberg (2015, 585, 594-95) used both fearism and ‘fearism’ interchangeably on the same pages. And, the second problem, in terms of fragments extracted in citations from Fisher’s (2006) original definition, the pattern involved using (pretty much) the same standard (Part B) *direct quote:* used in 55% of the publications as 23-24 words (Zembylas 2010, 2013; Vasquez 2014; Sadozai and Ali 2014; Masumbe 2015; Kalir 2015) with 18% using 20-21 words (Coulson 2016; Harrison 2016), 9% using 11 words of a different quote (Part A) in Fisher (2006, 51)\(^{25}\) and uniquely, 9% using nine words as a paraphrase only. With anywhere between 9-24 words being cited from the original of Fisher (2006, 51-52) at 148 words and updated to 339 words (Fisher 2010, 80) and an entire book (Fisher and Subba, 2016a), it raises questions of adequacy amongst the MECS’s discourses on fearism (see Discussion). Fearism as it has meant to be used in Fisher’s work from the beginning, is significantly more complex than a 24-word quote can convey: that is, *fearism* – ‘a process and discourse hegemony [which] creates an experience of fear that is normalized... keeping the cultural matrix of ‘fear’ operative and relatively invisible’ (Fisher 2006, 51).

For Fisher, the origination of fearism, as part of the new scholarship on ‘fear,’ has always been complex and radically rooted in an umbrella evolutionary conception of the ‘Fear Problem.’ To compare (at least) Fisher (2006) to the MECS’s discourses, is logically invoked in this investigation because of the overall dependency of selected MECS’s authors on that original source for validation and/or understanding fearism. Thus, from a ‘Fear’ Studies perspective (Fisher 2006), any near critical postmodern integrated/holistic understanding of *fearism* ought to be constructed through a (minimum) cluster of other intimately related concepts and phenomena: fear-mongering, politics of fear, culture of fear, discourse of fear, rhetoric of fear ideology of fear, imaginary of fear, hegemony of fear, matrix of fear and geo- and bio-politics of fear. A word-search in the 13 publications showed surprisingly little to no engagement with these concepts *per se,* other than politics of fear and culture of fear. Yet, implicit use of all these concepts and phenomena, more or less, are embedded in the MECS’s discourses in this review study.

\(^{25}\) “While the contemporary *hidden curriculum of fear* (Marshall, Sears, and Schubert 1999) constitutes immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers as the symbolic figures of *fearism*—that is, ‘the systematic (often unconscious) production and perpetration of fear on others’ (Fisher 2006, p. 51)” (Zembylas 2010, 31). For some reason, no other MECS’s discourses use this (part A = first half) of Fisher’s definition.
MECS’s author Zembylas (2009) reaffirms the rich multidisciplinary study of fear going on in recent years (beyond biology and psychology), noting conceptions like ‘politics of fear,’ ‘geographies of fear’ and ‘culture of fear,’ to name a few, have surfaced (especially, frequently after 9/11) and ‘provide testimony to the cultural significance of fear today’ (187). He also cited Buonfino (2004) in correlating the post-9/11 rise of ‘a notion of the culture of fear’ in the US and concomitantly ‘fear is increasingly associated with immigration and asylum seeking in Europe’ (187). Zembylas (2009) is worth citing at length on ‘politics of fear’ for a rather complete, if not iconic, explanation of the interrelated concepts and phenomena that all 13 authors, more or less, are critically analyzing and concerned with:

The politics of fear acknowledges the important role of power relations and cultural scripts (Garland, 2001) in the process of establishing others as fearsome, thus, the Other is fearsome because he/she is constructed as a danger to our (e.g. our national group) very existence.... Terrorism and immigration play well together with audiences accustomed to the politics of fear as well as with demands for social policies geared to protect those audiences from the threat posed by strangers.... Immigration, in particular, is cast as a terrible trend that threatens the values of freedom, security and culture.... the politics of fear sustain the affective conditions that enable anti-immigration and nationalism to flourish, curtails civic liberties, promotes attacking everyone who is different, and stifles dissent as being ‘unpatriotic’.... I argue, then, that expanding the discourse of fear to include immigration and asylum seeking perpetuates the politics of fear that follows the establishment of affective (and literal) borders that exclude ‘the enemy-Other’.... Discourse of fear serve as public pedagogies of fear that make more visible the boundaries between us (e.g. the legitimate citizens) and them (e.g., the poor immigrants who want to take away the legitimate citizen’s wealth); these public pedagogies of fear create experiences of fear that are normalized, while preventing any critical analysis of the implications of fearism, as Fisher (2006) labels the systematic production and perpetuation of fear for political and economic purposes. (190-91)
From this author’s perspective, he has thus provided an interwoven frame for what could be called a synergic dynamic or ecology of fear26 in the Migration Problematique, what some rightfully label the imposing ‘ideological frame’ (Zembylas 2010, 38) and/or ‘ideological warfare’ (e.g., Harrison 2016, 7). And, fear (and/or ‘fear’), in all its powerful splendor, is right at the core of the weaponry, causes, affects, and effects.

