

Public Philosophy: Revitalizing Philosophy as a Civic Discipline

Report to the Kettering Foundation

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PRAXIS-EDU: consulting on public engagement and sustainability

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Philosophy has followed most other academic disciplines in seeking to make both its public voice and public value clearer and more explicit. Arguably philosophy has greater resources to draw on, given the deep civic roots of the discipline. In recent years, the American Philosophical Association formed a committee on public philosophy, following most other U.S. professional disciplinary associations in forming a committee intended to support and develop the public dimensions of the respective discipline. More recently, a group of philosophers founded the Public Philosophy Network (PPN), an association dedicated to the promotion of publicly engaged philosophical research, social action projects, and teaching.

As co-founder and co-director of the Public Philosophy Network, I have facilitated a series of in-person and on-line discussions that aim to foster greater reflection on public philosophy and an understanding of steps necessary to encourage and support publicly engaged philosophical research, projects, and teaching. We also provide a forum for philosophers to document their work in public philosophy and find partners for their work.

As part of our role in fostering discussion and reflection on public philosophy, we focus on the following three questions:

- How has the discipline of philosophy experienced a disconnection from public life and narrowing of its public role? How does public philosophy fit into the larger emergence of public forms of scholarship across disciplines?
- What are the core characteristics of public philosophy? How does public philosophy differ from applied philosophy, scholar-activism, and other more familiar approaches?
- What does publicly engaged philosophy have to contribute to addressing the public dimensions of complex public issues?

In this document I propose five theses intended to provoke further reflection and discussion, followed by two practical directives. Although I have learned from, and cite, discussions that have taken place in various forums, the theses argued here are my own and are intended to invite further deliberation and debate. The first four theses are more normative about the practice of publicly or civically engaged philosophy; the last three deal with more strategic and practical issues that must be addressed if we are to support these norms of public philosophy.

Thesis 1: Public philosophy should be transformative

Thesis 2: Public Philosophers should not be understood as “experts”

Thesis 3: Public Philosophy demands collaborative and interdisciplinary work

Thesis 4: Public Philosophers must be committed to assessing their work and being accountable to their public partners

Thesis 5: Public philosophy demands that we work to make philosophy more inclusive and representative of various publics

Practical Directive 1: We must make changes to both undergraduate and graduate philosophy curricula to encourage and support publicly engaged philosophy

Practical Directive 2: There is a need for infrastructural organizations and professional recognition to foster and support engaged philosophical work

These claims are developed in this document as *theses* intended to provoke further reflection, discussion and action in public philosophy, and are followed by some questions for discussion.

Recommendations and Next Steps: The Public Philosophy Network will work out steps for the dissemination and discussion of this document as a way of helping philosophers rediscover philosophy's civic roots and reinvent philosophy as a contemporary civic discipline. Further, our aim is to help non-philosophers recognize the promise of philosophy as a resource that might help them further various civic aims and projects. To that end, we will circulate this document to community based practitioners that are part of our network as well as to the members of the Kettering Workshop on the Civic Disciplines that took place in May 2012. The Public Philosophy Network will utilize its on-line forums and host a structured discussion at The Public Philosophy Network's conference at Emory University and at a satellite session held at The Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy; both conferences will be held in March 2013. We also have plans to publish interviews with individuals and collaborative teams who best evince the principles of public philosophy outlined in this document, as we believe that the best way to encourage and support the practice of public philosophy is to provide models for others. Further, those who practice public philosophy still struggle for recognition within the discipline, and it is important that we recognize and value their work.

WHAT IS PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY?

What are the core characteristics of public philosophy? Does public philosophy differ from applied philosophy, scholar-activism, and other more familiar approaches, and if so, how?

The Public Philosophy Network welcomes anyone who identifies as having an interest in public philosophy, however they might define it. But the PPN Advisory Board nevertheless thinks it important that we foster further discussion and reflection on the nature of public philosophy so that we can be clear about just what it is that we want to support and promote.

