LESSON 01

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNICATION

Etymology
The word ‘communicate’ has its root in the Latin word communicate, ‘to share’ international communication, then, is about sharing knowledge, ideas and beliefs among the various people of the world, and therefore it can be contributing factor in resolving global conflict and promoting mutual understanding among nations.

Introduction
As the new millennium dawned, global television tracked the rise of the sun across the world, with image broadcast live via 300 satellite channels to audiences in each of the world’s 24 time zones. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, millions of people can communicate with each other in real time, across national boundaries and time zones, through voice, text, and pictures, and, increasingly, a combination of all three. In a digitally global, the flow of data across borders has grown exponentially, boosting international commerce, more and more of which is being conducted through new technologies.

Definitions
• ‘International communication means that communication which accrues among the nations’
• ‘communication which occurs across international borders’
• ‘a.k.a. trans border or transnational communication’

Scope of IC
International communication has been traditionally concerned with government-to-government information exchanges, in which a few powerful states dictated the communication agenda. Advances in communication and information technologies in the late twentieth century have greatly enhanced the scope of international communication going beyond government-to-government and including business-to-business and people-to-people interaction at a global level and at speeds unimaginable even a decade ago. In the contemporary world international communication ‘encompasses political, economic, social, cultural and military concerns’. International communication studies have broadened to include cultural and media studies all these studies which are mentioned in this table.

Communication and empire
Communication has always been critical to the establishment and maintenance of power over distance. Form the Persian, Greek and Roman empires to the British, sufficient network of communication were essential for the imposition of imperial authority, as well as for the international trade and commerce on which they were based. Indeed, the extant of the efficiency of communication. Communications networks and technologies were key to the mechanics of distributed government, military campaigns and trade.

Writing system in empires
While many rulers, including the Greek polis, used inscription for public information, writing become more flexible and efficient means of conveying information over long distances: Rome, Persia and Great khan of China all utilized writing in system of information gathering and dispersal, creating wide ranging official postal and dispatch system. Mughal period in Indian history, the waqi’a-nawis were employed by the king to apprise them of the progress in the empire. Both horseman and dispatch runner transmitted news and reports.
Importance of trade and culture
The technologies of international communication and globalization may be contemporary phenomena but trade and cultural interchanges have existed for more than two millennia between the Greco-Roman world with Arabia, India and China. Information and ideas were communicated across countries, as shown by the spread of Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam.

Printing press and Languages
By the eighteenth century, paper introduced from China as a medium of the communication and began to replace the parchment in the Islamic world and spread to medieval Europe. In the fifteen century developed the printing press and the first printing press was opened in Goa in 1857, in the sixteenth century, the printing press were turning out thousand of copies of books in all the major European languages. The new languages, especially Portuguese, Spanish, English and French, become the main vehicle of communication for the European colonial power in many parts of the world.

Industrial revolution and transport
The industrial revolution in Western Europe, founded on the profits of the growing international commerce encouraged by colonization, gave a huge stimulus to the internationalization of communication. With the innovation in transport of railways and steamship, international links were being established that accelerated the growth of European trade and consolidated colonial empire.

The growth of the telegraph
The second half of the nineteenth century saw an expanding system of imperial communication made possible by the electric telegraph. Invented by Samuel mores in 1837, the telegraph enabled the rapid transmission of information, as well as ensuring secrecy and code protection. The business community was the first to make use of this new technology. The speed and reliability of telegraph were seen to offer opportunities for profit and international expansion. The rapid development of the telegraph was a crucial feature in the unification of the British Empire. The first commercial telegraph link set up in Britain in 1838, by 1851 a public telegraph service, including a telegraphic money order system, had been introduced. By the end of the century, as a result of the cable connections, the telegraph allowed the colonial office and the India office to communicate directly with the empire within minutes when, previously, it had taken months for post to come via sea.

The first underwater telegraph cable which linked Britain and France become operational in 1851 and the first transatlantic cable, connecting Britain and the USA, in 1866. Between 1851 and 1868, underwater networks were laid down across the north Atlantic, the Mediterranean, Indian ocean and the Persian gulf to regulate the growing internationalization of information, the international Telegraph Union was founded in 1865 with 22 members, all European except Persia, representing, the first international institution of the modern era and the first organization for the international regulation of a technical network. The outcomes of the two imperial wars the Spanish-American war and the Boer war (1899-1902) strengthened the European and US positions in the world and led to a rapid expansion in world trade that demand immediate and vastly improved communication links.

Invention of telephone
The Bell Telephone Company, established by the inventor of telephony Alexander Graham Bell in 1877, Telephone production increased in the US. The first international telephone made
between Paris and Brussels in 1887. At the end of the nineteenth century the USA had the largest number of telephones, due largely to the fact that they were manufactured there.

The era of news agencies
The newspaper industry played an important role in the development of international communication and increases the demand of news. The establishment of the news agencies was the most important development in the newspaper industry of the nineteenth century altering the process of news dissemination, nationally and internationally. The francs havas agency was founded in 1835, the German agency wolf in 1849, and the British Reuters in 1851. The US agency, Associated press (AP) in 1848, but only the three European agencies began as international ones; Not until the turn of the century did an American agency move in this direction.

These three European agencies, all which were subsidized by their respective governments, controlled information marketed in Europe and were looking beyond the continent to expand their operation.
LESSON 02

POPULAR MEDIA AND COLD WAR PROPAGANDA

Advent of the popular media
In this lesson we discuss the three major popular media
Newspaper industry
Film industry
Music industry
Advertising agencies

Newspaper industry
The expansion of printing presses and the internationalization of news agencies contributing factor in the growth of a worldwide newspaper industry. The time of India was founded in 1838 which southeast Asia’s premier newspaper advance in the printing technology meant that newspaper in non European languages could also be printed and distributed. By 1870 more than 140 newspapers were being printed in Indian languages.

Film industry
The internationalization of a promising mass culture, however, began with the film industry. Following the first screening in Paris and Berlin in 1895. By the first world war, the European market was dominated by the firm path’ founded in 1907 in France, whose distribution bureau were allocated in seven European countries as well as in turkey, the USA and brazil. independent studios grow the Hollywood industry which was the to dominate global film production.

Music industry
Music play the important roll in the in the worlds mass culture and brought the closer people of the world. in the realm of popular music, the dog and trumpet logo of HMV became a global image within few years of founding the company, in 1897. This company worked many areas of the world like in Balkans, the Middle East, Africa Asia and China.

Advertising agencies
In the twentieth century advertising became increasingly important in international communication. After the second world war many international companies’s slogan famous in all over the world for example Coca cola’s slogan, Pepsi ‘the Pepsi generation’ and the Nike’s slogan ‘just do it’, always being assumed across the world.

Radio and international communication
As with other new technologies, western countries were the first to grasp the strategic implication of radio communication after the radio transmission of the human voice in 1902. Unlike cable radio equipment was comparatively cheap and could be sold on a mass scale. There was also growing awareness among American businesses that radio, if properly developed and controlled, might be used to undercut the huge advantages of British dominated international cable links, they realized unlike cable radio weaves could travel anywhere, unrestrained by politics and geography.
At the 1906 international radiotelegraph conference in Berlin, 28 states debated radio equipment standards and procedures to minimize the interference. The great naval powers also the major user of radio (Britain, German, USA and Russia), had imposed a regime radio frequency
allocation, allowing priority to the country that first notified. The international radiotelegraph union of its intentions to use a specific radio frequency.

**The battle of the airwaves**
The strategic significance of international communication grew with the expansion of the new medium. Ever since the advent of the radio, its use for propaganda was an integral part of its development, with its power to influence values, beliefs and attitudes. During the first world war, the power of radio was quickly recognized as vital both to the management of public opinion at home and propaganda abroad, directed as at allies and enemies alike. As noted by a distinguished scholar of propaganda: ‘During the war period it came to be recognized that the mobilization of man and mean was not sufficient; there must be mobilization of opinion. Power over opinion, as over life and property, passed into official hands’(lasswell,1927: 14). The second world war saw an explosion in international broadcasting as propaganda tool on both sides(communist and capitalist)

**The Cold War—from communist propaganda to capitalist Persuasion**
The victorious allies of the Second World War – the Soviet Union and the west led by the United States – soon fell out as differences emerged about the post-war order in Europe and the rest of the world. The clash was, in essence, about two contrasting view of organizing society: the soviet view, inspired by Marxism-Leninism, and the capitalist individualism championed by the USA. The defeat of Nazism and militarism of Japan was accompanied by the US proclaimed victory of democracy and the creation of the United Nation system. Though the 1947 general assembly resolution 110(ll)condemned ‘all forms of propaganda which designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace breach of the peace or act of aggression,’ both camps indulged in regular propaganda as battle lines of the cold war were being drawn.

**Soviet broadcast propaganda**
While the Soviets used propaganda as a means to gain political advantages in international relations, there is no effective technique to measure the success of their campaign. Even though there is no accurate assessment of how people reacted to the propaganda, it may be assumed that there was an overall influence domestically and abroad. Even though it may not have been as successful as intended in encouraging other regions of the world to support communism during the period, the Soviets publicized their policies and the positives that it brought to their society. It allowed the government to unite their general population and gain external support during the Cold War. Without the use of propaganda to unite the Soviet population, the government may have also had to deal with conflicts at home.