Therefore, it is not surprising in this review that politics of fear per se was by far the most prevalent in the 13 publications, followed by culture of fear. There is a vast body of contemporary research across disciplines that utilizes these terms in an attempt to represent the negative phenomena involved—of which, most characteristically, includes a universal pattern of fear-mongering in terms of a post-/neo-colonial critique of ‘fear of the Other.’ In this review, frequent use of politics of fear per se was virtually restricted to Balch (2016) and Zembylas’s publications.27 Note, in Fisher’s original definition of fearism, he included, ‘sounds a little like [Corey] Robin’s [2004] “political fear” definition because fearism is intertwined with conflict’ (51). This statement was omitted from all 10 publications that cited Fisher (2006). Unfortunately, politics of fear per se was also excluded, other than Balch, Sadozi and Ali, and Zembylas—the latter, who had likely been the only MECS’s author among them to have actually read Fisher (2006) carefully.28 A most interesting emergent variant was ‘politics of fearism’ (Harrison 2016, 7) and copied by Marino 2016, 3). Equally interesting, was ‘discourse(s) of fearism’ (Sadozai and Ali 2014, 109-10, 117, 120) or ‘discourses of fear-ism’ (Harrison 2016, 7). The switch from plain fearism to articulate variants indicates a potentially powerful analytic shift in understanding fearism and its uses in MECS’s discourses and beyond (see Discussion).

Arguably, in comparison with politics of fear, an equally, if not more, important related concept and phenomena, the culture of fear, is virtually always implied in the 13 articles and MECS’s discourses; yet, only Kalir (2015) freely associates fearism, as does Fisher’s oft-quoted definition

26 Ecology of fear (e.g., Fisher 2012a) is a growing relative popular academic conception (with theories) found across several disciplines; roots of this are traceable, in part, to Tuan (1979) and Davis (1999).
27 The other exception, Raven-Ellison (2013), used geopolitics (citing R. Pain).
28 The one exception is Masumbe (2015), who uniquely, does not use Zembylas’s quotation of Fisher. The most feasible reason for Zembylas’s careful reading of Fisher was due to them both being in the field of critical Education and had published in the same Journal of Curriculum Theorizing.
(2006, 51), with a ‘cultural matrix of fear’ as core to the immigrant problems in Israel (585). If we take matrix as a serious term meaning womb-like and/or template for all further developments from its foundational source—then, when Fisher (2006) argued, ‘Fearism is dedicated to keeping the cultural matrix of ‘fear’ operative and relatively invisible’ (51), it behooves MECS’s authors to look to the source of Fisher’s evolutionary ‘Fear’ Studies context (and/or meta-theory) for understanding fear, ‘fear’ and fearism and what he terms, from of his dissertation work (Fisher 2003), the ‘Fear’ Matrix (Fisher 2006, 44-47).

None of the 13 authors adequately quote enough of Fisher’s (2006) definition and concept of fearism, never mind its up-dated versions. They equally disregard the implications of how fear becomes necessarily something else (i.e., ‘fear’) because of fearism and because fear is now located within the meta-context of a cultural matrix of ‘fear,’—all, which are critical for Fisher, in understanding the culture of fear phenomena and fearism. Interestingly in this review study, among relevant overlapping notions, one finds ‘biopolitical matrix’ (Claudio Minca, cited in Zembylas 2010, 38), hidden matrix’ (Giorgio Agamben, cited in Vasquez 2014, 89) and ‘exclusionary matrix’ (Judith Butler, cited in Raven-Ellison 2013, 260). And, no MECS’s critical discourse ought to be unfamiliar or disinterested in the postcolonial intersectionality of the ‘Matrix of Domination’ (Collins 2000).