The Public Philosophy Network chose “public philosophy” to mirror the language used by the American Philosophical Association and other professional disciplinary associations to denote publicly engaged and/or explicitly publicly relevant scholarship, action, and teaching. Most all disciplinary organizations have used the word “public” as a descriptor of this work, e.g., there exists committees on public history, public sociology, and so forth.

But this is by no means the only terminology that we might use, and there are some concerns and misconceptions that have arisen that we might try to clear away (although members may want to continue to debate some of these claims):

1. **Public philosophy should not be confused with mere publicity or celebrity.** Most people who do publicly engaged philosophical work are not well known and do not seek high profile public positions, but rather work within the contexts of one or more communities to which they belong or to which they have been invited to support. We must acknowledge that there are various publics and public scales, and that the point is not publicity but publicly effective philosophical work. If public philosophy aims to understand and strengthen civic culture, then such an aim is not often fulfilled by speaking to large audiences but by working *with* people in various settings and contexts.¹
2. **Some members worry about the word “public” and its relationship to philosophy/philosophers.** The concern is that we remember that philosophers are themselves members of various publics. In a workshop on public philosophy held at Morgan State University, one department member described the concern as follows: “My work as philosopher in the community is not that of someone coming from academy to the community; I am already a member of the community. I am not articulating the Truth, but am part of a conversation.”
3. **Public philosophy should not be reduced to a model of service learning, given that service learning models often work from a paradigm of simple application of theory to practice.** Discussions that we have fostered within the Public Philosophy Network question such simple conceptualizations and cannot be reduced to service learning, and certainly not to a specific model of service learning that oversimplifies the complexities of the theory/practice relation.

Some Conceptions of Publicly Engaged Philosophy

Meagher and Feder (2010) teased out three competing conceptions of public philosophy that emerged in our first facilitated discussion on the topic and that continue to be at play:

- Philosophy is itself a public good
- Public philosophy is intentional and aims at public benefit
- Public philosophy identifies and resists oppression

These conceptions overlap, but there are also tensions between them. The first conception seems to work from the premise that the problem is that the public misunderstands or ignores philosophy and fails to understand its benefit, and the solution is to make philosophy more publicly visible and educate the public about its value. On this view, the discipline of philosophy remains unchanged except that its work is taken into (or brought back into) public view. The second conception distinguishes particular types of philosophical work as “public philosophy,” namely, those philosophical inquiries and practices that are intentional in aiming at public benefit and make those benefits explicit and clear. On this view, at least some practices of philosophy would not count as “public philosophy.” The third conception defines what those public benefits should be.

Given that philosophy is not alone in trying to think about how it might become more public, we might borrow from the definition of public scholarship by Cantor and Lavine (2006). They identify its characteristics as follows:

1. *Connects directly to work with specific public groups in specific contexts*
2. *Arises from faculty’s field of knowledge*
3. *Involved cohesive (but varied) outputs*
4. *Jointly planned with public partners*
5. *Integrates discovery and learning*

If we were to apply this definition of public scholarship to philosophy, then the first conception of public philosophy as any philosophy simply done in public or promoted in public would be ruled out. But does that mean that we must insist that philosophers always seek out and work with specific public partners, as points (2) and (4) suggest? Such partnership work might be extremely valuable, as, for example, when a philosopher works with an urban neighborhood organization to facilitate a discussion on concepts of community or on racism. But there may be times when the types of interventions that philosophers can best make would require engaging in critique of organizations rather than partnering with them.

Some types of publicly engaged scholarship and writing with which PPN members have engaged (and want to continue to do) is critical reflective work that has been useful to various publics, but might not always be planned or even anticipated in advance. But when philosophers engage in public action (as opposed to research/writing) with groups to which they do not already belong, there is a moral imperative to engage those groups in the planning process.

It is often useful to think critically about the various metaphors used to describe the role of the philosopher in public life, as a way of thinking about how we as philosophers want to understand our role, as well as how philosophers want to communicate their roles to various public constituencies.