**Media Used By the Soviets for Propaganda**
Soviet propaganda utilized various types of media, such as radio. The Soviet Union focused upon domestic issues, such as patriotism, through radio shows, such as Radio Moscow and Radio Peace and Progress. The government also sponsored Radio shows that used propaganda techniques to manipulate and control the general public's opinion of the Soviet state. Even student textbooks emphasized the main Soviet objective and the overriding principle of Soviet foreign policy, which was the international domination of the Soviet state, bringing ultimate peace.

**US broadcast propaganda**
Although the Voice of America had been a part of us diplomacy during the Second World War with the advent of the Cold War propaganda becomes a crucial component of US foreign
broadcasting. VOA was organized in 1942 under the Office of War Information with news programs aimed at areas in Japan and the south Pacific and in Europe and North Africa under the occupation of Nazi Germany. VOA began broadcasting on February 24, 1942. In 1952, the Voice of America installed a studio and relay facility aboard a converted U.S. Coast Guard cutter renamed Courier whose target audience was Russia and its allies.

During the Cold War, the U.S. government placed VOA under the U.S. Information Agency to transmit worldwide, including to the countries behind the Iron Curtain and to the People's Republic of China (PRC). In the 1980s, the USIA established the WORLDNET satellite television service, and in 2004 WORLDNET was merged into VOA. In 1947, Voice of America started broadcasting in Russian with the intent to counter more harmful instances of Soviet propaganda directed against American leaders and policies. Soviet Union responded by initiating aggressive, electronic jamming of VOA broadcasts on 24 April 1949. Throughout the Cold War, many of the targeted countries' governments sponsored jamming of VOA broadcasts, which sometimes led critics to question the broadcasts' actual impact. However, after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, interviews with participants in anti-Soviet movements verified the effectiveness of VOA broadcasts in both transmitting information to closed societies and inspiring their oppressed people to continue to push for democracy and freedom. The People's Republic of China diligently jams VOA broadcasts (see Firedrake). Cuba has also been reported to interfere with VOA Satellite transmissions to Iran from its Russian-built transmission site at Bejucal.

The cold war—from communist propaganda to capitalist persuasion
Now we study about the BBC’s role in the cold war era specially its reliability and balance point of view.

The BBC
In contrast US state propaganda, the BBC’s external services prided themselves on presenting a mature, balance view, winning by argument, rather than hammering home a point, in the best a tradition of British understatement. This proclaimed policy of ‘balance’ gave the BBC more international credibility than any other broadcasting organization in the world. The BBC’s dependence on the British government was evident, since its budget was controlled by the treasury through grant in aid from the foreign and colonial office, which could also decide which language were used for programmed and for how long they were broadcast to each audience. For example during the Berlin blocked of 1948-49 almost the entire output of the BBC’s external service was directed to Eastern block countries. In addition, the government exerted indirect influence on the BBC since the relay station and overseas transmitter were negotiated through or owned by the diplomatic wireless service. What distinguished the BBC was its capacity to criticize its own government, however indirectly. The special relationship ‘that characterized US/UK ties during the cold war years also was in evidence in the realm of international broadcasting. With the establishment of its Russian language unit in 1946, the BBC World service played an important roll and key part in the Cold War through its strategically located global network of relay stations.

Cold war propaganda in the third world
Another major battle for the hearts and minds of people during the cold war was fought in the third world, where countries were emerging from century’s subjugation under European colonies powers. The Soviet Union had recognized that, since the nature of the anti colonial movements in Asia and Africa was largely anti western, the political situation was ripe for promoting communism. The west, on the other hand, was interested in continuing to control raw
materials and develop potential market for western products. Radio was seen as a crucial medium, given the low levels of literacy among most of the population of the developing countries. In addition the nascent media in the newly independent countries in Asia and Africa were almost always state- control and thus less able to compete with foreign media, with their higher credibility and technological superiority. The Middle East was a particular target for western broadcasters, given its geo strategic importance as the source of the world’s largest supply of oil.

In Asia, in addition to direct broadcast from the USA, VOA operated from Japan, Thailand, and Sri Lanka. Following the Chinese revolution in 1949, US priority was to stop the expansion of communism into other part of Asia. In the 1951, the CIA funded the manila-based radio free Asia, notable for its anti-communist stridency. It was later replaced by radio of free Asia which continued until 1966.
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AND DEVELOPMENT

For nearly half a century, the cold war divided the world into hostile east-west blocs. This had significant implications for the development of Third World countries, most of whom wanted to avoid bloc’s politics and concentration on the economic emancipation of their population. The phrase ‘Third World’ itself was a product of cold war, said to have been coined by French economic historian Alfred Sauvy in 1952, when the world was divided between the capitalist First World, led by the USA and the communist Second World with its center in Moscow. The ‘Third World’ was the mass of countries remaining outside these two blocs.

National liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America had altered the political map of the world. The vast territory occupied in 1945 by European colonial powers. For the newly independent ex-colonial states, international communication opened up opportunities for development. The Non-Aligned Movement, through the group of 77, establish in 1964, began to demand greater economic justice in such UN forums as UNCTAD and in 1974, the UN General Assembly formally approved their demand for creation New International Economic Order, based an equality and sovereignty. While this remained largely an ideal, it proved a new framework to redefine international relations, for the first time after the Second World War. At the same time, it was argued that the new economic order had to be linked to a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO).

The demand for a NWICO

The international information system, the NWICO protagonists argued, perpetuated and strengthened inequality in development, with serious implications for the countries of the south, which were heavily dependent on the north in the information sector. It was argued by third world leaders that through their control of major international information channels, the western media gave an exploitative and distorted view of their countries to the rest of the world. The existing order, they contended, had, because of its structural logic created a model of dependence, with negative effects on the polity economy and society of developing countries.

The chief complaints from the long litany of the third world demands were as follows:

- Owing to the socio-technological imbalance there was a one way of information the ‘center’ to the ‘periphery’ which created a wide gap between the ‘have’ and the ‘have nots;’
- The information rich were in position to dictate term to the information poor, thus creating a structure of dependency with widespread economic, political and social ramification for the poor societies;
- This vertical flow was dominated by the western-based transnational corporations
- Information was treated by the transnational media as a ‘commodity’ and subjected to the rules of the market;
- The entire information and communication order was a part of and in turn propped up international inequality that created and sustained mechanism of neo-colonialism.

The Mac Bride Commission

The international communication for the study of the communication problems that was established under the chairmanship of Sean Mac Bride by UNESCO occupies a prominent place in the debate regarding the establishment of a NWICO. The commission report, commonly known as the Mac Bride report, gave intellectual justification for evolving a new global
communication order. The commission was established to study for main aspects of global communication:

- The current state of world communication;
- The problems surrounding a free and balanced flow of information;
- How the needs of the developing countries link with the flow;
- How in light of the NIEO, a NWICO could be created, and how the media could become the vehicle for educating opinion about world problems.

**Opposition to NWICO**

The United States was hostile to NWICO. It saw these issues simply as barriers to the free flow of communication and to the interests of American media corporations. It attacked UNESCO as an organization and eventually withdrew its membership at the end of 1985. The matter was complicated by debates within UNESCO about Israel’s archeological work in the city of Jerusalem, and about the Apartheid regime in the South Africa. The Reagan administration was also hostile to other United Nations organizations such as the International Labor Organization. (The US rejoined UNESCO in 2003.) Since the issues raised by NWICO were complex, a media campaign was launched saying that NWICO was about licensing journalists and restricting press freedoms. In the 1970s, when the superpowers relations were relatively stable, the new world information and communication order was seen by southern leader as an integral part of an on going North- South dialogue. Under the president jimmy carter, for whom defense of human rights was the matter of personal commitment, the US administration appeared to take a favorable view of the problems faced by developing countries. However the carter administration played an important part and launching UNESCO’s International Program for the Development of Communication (IPDC).

**NWICO and the New Cold War**

Riding on a top of conservatism which flourishes on anti-soviet rhetoric, President Ronald Reagan redrafted the international agenda, dominated by ideas of a new phase in the cold war. On the world stage, Margaret Thatcher’s conservative government in London became an important partner in this venture. The Reagan administration announced significant restrictions on development aid. ‘Trade not Aid’ became the catchword and the assistance that was provided was to be primarily bilateral and aimed at promoting developmental projects design to build up the private sector in developing countries. US communication policy during the Reagan years reflected the goals of US foreign policy. Reagan’s self proclaimed mission of a fighting communism, enhanced by the US capacity to exercise control over the world information-communication order and its ability to disseminate a pro-American, anti soviet message globally, set the tone for an aggressive public diplomacy. The public diplomacy was geared to face the new communist threat and save the ‘free world’ for the encirclement of the Soviet Union. The international information committee (IIC) was establishing to ‘plan, co-ordinate and implement international information activities in support of US policies and interest relative to national security. Under the IIC, ‘project truth’ was set up, a campaign of an ideological war against the ‘evil empire’ an effort between the US information agency, the department of state and defense and the CIA. In order to propagate this message abroad, the Reagan administration strengthened the Voice of America as well as radio free Europe.