Moïsi’s (2009) critical global analysis of the “geopolitics of emotion” has pinned down three general types of cultures that “are reshaping the world” today. ‘Cultures of fear’ is the one that dominates the West (U.S., U.K., Europe) because, with globalization and internationalization of everything, there is an increasing sense in the West of ‘loss of control over the future’ and its domination (91-92). The culture of fear is thus a ‘meta-context’ (Fisher 2006, 57) with diverse definitions, conceptualizations and meanings, depending on the theorists and persons using it. It’s uses and dis-

29 There are many writing about the attention economy and the role of culture and media; see for example, Davenport and Beck (2001) and more critical is Boyd (2012), a presentation on culture of fear + attention economy as a powerful combination.
course(s) have been systematically studied by Fisher (2004) and refined in Fisher’s (2006) general definition:

*Culture of fear*— any human/living organization/system that manages fear, overtly or covertly, in harmful ways that ends up encouraging more fear in the organization, instead of less—resulting in a dispirited culture based on fear and intimidation (injustice), instead of trust, cooperation and true democracy. (56)

None of the 13 MECS’s authors picked-up on this definition. For the most part, they merely cited standard social science scholars (Ahmed, Altheide, Furedi, Giroux, Glassner, Pain) and did not pursue discourse(s) around the *culture of fear* with nuance or Fisher’s perspective. Although implicitly, more or less, most all of them suggested, that any state attempts to control the public’s fear and improve security regarding migration dynamics, usually leads to more fear and insecurity not less (*a la* Fisher). Explicit comment and theorizing on this particular culture of fear phenomena was rare other than Balch (2016), who provided the most explicit comment somewhat consistent with Fisher’s (2006) definition of culture of fear (dynamic):

There is also evidence that [immigration] enforcement operations can become more ‘zealous’ in the context of a highly charged public debate. These might be measures designed to assuage public fears, but they themselves create a culture of fear within migrant communities (Theodore 2013). (191)

As with the interesting emergent invention and use of *politics of fearism* (above) in a few texts, unfortunately, there was no comparable invention of *culture of fearism*.

Discussion: The Postmodern (Anthropocene) Migration Problematique

Schools [and cultures, in general] seem to be particularly successful in passing down fear (Fisher, 2006). Fear—e.g., of the “evil other” who is deemed responsible for unspeakable trauma against ‘us’—works both at the psychic level and the sociopolitical level, and it structures how the “other” is viewed through unconscious feelings, expectations, anxieties, and defenses. The emotion of fear, just like hatred... *does* something extraordinary....

— Zembylas (2015, 5)
Any good postmodern or postcolonial critique of the affective dimensions of cultural agencies for reproduction of particular affects and emotions, ought to take interest in the state of health of relationships and sociality by which strong democracy depends. Zembylas rightfully points to fear, as psychological and sociopolitical, yet relies in the end on the hegemonic ‘emotion of fear’ discourse\(^{30}\) as the ground for his investigations, which has been the case since he first introduced the term fearism (Zembylas, 2009, 191) from his citing Fisher (2006) as the primary source. Zembylas never pursued the deeper contextual theory and problematizing of the concept of fear (or ‘fear’), and fearism, which Fisher (2006) proposed. However, he and Peter Stearns (among others) have endorsed Fisher and Subba’s (2016a) further study of a philosophy of fearism.\(^{31}\) This omission has led, more or less, to significant misuses of fearism in discourses of other scholars for whom Zembylas (2010) has been a relatively popular secondary source to cite.

A small significant cadre of 13 researchers has been utilizing the term fearism with a similar negative connotation (with exceptions, e.g., Subba 2014)—but in contrast to populist uses, they are often more concerned with a contextualized and potentially efficacious definition and use as central to a critical analytic framework. In Migration, Ethnic and Citizenship Studies (MECS’s) discourses this definition, although sometimes used loosely, has primarily (nearly 80%) centralized around quoting and/or citing Fisher’s (2006, 51) complex definition of fearism.