In a discussion at Morgan State University, we generated a list of metaphors commonly used and those we might invent to help us think about our roles as public philosophers.

Metaphors on the role of the philosopher in public life:

- Philosopher as expert
- Philosopher as gadfly/critic (Socrates)

- Philosopher as public liaison officer (Dewey)
- Philosopher as deliberator, e.g., philosophy offers publicly useful skills
- Philosopher as citizen
- Philosopher as streetwalker, alternative tour guide—connects the stranger to the city, is a sort of stranger him or herself, as provide alternative tours, but is affected by the city while still having both critical distance and taking joy in the city

I would argue that all of the metaphors have some use and value with the exception of the first (see thesis statement 2 below).

What is the Value of Public Philosophy?

PPN member Bob Kirkman (2011) posted the following answer to this question, based on a discussion that we had at the PPN first meeting in Washington, DC, October 7, 2011:

1. **Facilitation.** *Philosophical training leaves us uniquely qualified to identify assumptions, worldviews, values held by participants in a discussion. From this, we can identify with precision points of convergence and divergence. We can elucidate assumptions, help to clarify values; we can aid translation across divergent worldviews; we can inform and enrich moral imagination.*
2. **Critique.** *Philosophical training also leaves us uniquely qualified to identify contradictions and tensions in prevailing views, ways in which current systems and institutions and ways of living rest on faulty assumptions and fall short of their own ideals. This critique can be subtle or radical but, in either case, it behooves philosophers to become skilled in communication, so even radical critique can go down more easily.*
3. **Vision.** *Philosophers are not uniquely qualified to contribute to creative problem solving, but we do have resources for synthesis, for putting together alternative possibilities for systems and institutions that are more coherent, that live up to their own ideals. In the pragmatic spirit of open deliberation, it seems to me especially important that such visions not be offered as take-it-or-leave-it dogma, but as hypotheses for consideration and experimentation.—source: (Kirkman 2011)*

In a workshop on public philosophy at Morgan State, colleagues identified the value/contribution of philosophy to public life as follows:

- Clarifies concepts
- Produces concepts and arguments, especially as provide foundation for social movements
- Organizes diverse voices
- Teaches and facilitates thinking and deliberation
- Offers critique

Summary: Public Philosophy and its Value

In summary, there are multiple practices that we might understand as “public philosophy,” and each brings something valuable to the public domain. First, as Kirkman notes, philosophers can be valuable facilitators who encourage public discussion and deliberation. But few philosophers actually do this work, and there are many obstacles to doing so, both internal and external to philosophy. Among those reasons for the fact that philosophy has been largely discredited as a publicly valuable practice due to the rise of positivism (and the dismissal of philosophy as “just theory,” the popular view in U.S. society that views about values are private rather than public

matters (see Lippmann 1955, 78-79). But philosophers have themselves retreated from the public domain, increasingly turning inward and using language that is inaccessible to a wider public (see McCumber 2001) Second, philosophers have the ability to identify and critique assumptions and show contradictions. But it is not often easy to enact these practices in public. Lastly, it is a mistake to think of the public role of philosophers as only critical in nature. As the philosophers at Morgan State University note, philosophy also provides tools to clarify concepts and organize diverse voices. And as Kirkman notes, there is also a reconstructive dimension to philosophy. Philosophers have never only been critics, but also utopian thinkers—and that need not be placeless or impractical. In our plenary discussion at our inaugural PPN conference in October 2011, Judith Green notes that we need not work only from hypotheticals. Other discussants also noted the importance of working in partnership with those who have good descriptions of problems and situations as well as good data. Of course, other discussants noted that part of the role of the philosopher is to question what constitutes “good descriptions” and “good data,” but there was some consensus on the need for public philosophers to work from real situations and that usually requires some empirical evidence.

While the points above concerning the definition and value of public philosophy can (and should) continue to be discussed, I present the remainder of my thoughts on public philosophy in terms of theses that aim to provoke further thought, discussion...and public philosophical practice.