**International communication at the end of the Cold War**

If the East-West ideological battle characterized the cold war years of international communication, the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the break up of the soviet union two years
later, transformed the landscape of the international politics, profoundly influencing global information and communication. Television played an important role during the 1989 revolution in Eastern Europe. Helping to bring the east-west ideological division of Europe to close. The August 1991 coup in Moscow, which led to the break up of the Soviet Union, was called ‘the first true media event in the history of the Soviet Union’. The crisis had been profoundly and decisively shaped by the electronic eye that transformed instantly continuously, element of a political confrontation into meaningful scripts with their corresponding images, style, and symbols’. Since the break up of Soviet Union, the media in the eastern block countries have gradually been converted to the market.

The end of the cold war, various celebrated as the dawn of a ‘new world order’, as ‘end of history’ and even a ‘clash of civilization’ profoundly change the counter of international communication. The super power rivalry had ended and the bipolar world, which had informed debates on international communication for half a century, sudden had become unipolar, dominated by the remaining super power, the United States. This shift also affected debates on international information flows within UNESCO, which in the late 1980s had lost its primacy as the key forum for discussing international communication issues. The focus of debates too had shifted from news and information flows to such areas as global telecommunication and transnational data flows.

Another key contributing factor was the availability of new information technology such as direct broadcasting satellites, fiber optics, and micro computers. The growing convergence between information and informatics – the combination of computer and telecommunication systems, traditionally dealt with as separate entities – made it essential to re-examine international communication in the light of technological innovations.

The globalization of communication was made with the innovation of new information and communication technologies, increasingly integrated into a privatized global communication infrastructure. The ‘time-space compression’ that new technologies encouraged made it possible for media and Telecommunication Corporation to operate in a global market, part of an international neo-liberal capitalist system. The privatization of international communication industries become a major development of the 1990s, accelerated by the liberalization of global trade.
LESSON 04

APPROACHES TO THEORIZING INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION

Theories have their own history and reflect the concerns of the in which they were developed. It is not surprising that theories of communication began to emerge in parallel with the rapid social and economic changes of the industrial revolution in Europe, reflecting the significance of the role of communication in the growth of capitalism and empire, and drawing also on advances in science and the understanding of the natural world.

In the twentieth century, theories of international communication evolved into a discrete discipline within the new social sciences and in each era have changes and their impact on society and culture. In the early twentieth century, during and after the First World War, a debate arose about the role of communication in propagating the competitive economic and military objectives of the imperial powers.

After the Second World War, theories of communication multiplied in response to new development in technology and media, first radio and then television, and increasingly integrated international economic and political system. Two broad though often international approaches to theorizing communication can be discerned: the political economy approach concerned with the underlying structure of economic and political power relations, and the perspective of the cultural studies, focusing mainly on the role of communication and media in the process of the creation and maintaining of shared meanings.

‘Free flow of information’

After the Second World War and the establishment of a bi-polar world of free market capitalism and state socialism, theories of international communication become part of the new Cold War discourse. For the supporters of capitalism, the primary function of international communication was to promote democracy, freedom of expression and markets, while the Marxists argued for greater state regulation on communication and media outlets.

The concept of the ‘free flow of information’ reflected western, and specifically US, antipathy to state regulation and censorship of the media and its use for propaganda by its communist opponents. The concept of ‘free flow of information’ therefore served both economic and political purposes.

Theories

Modernization theory – Daniel Lerner
- Mass media helps transform societies

Dependency theory – Schiller
- Multinational corporations result in cultural imperialism

Structural Imperialism – Galtung
- Center and periphery states; Core and less developed

Hegemony – Gramsci
- Dominant social group within society dominates media

Critical theory – Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse
- Mass culture is a commodity to be sold resulting in standardization

Public Sphere – Habermas
- Capitalism has reduced access of information to the public

Cultural Studies – Hall
- Different cultures interpret media messages differently
Modernization theory
Definition: Mass media helps transform societies.

Explanation:
Complementary to the doctrine of ‘free flow’ in the post-war years the view that international communication was the key to the process of modernization and development for the so-called ‘Third World’. Modernization theory arose from the notion that international mass communication could be used to spread the message of modernity and transfer the economic and political models of the west to the newly independent countries of the South. Communication research on what came to be known as ‘modernization’ or ‘development theory’ was based on the belief that the mass media would help transform traditional societies.

One of the earliest exponent of this theory was Daniel Lerner, Lerner proposed that contact with the media helped the process of transition from a ‘traditional’ to a ‘modernized’ state, characterizing the mass media as ‘mobility multiplier’, which enables individuals to experience events in far-off places, forcing them to reassess their traditional way of life. Exposure to the media, Lerner argued, made traditional societies bound by traditions and made them aspire to a new and modern way of life. Another key modernization theorist Wilbur Schramm saw the mass media as a ‘bridge to a wider world’ as the vehicle for transferring new ideas and models from the North to the South and, within the south, from urban to rural areas. Schramm endorsed Lerner’s view that mass media can raise the aspirations of the people in the developing countries. The mass media in the South, he wrote, ‘face the need to rouse their people from fatalism and a fear of change. They need to encourage both personal and national aspirations. Individuals must come to the desire a better life then they have and to be willing to work for it.

In the 1970s, modernization theorists started to use the level of media development as an indicator of general societal development.

Failure of the modernizers
One major shortcoming of the early modernization theorists was their assumption that the modern and the traditional lifestyles were mutually exclusive, and their dismissive view of the culture of the ‘indigent natives’ led them to believe in the desirability and inevitability of a shift from the traditional to the modern. The dominant culture and religious force in the region of – Islam - and a sense of collective pan-Islamic identity were seen as ‘sentimental sorties into the symbolism of a majestic past’. The elite in the region had to choose between ‘Mecca and mechanization’. The crux of the matter, Lerner argued, was ‘not whether, but how one should move from traditional ways toward modern life-styles. The symbols of race and ritual fade into irrelevance when they impede living desire for bread and enlightenment’.

What modernizers such as Lerner failed to comprehend was that the dichotomy of modern versus traditional was not invetable. Despite the entire west’s effort at media modernization, Islamic traditions continue to define the Muslim world, and indeed have become stronger in parts of the Middle East. In additions, these cultures can also use modern communication methods to put their case cross. In the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, for example, radical groups produced printed material and audiocassettes and distributed them through informal network to promote an anti-western ideology based on a particular Islamic view of the world.

Dependency theory
Definition:
- Multinational corporations result in cultural imperialism.
• A situation in which the economy of a certain group of a countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy, to which their own subjected.

**Explanation:**
Dependency theory developed in the late 1960s and 1970s under the guidance of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. It was developed out of the fact that economic growth in the advanced industrialized countries did not lead to growth and development in poorer countries. A historical condition which shapes a certain structure of the world economy such that it favors some countries to the determinant of others and limits the development possibilities of the subordinate economics.

Dependency theory was the view that transnational corporations most based in the North, exercise control, with the support of their respective governments, over the developing countries by setting the terms for global trade – dominating markets, resources, production, and labor. Development for these countries was shaped in a way to strengthen the dominance of the developed nations and to maintain the ‘peripheral’ nation in a position of dependence – in other words, to make conditions suitable for ‘dependent development’. In its most extreme form the outcome of such relationship was ‘the development of underdevelopment’.

**Two key points**
- Dependency is the source of underdevelopment.
- Dependency is the result of the imposition of a set of external conditions on third world development.

A group of the Latin American intellectuals (especially economists and sociologists), in the early 1960s began an overall critique to modernization theory. ECLA’s scholars started a set of theoretical approach that was going to be known generically as Dependency theory. It is argued that most of the foundations of the theoretical categories and development policies rooted in the modernization school have been exclusively based on the historical experience in European and North American advanced capitalist countries. These western analytical categories are not suitable to guide our understanding of the underdevelopment problem of the Third World.

**Underdevelopment formula**
- The colonial history planted the seed in political, economic, cultural and administrative dependence.
- Foreign capital and surplus penetrating in the national economy keeping the unequal exchange.
- Loss of economic control, wealth, and distribution to foreign powers.
- Underdevelopment and economic stagnation. Critiques
- It simplifies the core-periphery classification of countries, incapable of encompassing the variety of situation prevalent in international relations
- It plays down endogenous factor in explaining underdevelopment.
LESSON 05

APPROACHES TO THEORIZING INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION

Hegemony
Definition
Dominant social group within society dominates media

Explanation
Gramsci’s conception of hegemony is rooted in the notion that the dominant social group in society has the capacity to exercise intellectual and moral direction over society at large and to build a new system of social alliances to support its aims.
According to the gramsci, such a system exists when a dominant social class exerts moral and intellectual leadership – through its control of such institutions as school, religious bodies and mass media – over both allied and subordinate classes.
In international communication, the notion of hegemony is widely used to conceptualize political function of the mass media, as a key player in propagating and maintaining the dominant ideology and also to explain the process of media and communication production, with dominant ideology shaping production of news and entertainment.