To date, there are no previous studies on fearism as a concept used in discourses. To study the uses and misuses of fearism in (MECS), requires a referent comparison. In this critical review of MECS’s discourses relating to fearism (2009-16), Fisher’s view of fearism since 1997, situated in his

\(^{30}\) This author has raised this general critique of hegemonic discourse(s), for example, fear is an emotion, going back to the mid-1990s; but more specifically with Zembylas’s use (Fisher 2009).

\(^{31}\) “Those of us working in the domain of feelings, emotions, affect, trauma, healing, conflict and transformation in education, are about to have access to a new body of knowledge and way of thinking that are nothing short of a game-changer. R. Michael Fisher and Desh Subba, the two most eminent fearologists in the world, have written a provocative, impassioned and theoretically sophisticated argument about the (in)visible power of fear and our inability to navigate it productively in modern social and political life.” (Zembylas ii); “This book correctly identifies fear as a major contemporary problem, and uses cross-cultural dialogue not only to improve diagnosis but also to propose some possible remediation. The focus is commendable.” (Stearns ii).
articulation of the evolutionary and global Fear Problem and a higher education agenda of invoking ‘Fear’ Studies (Fisher, 2006), is brought to bear on MECS. Overall, the emphasis of interest in this article is the postmodern shift from researching and writing about fear to fearism, with a suggested importance like, but different from, the shift from terror to terrorism—that is, a shift from the psychological to the sociopolitical spheres.

The post-9/11 era began with an unfortunate conflation, typical in many headlines of the day, with the U.S. declared ‘War on Terrorism’ that became quickly affectively mediated for maximum effect as the ‘War on Terror.’ The affective register being the all intended means of getting people’s attention by the elites control of the discourse. Zembylas (2009) rightfully names the ongoing migration problematic of exclusion and inclusion, on all levels of societies, because of fear’s role in making ‘powerful affective borders’ (191-195). This author would have preferred ‘War on Fearism’ to describe what was going on below the surfaces of spectacle. Perhaps, the post-9/11 traumatic perceptions, thinking, strategies and outcomes would have been very different and less destructive.

The term terrorism has had a long history of articulation (since the French Revolution) compared to the term fearism—the latter, having appeared in the last 25 years; and, taken-up with some significance at the margins of academic discourse (e.g., in MECS) in only the last seven years. This author raises questions about why terrorism and fearism have evolved as concepts so differently, and even now seem involved in contested territories, of which this review study implies. In contrast to terrorism as an analytic concept, fearism is fragile and may easily become stylistic if not disappear as quickly as it arose.

Why use fearism as a concept at all in MECS’s discourses? While challenging explicitly the oppositional insidious discourse of fearism, in contrast to the preferred discourse of humanitarianism or liberalism (for e.g.s), implicitly, the 13 MECS’s scholars are simultaneously operating a hidden

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32 There is likely some others who are involved in this resistance to the use of “fearism” as a juxtapositioning with “terrorism,” although, so far only Colarik (2006) has expressed this overtly, “[T]he term ‘terrorism’ has been hijacked by self-interests seeking an explanation of their respective controls and power base by turning this term into a form of fearism. This book seeks to establish cyber terrorism as it is applied to the global information infrastructure and its use by terrorists for the creation of violence and not just fear “(xiv). This raises the question for this author, when is fear not part of a violent infrastructure of psychic, sociopolitical, cultural and even theological dimensions?
curriculum on two fronts: (a) they are challenging the MECS’s discourse hegemony by calling out a new term and potential theory of fearism in order to explain the problematics of migration better and, (b) they are reproducing the emotions discourse hegemony (and psychology of fear) —the latter, is discussed near the end. Although it may be relatively easy for critical MECS’s scholars, promoting an anti-fearism agenda, to unveil fearism, this author agrees with Zembylas (2010) and a need for more self-critical praxis among MECS’s scholars. He asked, ‘But how [as well] is fearism interrelated with liberal and humanitarian discourses of citizenship...? ‘(31). One ought to expect liquid discourse(s) of fearism able to infiltrate most any discourse, including this article. The worse parts of fearism, as articulated (theorized) by Fisher (2006) involves,