5 THESES TO PROVOKE DISCUSSION, REFLECTION, AND BETTER PRACTICES IN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY

Thesis 1: Public philosophy should be transformative

There is little question that public exposure to philosophy can be a good. At least since Plato philosophers have made such claims. In the twentieth century U.S. context, Walter Lippmann argued for the need for philosophers to work both in and outside the academy, arguing that philosophers provide necessary images for the development of moral and political character and a conception of the public good that transcends private interests (Lippmann 1955, 135). Similarly, John Dewey argued that the philosopher’s task is to thematize values implicit in public life and enable persons to move beyond either/or thinking to see multiple possibilities (1963, pp. 4-10). Further, as noted above, various recent discussions have articulated the value of philosophy in enabling people to become better critical thinkers and communicators as well as better able to envision better options. So, in this sense, all philosophy has the promise of having a public value, and it should be taught in universities and schools and it merits exposure through blogs and other media. Linda Martín Alcoff refers to this view of the publicly engaged philosopher as the “popularizer model” (2002, 528-530). And she argues that popularized philosophy need not sacrifice nuance and rigor to be effective, citing the example of Martha Nussbaum’s book *Cultivating Humanity*.

But with Alcoff, I want to argue against both the popularizer model and the Socratic gadfly or critic as the primary or best way to do publicly engaged work. These views assume that philosophy need not transform itself in anyway and suggests that the goal of public philosophy is to simply bring the public good to the public. As Alcoff notes, the popularizer model still assumes that the intellectual work is done outside of public life and then delivered to some public, and thus tends to highlight a divide between the philosopher and her public. But as Alcoff argues, “the public arena is a space where intellectual work is done, where problems emerge to be addressed, and where knowledge and

experience are gained that can address a variety of issues...Furthermore, one can receive vital feedback concerning one's positions, which can suggest needed modifications" (2002, 530). Alcoff further distinguishes this type of work from the critic, not because criticism is unimportant, but because it too still assumes a distance from the public.

Public philosophy should be transformative; both philosophy and its public(s) should be transformed through their interactions with one another. In other words, "public philosophy" is not simply a matter of doing philosophy in public. A truly public philosophy is one that demands that the philosopher both become a student of community knowledge and reflect on his or her public engagement, recognizing that philosophy can benefit at as much from public contact as can the public benefit from contact with philosophy. The publicly engaged philosopher does not assume that he or she knows the questions in advance, but draws on his or her experiences in the community to develop and frame questions. Further, publicly engaged philosophy demands accountability on the part of the philosopher to his or her publics—understanding that philosophers are themselves members of those publics (see thesis 4).

Discussants at the Public Philosophy founding meeting noted that any discussion of "public philosophy" necessitates that we think about what we mean by "public," noting that philosophy can transform and even bring publics into being through discourse and various practices. Some participants tended to work from the Deweyan idea that publics emerge when a sufficiently large group of persons are indirectly affected by a particular social transaction and come together out of their common interest in solving the problem. Social movements (and the philosophers who work with them) often invoke this sense of "public." On the other hand, those philosophers who are more directly engaged with public policy often define "public" in terms of the institutionalization of modes of public discourse (Meagher and Feder 2010).

The model of publicly engaged philosophy as transformative contrasts with the idea of the intellectuals who simply communicate their work to broader, non-academic publics or simply applies their work to various public problems. The publicly engaged philosopher who aims for transformation is enmeshed as an intellectual in public life.

Can you provide particularly good models of publicly engaged philosophy that was transformative? Or counter-examples of other models of publicly engaged philosophy that seem equally or more important for our civic lives?