Critical theory
Definition
Mass culture is a commodity to be sold resulting in standardization

Explanation
The industrial production of cultural goods – films, radio programmes, music and magazines, etc. – as a global movement, they argued that in capitalist societies the trend was toward producing culture as a commodity. Adorno and Horkheimer believed that cultural products manifested the same kind of management practices, technological rationality and organizational schemes as the mass production industrial goods such as cars. Such industrial production led to standardization, resulting in a mass culture made up of a series of object bearing the stamp of the culture industry. This industrially produced and co-modified culture, it was argued, led to the deterioration of the philosophical role of culture. Instead, this mediated culture contribute to the incorporation of the working classes into the structures of advanced capitalism and it limiting their horizons to political and economic goals that could be realized within the capitalist system without challenging it. The critical theorist argued that the development of the ‘culture industry’ and its ability to ideologically inoculate the masses against socialist ideas benefited the ruling classes.

The concentration of the ownership of a cultural production in a few producers resulted in a standardized commercial commodity, contributing to what they called a ‘mass culture’ influenced by the mass media and one which thrived on the market rules of supply and demand. In their view, such a process undermined the critical engagement of masses with important socio-political issues and insured a politically passive social behavior and the subordination of the working classes to the ruling elite.

In an international context the idea of ‘mass culture’ and media and cultural industries has influenced debates about the flow of information between countries, etc. – as a global movement, they argued that in capitalist societies the trend was toward producing culture as a commodity. Adorno and Horkheimer believed that cultural products manifested the same kind of management practices, technological rationality and organizational schemes as the mass production industrial goods such as cars. Such industrial production led to standardization, resulting in a mass culture made up of a series of object bearing the stamp of the culture industry. This industrially produced and co-modified culture, it was argued, led to the deterioration of the
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In an international context the idea of ‘mass culture’ and media and cultural industries has influenced debates about the flow of information between countries.

The public sphere

**Definition**

Capitalism has reduced access of information to the public

**Explanation**

Hebermas argued that the ‘bourgeois public sphere’ emerged in an expanding capitalist society exemplified by eighteenth century Britain, where entrepreneurs were becoming powerful enough to achieve autonomy from state and church and increasingly demanding wider and more effective political representation to facilitate expansion of their businesses. In his formula of a public sphere, Hebermas gave prominence to the role of information, as, at this time, a greater freedom of the press was fought for and achieved with parliamentary reform. The wider availability of printing facilities and the resultant reduction in production costs of newspapers stimulated debate contributing to what Hebermas calls ‘rational – acceptable policies’ which led by the mid nineteenth century to the creation of a ‘bourgeois public sphere’. Cultural studies perspective on international Communication

While much of the debate on international communication post – 1945 and during the cold war emphasized a structural analysis of its role in political and economic power relationship, there has been a discernible shift in research emphasis in the 1990s in parallel with the ‘depoliciticization’ of politics toward the cultural dimensions of communication and media. The cultural analysis of communication also has a well established theoretical tradition to draw upon, from Gramsci’s theory of hegemony to the works of the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School. One group of scholars who adopted Gramsci’s notion of hegemony were based at the center for contemporary cultural studies at the university of Birmingham Britain , as it came to be known in the 1970s did pioneering work on exploring the textual analysis of media, especially television, and ethnographic research. Particularly influential was Halls model of ‘encoding decoding media discourse’ which theorized about how media texts are given ‘preferred reading’ by producers and how they may be interpreted in different ways – from accepting the dominant meaning; negotiating with the encode message or taking an appositional view.

Though the cultural studies approach professes to give voice to such issues – race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality remain its key concerns – it has generally rendered less importance to class-based analysis. The cultural studies approach to communication has become increasingly important. Theories of the information society spectacular innovation in information and communication technologies, especially computing, and their rapid global expansion have led to claims that this is the age of information. Breakthrough in the speed, volume and cost of information processing, storage and transmission have undoubtedly contributed to the power of information technology to shape many aspects of western, and increasingly, global society. The
convergence of telecommunication and computing technologies and the continued reduction in the costs of computing and international telephony have made the case for the existence of the information society even stronger. According to its enthusiasts, an international information society is under construction which will digitally link all homes via the internet – the network of networks. The information grid of networked computer is being compared with the electricity grid, linking every home, office and business, to create a networked society, based on what has been termed as the ‘knowledge economy’. These networks have become the information superhighways, providing the infrastructure for a global information society. However, critics have objected to this version of society, arguing that these changes are technologically determined and ignore the social, economic and political dimensions of technological innovation.

The term ‘information society’ originated in Japan, but it the USA where the concept received its most ardent intellectual support. Change in industrial production and their effect on western societies informed the work of sociologist Daniel bell, who became an internationally known exponent of the idea of a ‘post industrial’ society – one which the service industries employ more workers than manufacturing. Bells ideas were keenly adopted by the scholar who wanted to pronounce the arrival of ‘the information age’. Another key figure, Alvin Toffler, though more populist than bell, was very influential in propagating the idea of an information society, calling it the third wave – after the agricultural and industrial eras – of human civilization. The ‘third wave’ was characterized by increasing ‘interconnectedness’, contributing to the ‘evolution of a universal interconnected network of audio, video, and electronic text communication’, which, some argue, will promote intellectual pluralism and personalized control over communication.

With it growing co-modification, information has come to occupy a central role as a ‘key strategic resource’ in the international economy, the distribution, regulation, marketing and management of which are becoming increasingly important. Real-time trading has become a part of contemporary corporate culture, through digital networking, which has made it possible to transmit information on stock markets, across the globe.

**Discourse of the globalization**
What is globalization and when did it begin?

The term globalization has been in use since the early 1960s. Academic use of the word only began in the early 1980s, but has become increasingly prevalent in a number of disciplines. Publications on the issue of globalization started to appear in the first half of the 1908s, at a rate of one to three per year (Busch, 2000). The term began appearing regularly in the mainstream press in the late 1980s, beginning primarily as a reference for the expanding free market but more recently including more political and cultural references and, more specifically, has begun appearing in reference to specific events, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) protests in Seattle and the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Although it appears that the usage of the term has increased consistently in recent years, globalization remains what may be called a shifting concept in that there is not a universally accepted definition of the term (Busch, 2000). Not only has globalization been considered “the concept of the 1990s, a key idea by which we understand the transition of the human society into the third millennium” (Waters, 1995, p. 1), it has also been criticized as “largely a myth” (Hirst and Thompson, 1996, p. 2). Some definitions that illustrate the great variety of understandings of globalization, ranging from strictly economical to relatively all encompassing, include:

- Globalization refers to a world in which, after allowing for exchange rate and default risk, there is a single international rate of interest (Brittan, 1996).
Globalization means the partial erasure of the distinctions separating nation currency areas and national systems of financial regulation (Strange, 1995, p. 294).

Globalization refers to the multiplicity of linkages and Interconnections between the states and societies which make up the modern world system.

It describes the process by which events, decisions, and activities in one part of the world can come to have significant consequences for individuals and communities in quite distant parts of the globe (McGrew, 1992, p. 23).

Globalization...is the inexorable integration of markets, nation-states and technologies to a degree never witnessed before – in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations and nation-states to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper than ever before (Friedman, 2000).

A social process in which the constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding (Waters, 1995, p. 3).

A series of national and supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule (Hardt and Negri, 2000, p. xii).

Globalization is “action at distance” (Giddens, 1994, p. 4).

This list of definitions is by no means comprehensive, but it clearly demonstrates that globalization means different things to different people. Some consider it a predominantly economics-based phenomenon while others suggest that it is a worldwide system of hegemony. Many suggest that it is misunderstood and ill defined.

Susan Strange even refers to it as “a term used by a lot of wooly thinkers who lump together all sorts of superficially converging trends in popular tastes for food and drink, clothes, music, sports and entertainment with underlying changes in the provision of financial services and the directions of scientific research, and call it all globalization without trying to distinguish what is important from what is trivial, either in causes or in consequences” (1995, p. 293). Despite such cynicism regarding the nature of globalization rhetoric, it abounds and, as such, begs for both serious and critical analysis in order to better understand the contexts in which it is discussed and the predominant themes in those discussions.

The globalization debate

The word "globalization" occurred for the first time in 1968, and they are both synonymous with the English term globalization. This definition of what it means to “globalize” is, needless to say, rather broad and requires some clarification. As a starting point, it may be useful to compare it with the concepts of Internationalization, Trans nationalization and Multi nationalization. These are, however, also rather vague concepts, and a comparison are therefore doomed to be cursory.

The following is an attempt at schematizing the four concepts of globalization, internationalization, Trans nationalization and Multi nationalization, and thus to contrast them with each other. The various concepts are to a great degree being used interchangeably, and laying out the conceptualization that forms the basis for the analysis will be useful.