[F]earism, is attempting right now as you and I communicate, to erase (or skew, diss) any memory of this [article’s] contents, and mostly to erase (or skew, diss) the author’s name who wrote it because a serious critique of our current knowledge about fear (‘fear’) and fearism itself is at the foreground of the communication.... any educator who has taught anti-racism education or any anti-oppression topics will pick up on exactly what I am saying here. (51-52)

Rightly, critical MECS’s scholars in this review study are challenging the terrorism discourse hegemony, which, more or less, spins in and around everything to do with migration issues today and MECS in general. Fear(ism), the new up-grade conception, is being called up in a cultural perspective more so than the political discourse agenda(s) of terror(ism). Thus, this article has suggested the meta-context of culture of fear may be a more fruitful context for expanding the definition and meaning of fearism compared to the politics of fear discourses. Yet, the 13 MECS’s scholars’ texts indicate we likely require a cluster of related and synergistic concepts and phenomena and new postmodern scholarship on fear (and ‘fear’) to have an adequate definition of fearism for the early 21st century. The MECS’s discourses suggest we ought to be thinking critically about fearism as very complex, involving (at least) its uses as a contested concept, phenomenon, analytic framework, discourse, rhetoric, ideology, imaginary and matrix.

Equally complex, and intimately related to fearism is fear itself, especially once we leave behind mere individual biopsychological fear. This review study (as did Fisher, 2006) suggests one ought not underplay, though it is easy to do so, the problematic of defining, theorizing and making meaning of fear in the 21st century. Like fearism, it is a contested territory. Fear has
long been recorded as not merely natural (biological) for survival purposes—but when situated in sociocultural, political, traumatic and historical contexts (e.g., fearism), it contributes insidiously to decline in acceptance of diversity (e.g., “the Other”) and tends to sacrifice overall higher qualities of life for basic (in)security needs via organizational hyper-vigilant bordering/defense, mistrust and competition over cooperation—all, leading to unhealthy non-sustainable sociality and democracy, with a general loss of reason, empathy and compassion for others. Fear is also a weapon of power and thus it’s control in all its formations will be sought after by the elites and thus we cannot trust unwittingly what they want to tell us fear is.

Thinking uncritically about only fear without contextualizing it within a complex assemblage of fear(ism) and/or fearism, has violent reductionistic consequences that are epistemologically no longer tenable. Fisher (2012b) documented the Love vs. Fear meta-ethical and motivation discourses across time, geographies, cultures and disciplines. Fear in this largest sense, has great power to bring both good and evil. Our fear management/education at all levels needs serious revision because in the last few centuries (at least) fear seems to have the upper hand—fear has us in its grip (Fisher & Subba, 2016, xxii). The 13 authors in this review study all fall short in this regard (Zembylas somewhat an exception). Typically, they do not provide contextual nuance and critical theory sufficient to define fear (and/or ‘fear’) and give it meaning. They fail to take in the intricate challenges of Fisher’s work. They cite Fisher (2006, 51) as the definition for fearism, which includes both fear and ‘fear’ but they do so as if that definition is value-free and unchallenging of everything we think we already know about fear.

Equally, the 13 authors restrict their contextualization of the fearism problematic in MECS and, arguably, they end up with a reduced notion of the forces involved in migration issues. Fisher’s context for fearism has always been much larger, for example we (most in the West, at least) live in a postmodern world within the Anthropocene era and the great disruptions of climate change and species mass extinctions, all of which is part n’ parcel of increasing human global migration challenges. Fear toxicity levels, associated with trauma, may well become the next human-generated Anthropocene factor analogous to deadly increasing levels of carbon dioxide.33

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33 Although there are a plethora of books on the Anthropocene as meta-context for world problems, Klein (2014) offers a poignant criticism, and in particular her view “If we can shift the cultural context [i.e., market fundamentalism, neoliberalism] even a little, then there will be some breathing room for those sensible re-
With the larger context of fearism in mind, the core message/principle of this article is: *when attention on fear shifts to fearism, that makes a significant difference in the level of complex understanding required by which we can appropriately research, talk, write, and teach about fear(ism) and how to better manage it.*

Future recommendations for uses of *fearism* in MECS:

1. read carefully the original authors (with up-graded conceptualizations) who have coined the term in order to gather contextual nuance as to how it was intended to be used; and, be creative also in, more or less, by-passing the already pre-given definitions and meanings so as to keep a freshness and criticality because fear (‘fear’), fear(ism) and fearism are likely in continually morphing dynamic processes and there is a likely fruitful emergent notion of *culture of fearism* awaiting; in particular, the expansion of a “philosophy of fearism” (e.g. Fisher and Subba, 2016a) brings forward a distinction of a negative fearism (toxic version) in comparison to fearism as positive (*a la* Subba, 2014)

2. read and self-critically reflect on how discourses on fear as an emotion (e.g., Zembylas) have dominated our pre-given understanding of fear, and thus that will impact (restrict) conceptions of fearism and its use as a critical concept; there is a need to be extra cautious when critiquing fearism ‘out there’ in other discourses (e.g., from a critical MECS’s stance) because it is easy to reproduce (perhaps, more subtly) the very fearism one is trying to eliminate (e.g., see Fisher’s (2006, 56) definition of the “culture of fear” dynamic)—see also, the ethical imperative required in our methodologies so as to not add unnecessary fear-mongering ourselves, while critiquing others whom we claim are spreading fearism destructively—thus, to include the study of fearlessness as a dialectical process/theory that might inform MECS’s discourses

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*formist policies that will at least get the atmospheric carbon numbers moving in the right direction [down]” (26). Klein ends her introduction to this book by attempting to address the problem of deniers of climate change in the framework of the problem of fear of facing the truth. She wrote, “But what should we do with this fear that comes from living on a planet that is dying, made less alive everyday? First, accept that it won’t go away.... Next, use it” (28). She offers steps to fear management/education, which is a good direction to go.*
3. The term *fearism* has been used in popular culture to label the situation of someone and/or some organization being excessively operating from a fear-driven modality, the worse of this is that they end up passing it on as contagion through fear-mongering, often for the (conscious or unconscious) purpose to gain power and domination in order to manipulate others’ fear. How effective such a populist use is has not been studied, though Olmstead (2011) puts forward an interesting thesis that there may be curative advantages in changing our language and conceptions of oppression. For example, he asserts “the old racism” charge against haters may be better recalibrated today into a discourse using fear *via* recognizing the “new fearism”—any cross-pollination from popular culture with academic uses may prove fruitful.

4. to consider the contested discourses between fearism and terrorism (e.g., Fisher 2016b; Fisher and Subba 2016b) and consequences of a focus on fearism (and fear), in contrast to a focus on terrorism and its chosen terms of focus, in particular in regard to what Balch has recently offered: ‘[I]f I was pushed I would say that fearism could refer to an obsession among some scholars to criticise/dismiss policy as irrational because it is based on something else irrational—fear.... I like to use the word ‘fear’ instead of ‘security’ in immigration policy studies.... [in contrast to] many authors who prefer security or securitisation—I feel that ‘fear’ is less banal and goes more directly to the emotional source of power that these [e.g., MECS’s] authors are claiming that drives immigration policies.’ (pers. comm., Jan. 6, 2017); ultimately, it may be better to use a new term like *culture of fearism* and/or *culture of terrorism* to balance the cultural dimension with the political dimension in MECS’s discourses.

This critical review of MECS’s discourses using fearism is preliminary. Its main limitation is derivative from being initial and incomplete, as well,

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34 Olmstead (2011) wrote, “Hate is so last century; it has been replaced by fear.... [T]he same person who is certain they’re no hater [despite being charged, for e.g., they are a “racist” and hater] might be willing to admit they’re afraid. It’s a little humbling, but at least it doesn’t make you a bad person. And those who acknowledge that fear is driving them [e.g., into racist thoughts and behaviors] might start to peer over the veil of unreason to make less fevered and more rational choices.” Segal (1984), a psychotherapist, in a similar ethical humanist vein, claimed, “We are not bad, we are frightened” (88).
only using “fearism” as the centralizing concept to bring together the articles that qualified. A larger study could examine “fear” and all its relative terms and how they are being used in MECS. That, together with the current study, would provide a better picture of MECS’s discourses in relation to fear(ism). As well, this author has many hypotheses that could be brought forth from the current review but they would create a very long article beyond the scope of this venue. The intention of this first article is to bring some improvements in using fearism but also to put data and issues on the MECS’s table for further dialogue, hypothetical speculation, and potential research collaborations.

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