Thesis 2: Public Philosophers should not be understood as "experts"

At a time when philosophers often feel underappreciated and largely discredited by the public, it is tempting for philosophers to try to reassert themselves into various public domains by claiming to be experts in some subfield or another. For in our technocratic age where positivism still reigns supreme, credentialed, authoritative claims to knowledge tend to hold the greatest influence. Yet part of the role of the philosopher is to question the encroachment of science and positivistic understandings of truth into domains where it should have no or a limited role. In other words, philosophers should resist the label of "expert," given its technocratic valence, as public philosophy promises to provide an antidote to technocratic thinking. Indeed, the philosophers' public role should in part consist in encouraging public questioning of all authority, and such cannot be done if we claim expert authority ourselves.

Further, the “expert” rarely questions his or her position of authority, but we call on public philosophers to do just that, to reflect critically on their roles within various publics. Philosophers with full-time academic positions are privileged with both secure work and sufficient leisure to have time to think. Those who have such privilege must recognize it as such, so as not to abuse it but also to wield it honorably.

In contrast to the “expert” who applies her or her knowledge and thus works from an instrumental mode of reasoning and a simplistic understanding of the relationship between theory and practice, public philosophers should understand their work as “public work,” (Boyte and Kari 1996) that is co-built in dialogue with various public constituents.

Whereas the “expert” makes a claim to neutrality and objectivity, the public philosopher engages in a critique of these terms. As a collaborator (see thesis 2), the public philosopher is a co-builder of knowledge with various public constituencies of which we are a part. Public philosophers should recognize the value of community-based knowledge. As both philosophers and members of various publics, we have a stake in the outcome of discussion and deliberation and we must be honest about that fact.

The “expert” often claims to know the answers, whereas philosophers claim to ask the right sorts of questions. The philosopher also may provide alternative visions of the possible. But the philosopher must refuse the role of posing single right answers to complex problems. Rather, it is our job to expose public problems as wicked problems. “A wicked problem is a form of social or cultural problem that is difficult to solve because of incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements” (Austin Center for Design, 2012). Most contemporary civic problems, e.g., poverty, climate change, sustainability, global health and wellness are examples of wicked problems. But although this is fairly new terminology that comes to us from organizational and planning theory, philosophers have arguably always dealt with wicked problems—making inquiries into the big questions such as justice that others avoided, and recognizing that part of the problem is that we often do not know how to pose the problem. Philosophers must think with various public constituents to expose the facets of wicked problems and to move beyond dichotomous thinking to more creative and complex solutions.

Lastly, the expert claims an elite status, but that is a counterproductive claim for the public philosopher. As then Executive Director David Schrader said in an interview, “we live with the distorted ghost of Socrates. We have two models of Socrates, one in which he is in the marketplace, himself a part of the public. But the second model is the Socrates who knows better than the public . . . and this is the ghost that plagues us. Philosophers often fail to think of themselves as part of the public” (2011). Harry Boyte (2009) argues that the cult of the expert threatens civic agency by undermining the role of the public in favor of an elite group. If publicly engaged philosophers aim to develop civic agency and a more robust civil society, then we should not call ourselves experts.

If not “experts,” then what might public philosophers call themselves? Harry Boyte suggests that all public scholars should think of themselves as “resources for action,” and this might be appropriate. Are their fields of engagement where the term “expert” is appropriate?

Thesis 3: Public Philosophy demands collaborative and interdisciplinary work

Most public philosophy work demands that philosophers work collaboratively with others, both across academic disciplines and across academic-community divides. There are a number of reasons for this: first, if we are working on problems in which members of one or more publics has a stake, then our work cannot be the exclusive domain of philosophers. Particularly in cases where philosophers are working on issues concerning democracy, civil society, and participation, it is critically important that the philosophical practices incorporate participatory and democratic ideals (cf. Bäckstrand 2003 on civic science, 28). Relatedly, if we agree with the thesis that public philosophy should be transformational, then the public philosopher must be open to dialogue with, and learning from, others. Secondly, if we agree that many problems in the civic domain are “wicked problems,” that is problems that are large and ill-defined, involved or affect large numbers of people, and are interdependent on other problems (“Poverty is linked with education, nutrition with poverty, the economy with nutrition, and so on” (Kolko 2009, chapter 3), the work requires collaboration with others and interdisciplinary work. Certain kinds of problems can’t be managed unless the public acts—and keeps on acting. A public that can act effectively is needed most when communities face ... “wicked” problems (Kettering 2006, 6). Because of the interdependence of people and of social problems, those who practice public philosophy require strategies that entail a collaborative approach that facilitates discussion on deliberation on both how to define the problem in a way that makes sense to all stakeholders and then how to work together to find meaningful solutions. As Gilad Tanay from Academics Against Poverty noted at the 2011 Advancing Public Philosophy plenary session, “The real world doesn’t recognize disciplinary boundaries. If you want to come into the public debate as philosophers, you better know and understand the situation and what the political possibilities are.” As Henry Shue argues, “We’ve got to give arguments that are embedded in institutional and political contexts” (2011).