“Internationalization” may be said to focus on the relationship between states (i.e., that the state is considered the basic unit in the process). Exchange of goods, services, money, people and ideas take place between states, and the concept of internationalization denotes an increase in such exchanges. The term “trans nationalization” is interpreted as transfers on other levels than the state level (i.e., exchanges across state borders between various kinds of organizations, companies and individuals). The concept of “multi nationalization,” on the other hand, focuses on the company as the unit of analysis in international political economy, and signifies a process.
in which a so-called multinational company (MNC) transfers resources from one national economy to another.
LESSON 06

A CRITICAL POLITICAL-ECONOMY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

One of the significant themes in international communication research within the critical political economic tradition in the transition from America’s post-war hegemony to a world communication order led by transnational businesses and supported by their respective national states increasingly linked in continental and global structures. Researchers working within this area have focused on transnational corporate and state power, with a particular stress on ownership concentration in media and communication industries world-wide – and the growing trends towards vertical integration – companies controlling production in a specific sector – and horizontal integration – across sectors within and outside media and the communication industry. Other scholars have supported movements for greater international information and communication equality, with concerns about incorporating human rights into international communication debates. Skeptical of the dominant market-based approach, many scholars have defended the public-services view of state-regulated media and telecommunication organizations and advanced public interests concern before government regulatory and policy bodies both at national, regional and international levels.

In the twenty-first century, the focus of critical scholars is likely to be the analysis of the characteristics of the transnational media and communicational corporations and locating them within the changes in international organizations such as the World Trade Organization or the international Telecommunication Union, which have played a crucial role in managing the transition to a market driven international communication environment. The role of new technologies, especially the internet, in international communication has also informed the critical research agenda. The dismemberment of the soviet union and the advent of ‘market socialism’ in china and the rightward shift of the left in Europe and across the developing world, have posed a challenge to the political economic theoretical framework. However, a critical understanding of the political economy of international communication is essential if one wants to make sense of the expansion, acceleration and consolidation of the US-managed global electronic economy.

Creating a global

Communication infrastructure

In the 1980s and 1990s fundamental ideological changes in the global political arena led to the creation of pro-market international trade regimes which had a huge impact on international communication. The process of deregulation and privatization in the communications and media industries combined with new digital information and communication technologies to enable a quantum leap in international communication, illustrated most vividly in the satellite industry. The resulting globalization of telecommunication has revolutionized international communication, as the convergence of the telecommunications; computer and media industries have ensured that much more information passes through a digitally linked globe today then ever in human history. This was made possible with the innovation of new information and communication technologies, increasing integrated into a privatized global communication infrastructure, primarily as a result of the policy shift – from a state centric view of communication to one governed by the rules of the free market – among major power and, in turn, in multilateral organizations such as the international telecommunication union (ITU). Analysis of international communication has traditionally been confined to government-to-government activities where a few powerful states dictate the communication agenda, but with the growing availability of regional and global satellite networks, communication systems have become more far-reaching for telecommunications, broadcasting and increasingly in electronic
The privatization of telecommunication
In the arena of telecommunications, the state was, for most of the twentieth century, the key player in providing a national infrastructure and equipment, and regulating international traffic. In the 1990s, the state monopolies of post, telegraph and telecommunication (PPT) were forced to give ground to private telecommunication networks, often part of transnational corporations. This shift, which started among some western countries, has now affected telecommunications globally with the majority of PPTs privatized or in the process of privatization. Since the founding of the international telegraph union in 1865, regulation of international telecommunication was the subject of multilateral accord, setting common standards for telecommunication networks across the globe and prices for access to and use of these networks. These conventions were based upon the principle of national monopoly and cross-subsidization, so that national telecom operator such as the British post office – which had monopoly of equipment and service within Britain – could keep the cost affordable for small users by subsidies from international telephony revenues. In the 1980s, this regulatory framework was criticized as not taking into account technological innovations, such as computing, fiber optic cables and fax machines. Especially significant was the blurring of the distinction between the transmission of voice and data made possible by these new technologies. As telecommunication traffic increased, so did the demand from transnational corporations for the reduction of tariffs, especially for international services. These companies opposed national monopolies, arguing that a competitive environment would improve services and reduce costs. In 1984 US President Ronald Reagan announced as ‘open skies’ policy, breaking the public monopoly and allowing private telecommunications networks to operate in the national telecommunication arena. The general shift from the public–service role of telecommunication to private competition and deregulation had a major impact on international telecommunication policy, shaped by the USA, Britain and Europe, all of whom have companies with global ambitions.

Free trade in communication
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (typically abbreviated GATT) was originally created by the Britton Woods Conference as part of a larger plan for economic recovery after World War II. The GATT’s main objective was the reduction of barriers to international trade. This was achieved through the reduction of tariff barriers, quantitative restrictions and subsidies on trade through a series of agreements. The GATT was an agreement, not an organization. Originally, the GATT was supposed to become a full international organization like the World Bank or IMF called the International Trade Organization. However, the agreement was not ratified, so the GATT remained simply an agreement. The functions of the GATT were taken over by the World Trade Organization which was established during the final round of negotiations in the early 1990s. The history of the GATT can be divided into three phases: the first, from 1947 until the Torque Round, largely concerned which commodities would be covered by the agreement and freezing existing tariff levels. A second phase, encompassing three rounds, from 1959 to 1979, focused on reducing tariffs. The third phase, consisting only of the Uruguay Round from 1986 to 1994, extended the agreement fully to new areas such as intellectual property, services, capital, and agriculture. Out of this round the WTO was born.
World Trade Organization (WTO)
In 1993 the GATT was updated (GATT 1994) to include new obligations upon its signatories. One of the most significant changes was the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The 75 existing GATT members and the European Communities became the founding members of the WTO on January 1, 1995. The other 52 GATT members rejoined the WTO in the following two years (the last being Congo in 1997). Since the founding of the WTO, 21 new non-GATT members have joined and 28 are currently negotiating membership. Of the original GATT members, only the SFR Yugoslavia has not rejoined the WTO. Since FR Yugoslavia, (renamed to Serbia and Montenegro and with membership negotiations later split in two), is not recognized as a direct SFY successor state; therefore, its application is considered a new (non-GATT) one. The contracting parties who founded the WTO ended official agreement of the "GATT 1947" terms on December 31, 1995. Whereas GATT was a set of rules agreed upon by nations, the WTO is an institutional body. The WTO expanded its scope from traded goods to trade within the service sector and intellectual property rights. Although it was designed to serve multilateral agreements, during several rounds of GATT negotiations (particularly the Tokyo Round) plurilateral agreements created selective trading and caused fragmentation among members.

WTO arrangements are generally a multilateral agreement settlement mechanism of GATT. The WTO was set up with a clear agenda for privatization and liberalization.

“The fundamental cost of protectionism stems from the fact that it provides individual decision makers with wrong incentives, drawing resources into protected sectors rather than sectors where a country has its true comparative advantage. The classical role of trade liberalization, identified centuries ago, is to remove such hindrances, thereby increasing income and growth.

As part of this, the WTO also argued that dismantling barriers to the free flow of information was essential for economic growth. It was even implied that it was not possible to have significant trade in goods and services without a free trade in information. The importance of a strong communications infrastructure as a foundation for international commerce and economic development was increasingly emphasized by international organizations.

One key outcome of the Uruguay Round was the 1995 The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is a treaty of the World Trade Organization (WTO) that entered into force in January 1995 as a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations. The treaty was created to extend the multilateral trading system to services, in the same way the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provides such a system for merchandise trade.

All members of the WTO are signatories to the GATS. The basic WTO principle of most favored nation (MFN) applies to GATS as well. Impact of WTO agreements on international Communication Three major agreements, signed in 1977 under the aegis of the WTO, are likely to have a profound impact on global trade, especially in information and communication areas. In February 1997, 69 WTO countries agreed a wide-ranging liberalization of trade in global telecommunication services. Of the three agreements, the most significant for international communication is the GATS fourth protocol on basic telecommunication services. Within GATS, the telecommunication sectors divided into two broad categories: basic service (e.g. voice telephones, data transmission services, telegraph) and value added services. During the round, most countries committed themselves to liberalize value added services, but not basic telecommunication services, so the fourth protocol ensures that basic telecommunication will also be liberalized.
LESSON 07
LIBERALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE TELECOM SECTOR

The mission of the Telecommunication Development Sector, as set out in the Constitution and the Convention, encompasses the Union’s dual responsibility as a United Nations specialized agency and executing agency for implementing projects under the United Nations development system or other funding arrangements, so as to facilitate and enhance telecommunication development by offering, organizing and coordinating technical cooperation and assistance activities.

The work of ITU-D will reflect the various resolutions of the world telecommunication development conference. It will place emphasis on gender balance in its programmes and will reflect the needs of other aspects of global society such as youth and the needs of indigenous peoples. Emergency telecommunications is another area where renewed efforts are required. Collaboration with the private sector should be more clearly defined and expanded so as to reflect the changing roles of public and private entities in the telecommunication sector. The "Year 2000" problem should be urgently addressed.

ITU-D should also use the mechanisms for advancing Sector goals included in Opinion B of the World Telecommunication Policy Forum (Geneva, 1998) and the opportunities provided by the ITU programme funded by the surplus funds from TELECOM exhibitions.

In fulfilling its mission, ITU-D will cover the five major areas of telecommunication development sector reform, technologies, management, finance and human resources. It is supported by the four main modes of action by which the Sector carries out its work: direct assistance (including project execution), resource development and mobilization, partnerships and information sharing, which are reflected in the organizational structure of BDT.

The Telecommunication Development Sector environment

The telecommunication development environment is characterized by the following features: The restructuring and liberalization of the telecommunication sector at the national and international level, and the three agreements on basic telecommunications services, financial services and information technology products concluded through the World Trade Organization, have increasing consequences for the provision of international and national telecommunication services. Competition is rapidly becoming the rule rather than the exception. The above factors are straining the accounting rate system beyond its limits, calling for a rapid revision of accounting rates and causing major changes in traditional income flows which are of critical importance to certain countries. While the development gap has narrowed slightly in terms of access to basic telephone services, it is widening at a fast rate for advanced telecommunication services and access to information. However, the emergence of a global information society is creating new opportunities to close the gap. Political, technical and cultural factors are combining to promote these opportunities.

The rapid development of telecommunications in some countries is associated with general economic growth, particularly where some form of restructuring, liberalization and competition is introduced; however, other countries witness modest and uneven progress. Many different players, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), are invited to play a more important role.

Business practices, including development activities, are being revolutionized by information and communication technologies. This can be expected to have a significant impact on telecommunication development activities such as planning and training. Technology-based convergence of telecommunications, informatics and mass media offers new opportunities for cooperation between the formerly different parts of the telecommunication sector. Due to
increased emphasis on policy and regulatory frameworks that create open markets and encourage private investment, both domestic and foreign, development programmes rely less on technical assistance and more on partnerships and trade agreements. Private capital flows in several countries now exceed official development aid resources, but in others concessional finance is required to meet development needs.

Limited funds available to ITU, as compared with developing country needs, require ITU to play a catalytic development role. This envisioned catalytic role of ITU is developed further below.

The world of telecommunications
The invention of the global satellite networks also having a significant impact on the international telecommunications industry. Information liberalization and the deregulation which it promotes have led to unprecedented rates of merger activity and corporate consolidation in the information and communication industries. The increasing demand for wireless technologies and mobility is spreading into all aspects of telecommunications and represent a fundamental change that is transforming international communication. These trends will converge at a single point and profoundly change the industry and the marketplace. The telecommunications and ‘dotcom’ industries are merging, as are the computer and media industries. A consolidation of business in these sectors is likely to lead to a global dominance of the telecom by 10 – 15 companies in operator market. In 1998, the top 10 telecommunications corporations held 86 percent of the market in telecommunications while the leading 10 computer companies controlled almost 70 per cent of the global market. By the end of 1999, the value of mergers and acquisitions in the telecommunications industry had nearly doubled to $516 billion, mainly because of the two major deals in 1999 – MCI WorldCom’s acquisition of sprint, and Vodafone Air touch merger with German wireless carrier Mannesmann. The opening up of global telecommunications services is also set to benefit the suppliers of telecommunication hardware. In 1996 exports of telecommunication and broadcasting equipment from OECD countries was $95.1 billion, an increase of 108 percent over 1990. The $301 billion worldwide communication equipment market, growing at 14 per cent annually, is controlled by corporations in a few, mainly western countries. The USA is the biggest exporter of telecom equipment.
According to the OECD, the total revenue of the communication sector, including telecommunication services, broadcasting services and communications equipment, exceeding one trillion dollars for the first time in 1998.

**Implication of a liberalized global communication regime**

The global shift from state regulation to market-driven policies are evident everywhere. The WTO claims that the expansion of capital through the transnational corporations has contributed to the transfer of skills and capital to the global south but that it may have but also contributed to widening the gap between rich and poor is not mentioned. International communication is increasingly being shaped by trade and market standards and less by political considerations, what Hamelink has called ‘a noticeable shift from a political to an economic discourse’. The move to open up world trade by reducing tariff barriers has been unevenly applied. After the Uruguay Agreement came into force, several developing countries made huge reductions in their tariffs: India reduce its average tariffs on industrial products from 71 per cent to 32 per cent; Brazil from 41 per cent to 27 per cent; Venezuela from 50 per cent to 31 per cent. In contrast, the average tariff on industrial production in the north has been reducing from 6.3 per cent to 3.8 per cent. In addition giving priority to the service sector – financial services, insurance, maritime transport, telecommunication – has benefited the north, while the areas where the south might have had an advantage were not given much consideration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>country</th>
<th>International telephone revenue ($billions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AT&amp;T</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>9.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCI WorldCom</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>4.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deutsche Telekom</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGT</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong Telecom</td>
<td>HK/China</td>
<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDD</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France Telecom</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sprint</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSNL</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>1.60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Telecom Italia</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.43</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The major trading blocs have insisted that in a globalized world economy, with growing internationalization of production and consumption, it is important to harmonize domestic laws and regulatory structures affecting trade and investment, and remove any advantage or protection for domestic industries. A global market can only be created, runs the argument, through deregulation and letting the market set the rules of international trade.

Opposition to the process of deregulation and privatization has been under mind by changes in international policy at an institutional level. The UN is positioning itself closer to the operation of international business. As part of his ‘quite revolution’ to renew the United Nations for the twenty-first century, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan is building a stronger relationship with business community. A joint statement issued in Feb 1998 by Annan and international chamber of commerce stressed the UN’s role in setting the regulatory framework for the global marketplace in order to facilitate cross-border trade and investment. Who benefits from liberalization and privatization? The biggest beneficiaries of the process of liberalization, deregulation and privatization and the resultant WTO agreements have been the TNCs (transnational corporations) which dominate global trade. As the primary movers and shapers’ of the global economy, the TNCs have been defined as having three basic characteristics:

- Co-ordination and control of various stages of individual’s production chains within and between different countries;
- Potential ability to take advantage of geographical differences in the distribution of factors of production;

Potential geographical flexibility an ability to switch its resources and operations between locations at an international, or even a global scale. So the powerful are the TNCs that the annual sales of the top corporations exceed the GDP of many countries. The free market ideology and the new international trading regime that it produced have encouraged the free flow of capital across a borderless world. Concerns about Tran’s border data fles and their impact on national sovereignty have been replaced by the race to embrace the global electronic marketplace.
LESSON 08

THE GLOBAL MEDIA MARKETPLACE

The deregulation and liberalization of the international communication sector in the 1990s were paralleled in the media industries and, in conjunction with the new communication technologies of satellite and cable, have created a global marketplace for media products. The largest growing application of international communication infrastructure is for the delivery of media products information, news and entertainment. The convergence of the both media and technologies, and the process of vertical integration of the media industries to achieve this aim, have resulted in the concentration of media power in the hand of a few large transnational companies, with implications for global democracy.

Convergence

Before globalization, most media corporations had distinct areas of business: Disney, for example, was primarily concerned with cartoons films and theme park operations; time was known as a publishing business.

Time Warner

Time Warner, the largest media corporation in the world, was formed in 1989 through the merger of Time Inc. and Warner Communications. In 1992, Time Warner split off its entertainment group, and sold 25 percent of it to U.S. West, and 5.6 percent of it to each of the Japanese conglomerates Itochu and Toshiba. It regained from Disney its position as the world's largest media firm with the 1996 acquisition of Turner broadcasting. Time Warner is moving toward being a fully global company, with over 200 subsidiaries worldwide. In 1996, approximately two-thirds of Time Warner's income came from the United States, but that figure is expected to drop to three-fifths by 2000 and eventually to less than one-half.

Time Warner expects globalization to provide growth tonic; it projects that its annual sales growth rate of 14 percent in the middle 1990s will climb to over 20 percent by the end of decade. Music accounts for just over 20 percent of Time Warner's business, as does the news division of magazine and book publishing and cable television news. Time Warner's U.S. cable systems account for over 10 percent of income. The remainder is accounted for largely by Time Warner's extensive entertainment film, video and television holdings. Time Warner is a major force in virtually every medium and on every continent. Time Warner has zeroed in on global television as the most lucrative area for growth. Unlike News Corporation, however, Time Warner has devoted itself to producing programming and channels rather than developing entire satellite systems. Time Warner is also one of the largest movie theater owners in the world, with approximately 1,000 screens outside of the United States and further expansion projected.

CNN International

CNN International, a subsidiary of CNN, is also established as the premier global television news channel, beamed via ten satellites to over 200 nations and 90 million subscribers by 1994, a 27 percent increase over 1993. The long-term goal for CNN International is to operate (or participate in joint ventures to establish) CNN channels in French, Japanese, Hindi, Arabic and perhaps one or two other regional languages. CNN launched a Spanish-language service for Latin America in 1997, based in Atlanta. CNN International will also draw on the Time Warner journalism resources as it faces new challenges from news channels launched by News Corporation and NBC-Microsoft.
Disney
Disney is the closest challenger to Time Warner for the status of world's largest media firm. In the early 1990s, Disney successfully shifted its emphasis from its theme parks and resorts to its film and television divisions. In 1995, Disney made the move from being a dominant global content producer to being a fully integrated media giant with the purchase of Capital Cities/ABC for $19 billion, one of the biggest acquisitions in business history. Disney now generates 31 percent of its income from broadcasting, 23 percent from theme parks, and the balance from "creative content," meaning films, publishing and merchandising. The ABC deal provided Disney, already regarded as the industry leader at using cross-selling and cross-promotion to maximize revenues, with a U.S. broadcasting network and widespread global media holdings to incorporate into its activities. Historically, Disney has been strong in entertainment and animation, two areas that do well in the global market. In 1996 Disney reorganized, putting all its global television activities into single division.