Andrew Light replied to Tanay that public policy domains do recognize disciplines, but philosophy is not one that is recognized as having import. Light argued that if philosophers are to be successful in public policy domains, they need to educate themselves on the issue(s) on which they want to work. They will discover, he argued, that as philosophers that they bring unique concepts and approaches to the table, but that our lead-in to the discussion cannot be a pronouncement of our unique contributions as philosophers but rather our substantive knowledge of the issues. Paul Thompson, a public philosopher who works in agricultural ethics and food science, said that he has found that his colleagues in other disciplines recognize the value of the contribution of philosophy as an outcome of his engagement with them. He reported that both community-based practitioners and academics from other disciplines report that they found a lot of philosophical content to be really useful, e.g., basic concepts of normativity in ethics, issues about objectivity.

In a panel presented by a collaborative, interdisciplinary team at Michigan State in which they have developed an experiential learning project on an organic farm at MSU that they set-up as a community of care, dealing with collaboration across disciplines by bringing people together who had competing values around management of pigs and land, the panelists discussed the qualities necessary for collaboration: integrity, and the ability to listen well (Goralnik 2011). Relatedly, those who want to work in public policy need to learn the language of their colleagues in other disciplines and respect community-based wisdom.

What are the most important skills, qualities, knowledges and ethical commitments for the publicly engaged philosopher?

Thesis 4: Public Philosophers must be committed to assessing their work and being accountable to their public partners

Public philosophical work may take many forms, and not all of it necessarily involves clear partnerships with others. But if we understand publicly engaged philosophy as the practice of philosophy with the intent of some public or civic good, then publicly engaged philosophers should take responsibility for their work and take public criticisms and evaluation seriously. And in situations where public partners are involved, it is essential that philosophers commit to an assessment of their work that involves those partners (see discussion of Cantor and Levine above).

The Public Philosophy Network might consider adopting the core values of Imagining America's Assessing the Practices of Public Scholarship (APPS) group, quoted below:

- **COLLABORATION** – Integrated assessment engages community- and university-based stakeholders in defining meaningful outcomes and indicators of success, long before the assessment itself begins, and often in implementing the evaluation activity itself. Integrated assessment is grounded in a shared understanding of interrelated goals.
- **RECIPROCITY** – Integrated assessment is useful to both community- and university-based stakeholders. It goes back to all the stakeholders involved; it invites reflection, feedback, and critique.
- **GENERATIVITY** – Integrated assessment feeds the project, program, or course at hand. At the same time, it looks beyond the semester or project unit and invites stakeholders to evaluate the overall, long-term relationships at the heart of community-based education and public scholarship. Integrated assessment is part of an ongoing and dynamic process of programmatic, institutional, community, and/or regional development.
- **RIGOR** – Integrated assessment utilizes sound evaluation methodologies and practices.
- **PRACTICABILITY** – Integrated assessment activities are proportionate to the project and resources available. (Imagining America 2010).

How do we assess the benefits to the community of publicly engaged philosophical work? And who should do the assessment? Are there ways in which Imagining America's assessment values need to be revised for publicly engaged philosophers?

Thesis 5: Public philosophy demands that we work to make philosophy more inclusive and representative of various publics

If public philosophical practices are to gain credibility with various publics, then it stands to reason that philosophy needs to become more inclusive and representative of those publics. Within academe, more than 80% of full-time positions in philosophy are held by men, compared with 60% in

academe overall (Wilson 2013). Moreover, there is much evidence to suggest that women of all races and men of color disappear from the tenure track or have greater difficulty obtaining tenure track jobs at disproportionately high rates. Linda Martín Alcoff argues that one reason for this is that persons from underrepresented groups are more likely to feel an obligation to give back to their communities and may engage in public scholarship and social practice even though it is less likely to be evaluated positively by tenure and promotion boards (2002, 521).

So the irony is that while publicly engaged philosophy demands that we be more diverse, those who do publicly engaged work are more likely than others to be pushed out of the discipline if not the academy altogether.

The practice of public philosophy demands that its practitioners be intellectually and demographically diversity if we are to connect effectively to various publics.

Might the promotion and support of publicly engaged philosophical work itself assist in the diversification of the profession? In what senses is the diversification of the discipline of philosophy necessary if we are to gain credibility in various public realms?

Practical Directives

Directive I: We must make changes to both undergraduate and graduate philosophy curricula to encourage and support publicly engaged philosophy

Undergraduates are almost always introduced to Socrates in their first philosophy courses and are often empowered by the idea of Socrates as a gadfly in the marketplace who speaks truth to power. Yet little philosophical education beyond the introduction of Socrates continues along this model. If we agree on the general value of philosophy as providing both the foundational ideas and values necessary for civic engagement as well as the skills necessary for civic discussion and deliberation, then we would do well to find ways to continue to model philosophy in various public domains. Most philosophy departments have lagged behind their colleagues in political science and elsewhere in developing community-based learning programs and democratized models of teaching philosophy that enact civic values in the classroom itself. Philosophers have been understandably reluctant to adopt simple methods of service learning that pretend knowledge is simply applied within the community or that fail to heed ethical imperatives in the community, but there are nonetheless ample opportunities for community-based learning that integrates education in the history and methodology of philosophy with community-based partners and problems.

Philosophical training often focuses more on learning to speak and write well than on learning to listen. But we have a resource, in that we usually teach students how to charitably interpret texts; we can extend that to our listening to others.

Such changes in undergraduate education demands that philosophers abandon the prejudices that some hold against collaborative and community-based work as lacking rigor. There are models of academically demanding programs that enact the values outlined here. At Cortland State, for example, all philosophy majors major in social philosophy, a program that requires a rigorous course sequence in the history of philosophy as well as courses in logic and ethics, but also requires

courses that connect philosophy to contemporary social and political issues. Students engage in community-based learning, and the faculty model collaborative work through the Community and Faculty Fellows program launched in their Center for Ethics, Peace, and Social Justice. At Michigan State University, philosophy faculty have been involved in an innovative interdisciplinary program involving environmental science and agriculture as students from various majors work to raise pigs and discuss the ethics of animal care (Barrett 2011).

At the graduate level, there are also a number of programs that are working to educate their students to prepare them as public philosophers—whether they ultimately work within academe or outside it. American University, for example, offers three master’s degrees—one in the history of philosophy, one in Philosophy and Social Policy, and the third in Ethics, Peace and Global Affairs. The programs are not mutually exclusive; some courses overlap and students and faculty in all three programs interact and learn from one another. Students in the latter two programs complete internships. The University of North Texas offers a doctoral program in environmental philosophy that offers the opportunity to work at a field station in Chile and on a variety of interdisciplinary and collaborative projects. Doctoral students enrolled in the philosophy program at Penn State are encouraged to work on collaborative, interdisciplinary projects through the Rock Ethics Institute. Likewise, the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy at George Mason University offers its students a number of ways to become involved in public philosophy projects.

I invite readers to submit profiles of excellent courses, programs, and projects involving students in public philosophy to publicpn@gmail.com for review and possible inclusion on the Public Philosophy Network’s website and related publications.