ESPN
With the purchase of ABC's ESPN, the television sports network, Disney has possession of the unquestioned global leader. ESPN has three U.S. cable channels, a radio network with 420 affiliates, and the ESPN Sports-Zone website, one of the most heavily used locales on the Internet. One Disney executive notes that with ESPN and the family-oriented Disney Channel, Disney has "two horses to ride in foreign market not just one. ESPN International dominates televised sport broadcasting on a 24-hour basis in 21 languages to over 165 countries. It reaches the one desirable audience that had eluded Disney in the past: young, single, middle-class men. "Our plan is to think globally but to customize locally," states the senior VP of ESPN International. In Latin America the emphasis is on soccer, in Asia it is table tennis, and in India ESPN provided over 1,000 hours of cricket in 1995. Disney plans to exploit the "synergies" of ESPN much as it has exploited its cartoon characters. "We know that when we lay Mickey Mouse or Goofy on top of products, we get pretty creative stuff," Eisner states. "ESPN has the potential to be that kind of brand." Disney plans call for a chain of ESPN theme sports bars, ESPN product merchandising, and possibly a chain of ESPN entertainment centers based on the Club ESPN at Walt Disney World. ESPN has released five music CDs, two of which have sold over 500,000 copies. In late 1996, Disney began negotiations with Hearst and Petersen Publishing to produce ESPN Sports Weekly magazine, to be a "branded competitor to Sports Illustrated.

Bertelsmann
Bertelsmann is the one European firm in the first tier of media giants. The Bertelsmann Empire was built on global networks of book and music clubs. Music and television provide 31 percent of its income. Bertelsmann's stated goal is to evolve "from a media enterprise with international activities into a truly global communications group. Bertelsmann's strengths in global expansion are its global distribution network for music, its global book and music clubs and its facility with languages other than English. Bertelsmann is Considered to be the best contender of all the media giants to exploit the eastern European markets.

Sony
Sony's media holdings are concentrated in music (the former CBS records) and film and television production (the former Columbia Pictures), each of which it purchased in 1989. music accounts for about 60 percent of Sony's media income and film and television production
account for the rest. Sony is a dominant entertainment producer and its media sales are expected to surpass $9 billion in 1997. It also has major holdings in movie theaters in joint venture with Seagram. As Sony’s media activities seem divorced from its other extensive activities Sony was foiled in its initial attempts to find synergies between hardware and software, but it anticipates that digital communication will provide the basis for new synergies. Sony hopes to capitalize upon its vast copyrighted library of films, music and TV programs to leap to the front of the digital video disc market, where it is poised to be one of the two global leaders with Matsushita.” Sony also enjoys a 25 percent share of the multi-billion-dollar video games industry; with the shift to digital formats these games can now be converted into channels in digital television systems.

**Global trade in media products**
The global trade in cultural goods (films, printed matter, music, and computers) has almost tripled between 1980 and 1991. The United States is the leading exporter of cultural products and the entertainment industry is one of its largest export earners. Table lists the world’s top five entertainment corporations, three of which are based in the USA, while the other two have substantial US business and corporate connections.

**Television**
Most of the world’s entertainment output is transmitted through television, which is increasingly becoming global in its operations, technologies and audiences. One of the most significant factors is the growth in satellite television, which cuts across national and linguistic boundaries, creating new international audiences. In 1998 more than 2600 television channels were operating in the world, the majority of which were private channels.

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<th>THE WORLD’S TOP FIVE ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATIONS, 1998</th>
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<td><strong>Company</strong></td>
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**The international film industry**
Though more films are produced in India than in the USA global cinema and television screens are dominated by Hollywood: Hollywood films are shown in more than 150 countries. Half of Hollywood revenue comes from overseas markets, up from just 30 percent in 1980.

**The world’s top ten film producing nations**
India
USA
China
Japan
Philippines
France
Russia
Italy
Thailand
South Korea

International book publishing
In the world of book publishing, though China and Germany rank first and third in the highest number of titles produced in 1996, English language publishing is predominant. The global market for English language books is valued at around $25 billion a year and set to grow as the demand for English language books and publication increases world wide. The USA leads the world’s books export market, closely followed by Britain.

GLOBAL BOOK PRODUCTION – THE TOP TEN
China
United Kingdom
Germany
United States
Japan
Spain
Russia
Italy
France
South Korea
In the recent years, the company has expanded into newer market such as Eastern Europe, South America and China, where it is planning to launch a direct market book business.

Global news and information networks
In the realm of international news, US/UK –based media organizations produced and distribute much of the world’s news and current affairs output. From international news agencies to global news papers and radio stations, from providers of television news footage to 24- hour news and documentary channels, the US/UK presence seems to be overwhelming.

News agency
A news agency is an organization of journalists established to supply news reports to organizations in the news trade: newspapers, magazines, and radio and television broadcasters. They are also known as wire services or news services.

Commercial services
News agencies can be corporations that sell news (e.g. Reuters and Agence France-Press (AFP)), cooperatives composed of newspapers that share their articles with each other (e.g. AP), or commercial newswire services which charge organizations to distribute their news (e.g. Business Wire, CSRWire Canada, e|c|o/Huff Strategy, the Hugin Group, Market Wire and PR Newswire). Governments may also control news agencies, particularly in authoritarian states, like China (Xinhua), Australia, Britain, Canada, Russia (ITAR-TASS) and many other countries also have government-funded news agencies. A recent rise in internet- based alternative news agencies as a component of the larger alternative media have emphasized a "non-corporate view" that is independent of the pressures of business media.
News agencies generally prepare hard news stories and feature articles that can be used by other news organizations with little or no modification, and then sell them to other news organizations. They provide these articles in bulk electronically through wire services (originally they used telegraphy; today they frequently use the Internet). Corporations, individuals, analysts and intelligence agencies may also subscribe. The business need for wire services to produce reports acceptable to the largest number of clients possible is largely credited for the move away from an openly partisan press toward more objectivity in journalism.

**Associated press:**
The Associated Press, or AP, is an American news agency, and is the world's largest such organization. The AP is a cooperative owned by its contributing newspapers, radio and television stations in the United States, which both contribute stories to it and use material written by its staffers. Many newspapers and broadcasters outside the United States are AP subscribers — that is, they pay a fee to use AP material but are not members of the cooperative.

As of 2005, AP's news is used by 1,700 newspapers, in addition to 5,000 television and radio outlets. Its photo library consists of more than 10 million images. The AP has 243 bureaus and serves 121 countries, with a diverse international staff drawing from all over the world. As part of their agreements with the Associated Press, most newspapers grant automatic permission for the Associated Press to distribute their local news reports. For example, on page two of every edition of the Washington Post, the masthead includes the announcement, "The Associated Press is entitled exclusively to use for republication of all news dispatches credited to it or not otherwise credited in this paper and all local news of spontaneous origin published herein."

The AP Stylebook has become the de facto standard for news writing in the United States. The AP has a straightforward, "just-the-facts" writing style, often using the inverted pyramid style of writing so that stories can be edited to fit available space in a newspaper without losing the essence of the story.

The collapse of AP's traditional rival, United Press International, as a major competitor in 1993 has left AP as the only nationally oriented news service based in the United States. The other rival English-language news services, such as Reuters and the English language service of Agence France-Press are based outside the United States.

**Reuters**
Reuters Group plc (LSE: RTR and NASDAQ: RTRS); pronounced is a financial market data provider and news service that provides reports from around the world to newspapers and broadcasters. However, news reporting accounts for less than 10% of the company's income.[1] Its main focus is on supplying the financial markets with information and trading products. These include market data, such as share prices and currency rates, research and analytics, as well as trading systems that allow dealers to buy and sell such things as currencies and shares on a computer screen instead of by telephone or on a trading floor like that of the New York Stock Exchange. Among other services, the most notable is analysis of 40,000 companies, debt instruments, and 3 million economic series
International news channels

**Fox News**  
Online news and headlines from Fox News, including top stories, business, and sports news. Also offers Fox News television schedules, radio schedules, commentary, and opinion.  
www.foxnews.com

**MSNBC**  
Breaking news from MSNBC's online news portal, including world, national, business, sports, and entertainment news, as well as information about MSNBC television news.  
www.msnbc.com

**BBCNEWS**  
Explore BBC News through sites which offer news coverage including business, health, sports, and weather, news archives, information about the presenters, and audio/video clips from the major arm of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) responsible for the corporation's news gathering and production of news programs on BBC television.  
dir.yahoo.com/.../News_and_Media/BBC_News
COMMUNICATION AND CULTURAL GLOBALIZATION

The analysis of the effects of the explosion in international communication had been mainly preoccupied with the economic dimensions of globalization at the expense of cultural aspects of interactions between and among the world’s peoples. Is globalization another term of Americanization? The general pattern of the media ownership indicates that the west, led by the USA, dominates the international flow of information and entertainment in all major media sectors. But what is the impact of such one way flows of global information and entertainment on national and regional media cultures? It has been argued that international communication and media are leading to the homogenization of culture, but the patterns of global/national/local interaction may be more complex.