Directive 2: There is a need for infrastructural organizations and professional recognition to foster and support engaged philosophical work

Arguably the shift of the American university model from the British liberal arts emphasis to a German model that held up positivist science as the pinnacle of research was a primary cause for the destruction of academic disciplines as “civic,” that is, as focused on the public good (see Snyder 2000, 8). McCarthyism also had an impact on philosophy, purging socially engaged philosophers while promoting those who took a positivistic approach (McCumber, 2001). While one might think that philosophy would not struggle so much with the positivist model, the fact is that it affects how philosophical research is evaluated. I have argued elsewhere that a third reason for the retreat of philosophy from a civic mission has been the loss of place, the sense that intellectual work must be done from no place (Meagher 2012). As Gregory Jay argues, “Going local is not always respected or valued by our disciplinary structures of assessment. Faculty are trained to have a primary affiliation with and loyalty to their discipline...They do not limit their focus to a locale, which would be seen as ‘provincial’” (2012, 58).

The result is that those who practice public philosophy are likely to suffer when evaluated by traditional institutional norms—and as noted in thesis 6, this likely also has an impact on the lack of diversity within the profession. Alcott argues that while “not every instance of work in the public sphere will exemplify intellectual rigor and integrity...its intellectual rigor and value can be judged just as we judge the articles written in scholarly journals” (Alcott 2002, 522). Likewise Cantor and Lavine argue that we can and should develop standards by which publicly engaged work can be judged (

Participants in all discussions on publicly engaged intellectuals in which I have participated worry about the difficulties that exist in integrating community engagement and formal research. But Alcoff (2002) argues that the distinction is based on a false epistemological claim that suggests that only research done away from the public realm is real research. Nevertheless, there remains the practical difficulty that scholars still face evaluators who cleave to this distinction. As a result, work must be done within the academy to transform evaluative strategies so that publicly engaged intellectual work “counts.” The consortium **Imagining America** has taken the lead in making this transformation within the humanities, although most all professional disciplinary associations including the American Philosophical Association have formed committees on public scholarship or engagement.

The Public Philosophy Network was founded in part to provide a space for publicly engaged philosophers to work together to address barriers within the academy to their work. At present, we are developing two strategies to address these issues: a) broadening our understanding of what constitutes formal research and developing criteria by which we can evaluate and judge publicly engaged scholarship that has outputs other than publication in a formal academic journal, and b) providing outlets for refereed publication for publicly engaged scholars that would be recognized under the usual tenure and promotion review practices.

What other strategies should the Public Philosophy Network take in this regard? Are there other associations or infrastructure groups working on these efforts that have not been noted here?

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Additional Resources

Price, Clement. "An Academic Life in the Public Sphere." *Chronicle of Higher Education*. April 8, 2002. <http://chronicle.com/article/An-Academic-Life-in-the-Public/46002/>

Lachs, J. "Can Philosophy Still Produce Public Intellectuals?" *Philosophy Now*, http://philosophynow.org/issues/75/Can_Philosophy_Still_Produce_Public_Intellectuals

The Kettering Foundation has excellent articles about engaged/public scholarship, with particular focus on the role of public scholarship in enhancing civic engagement and fostering democracy. Recommended: Ronan, Bernie. "The Civic Spectrum: How Students Become Engaged." <http://kettering.org>

See the Imagining America reports at: <http://imaginingamerica.org/publications/reports-essays/> I particularly recommend: Cynthia Koch, "Making Value Visible: Excellence in Campus-Community Partnerships in the Arts, Humanities, and Design," especially pp. 15-24; Ellison J. and T. K. Eatman, "Scholarship in Public: Knowledge Creation and Tenure Policy in the Engaged University," Syracuse, NY: Imagining America. especially pp. 5-21.

¹ Cf. Boyte, Harry et al, 2012. "Summer Institute of Civic Studies—Framing Statement." Tufts University
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