Globalization of western culture
As detailed in the previous lessons the global communication hard and software industries are owned by a few transnational corporations, notably those based in the USA. So firstly we study about the Americanization.

Americanization
Americanization is the term used for the influence the United States of America has on the culture of other countries, resulting in such phenomena as the substitution of a given culture with American culture. When encountered unwillingly or perforce, it has a negative connotation; when sought voluntarily, it has a positive connotation.

Media
The spread of American media including TV, film and American music artists, has been the main component of Americanization of other countries. American TV shows are broadcast around the world. Many of the shows are broadcast through American broadcasters and their subsidiaries such as HBO Asia, CNBC Europe, Fox Channel and CNN International. All of what is known as the "big four" American broadcasters have international distributors, for example HBO broadcasts to over 200 countries. Many of these distributors broadcast mainly American on their TV channels. According to a recent survey by Radio Times The Simpson, Lost and Desperate Housewives are among the most watched shows, with CSI being the most watched show among the surveyed 20 countries. American films are also extremely popular globally. All of the top 20 grossing films ever are American made or have an American influence, either through publishers, cast or financiers. Titanic is currently the biggest grossing film worldwide without adjusting for inflation, it currently holds the top grossing film title in various countries including England, Germany, France, Spain among others. Adjusting for inflation, the highest grossing film of all time is gone with the Wind. Often part of the negotiating in free trade agreements between the America and other nations involve screen quotas. One such case is Mexico, after abolishing their screen quotas after the establishment of NAFTA with the US. Recently Korea has agreed to reduce its quota under pressure from America as part of a free trade deal. Many American artists are known throughout the world; artists such as Frank Sinatra, Michael Jackson and Elvis Presley are recognized worldwide and have sold over 500 million albums each. Michael Jackson's album Thriller is at 100 million sales the biggest selling album of all time.
American Business and Brands
Of the top ten global brands seven are based in the United States. Coca Cola, which holds the top spot, is often viewed as a symbol of Americanization. Coca Cola has vending machines in over 200 countries worldwide. Of the 25 biggest companies, thirteen are based in the United States. Many of these companies can be viewed as selling Americanized products. Many of the world's biggest computer companies are also American, such as Microsoft, Apple Inc., Dell, IBM and Google. Much of the software used worldwide is created by American based companies. The two largest Personal Computer companies, Dell and Hewlett Packard, which maintain over 30% of the market, are American based.

Fast Food
Fast food along with Coca Cola is also often viewed as being a symbol of American dominance and influence. Companies such as McDonalds, Burger King, KFC, Dominos pizza, among others have numerous outlets around the world. The success of these American companies has led to the spread of localized fast food restaurants.

Westernization
Westernization is a process whereby non-western societies come under the influence of "Western culture" in such matters as industry, technology, law, politics, economics, lifestyle, diet, language, alphabet, religion or values. Westernization has been a pervasive and accelerating influence across the world in the last few centuries. It is usually a two-sided process, in which western influences and interests themselves are joined by a wish of at least parts of the affected society to change towards a more westernized society, in the hope of attaining western life or some aspects of it. Westernization can also be related to the process of acculturation. Acculturation refers to the changes that occur within a society or culture when two different groups come into direct continuous contact. After the contact, changes in cultural patterns within either or both cultures are evident. In popular speech, Westernization can also refer to the effects of Western expansion and colonialism on native societies. For example, natives who have adopted European languages and characteristic Western customs are called acculturated or westernized. Westernization may be forced or voluntary depending on the situation of the contact. Different degrees of domination, destruction, resistance, survival, adaptation, and modification of the native culture may follow interethnic contact. In a situation where the native culture experiences destruction as a result of a more powerful outsider, a “shock phase” often is a result from the encounter. This shock phase is especially characteristic during interactions involving expansionist or colonialist eras. During the shock phase, civil repression using military force may lead to a cultural collapse, or ethnocide, which is a culture’s physical extinction. According to Conrad Phillip, the westerners "will attempt to remake the native culture within their own image, ignoring the fact that the models of culture that they have created are inappropriate for settings outside of western civilization" (Phillip, Conrad.2005). Window on Humanity.

Process of Westernization
Colonization (1492-1960s)
Europeanization
From 1492 onward, Europeanization and colonialism spread gradually over much of the world, colonizing major portions of the globe. During this period a strong influence was exercised on the indigenous cultures, which resulted in many colonies' indigenous populations assimilating certain elements of European culture willingly or by force, such as the language of the European
motherland or the Christian religion. In many cases the indigenous population was supplanted or marginalized by European and African immigrants. The two World Wars weakened the European powers to such extent that many colonies strove for independence, often inspired by nationalistic movements. A period of decolonization started. At the end of the 1960s, most colonies were autonomous. Those new states often adopted some aspects of Western politics such as the adoption of a constitution, while frequently reacting against western culture.

Globalization (1960s-now)
Westernization is often regarded as a part of the ongoing process of globalization. This theory proposes that western thought has led to globalization, and that globalization propagates western culture, leading to a cycle of westernization. The main characteristics are economic liberalization (free trade) and democratization, combined with the spread of an individualized culture. Often it was also regarded of the opposite of the worldwide influence of communism. After the break up of the USSR in 1991, many of its component states and allies nevertheless underwent westernization, including privatization of hitherto state-controlled industry. Westernization as globalization is seen by many as progress, as democracy and free trade spread gradually throughout the world. Others view westernization as a disadvantage. Some have protested that Asian cultures that have traditionally existed on a primarily plant-based diet might lose this healthy lifestyle as more people in Asia switch to a Western-style diet that is rich in animal-based foods. (Cornell Times, 2001)

Definitions, Synonyms, Organizer Terms
Current definitions of culture are informed by research from a variety of fields: anthropology, psychology, sociolinguistics, and critical theory. Nieto (1999) offers an extensive definition of culture as "the ever-changing values, traditions, social and political relationships, and worldview created, shared, and transformed by a group of people bound together by a combination of factors that include a common history, geographic location, language, social class, and religion."

Definitions
Cultural Diversity - n. Ethnic, gender, racial, and socioeconomic variety in a situation, institution, or group; the coexistence of different ethnic, gender, racial, and socioeconomic groups within one social unit

Cultural diversity
There is a general consensus among mainstream anthropologists that humans first emerged in Africa about two million years ago. Since then we have spread throughout the world, successfully adapting to widely differing conditions and to periodic cataclysmic changes in local and global climate. The many separate societies that emerged around the globe differed markedly from each other, and many of these differences persist to this day. As well as the more obvious cultural differences that exist between peoples, such as language, dress and traditions, there are also significant variations in the way societies organize themselves, in their shared conception of morality, and in the ways they interact with their environment. Joe Nelson, from Stafford Virginia, has popularized the words "Culture and diversity" while in Africa. It is debatable whether these differences are merely incidental artifacts arising from patterns of human migration or whether they represent an evolutionary trait that is key to our success as a species. By analogy with biodiversity, which is thought to be essential to the long-term survival of life on earth, it can be argued that cultural diversity may be vital for the long-term survival of humanity; and that the conservation of indigenous cultures may be as important to humankind as
the conservation of species and ecosystems is to life in general. This argument is rejected by
many people, on several grounds. Firstly, like most evolutionary accounts of human nature, the
importance of cultural diversity for survival may be an un-testable hypothesis, which can neither
be proved nor disproved. Secondly, it can be argued that it is unethical deliberately to conserve
"less developed" societies, because this will deny people within those societies the benefits of
technological and medical advances enjoyed by those of us in the "developed" world. Finally,
there are many people, particularly those with strong religious beliefs, who maintain that it is in
the best interests of individuals and of humanity as a whole that we all adhere to the single model
for society that they deem to be correct. For example, fundamentalist evangelist missionary
organizations such as the New Tribes Mission actively work to reduce cultural diversity by
seeking out remote tribal societies, converting them to their own faith, and inducing them to
remodel their society after its principles. Cultural diversity is tricky to quantify, but a good
indication is thought to be a count of the number of languages spoken in a region or in the world
as a whole. By this measure, there are signs that we may be going through a period of precipitous
decline in the world's cultural diversity. Research carried out in the 1990s by David Crystal
(Honorary Professor of Linguistics at the University of Wales, Bangor) suggested that at that
time, on average, one language was falling into disuse every two weeks. He calculated that if that
rate of language death were to continue, then by the year 2100 more than 90% of the languages
currently spoken in the world will have gone extinct. Overpopulation, immigration and
imperialism (of both the militaristic and cultural kind) are reasons that have been suggested to
explain any such decline. There are several international organizations that work towards
protecting threatened societies and cultures, including Survival International and UNESCO. The
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, adopted by 185 Member States in 2001,
represents the first international standard-setting instrument aimed at preserving and promoting
cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue. The EC funded Network of Excellence "Sustainable
Development in a Diverse World" SUS.DIV builds upon the UNESCO Declaration to
investigates the relationship between cultural diversity and sustainable development.

Global English
Modern English is sometimes described as the global lingua franca. English is the dominant
international language in communications, science, business, aviation, entertainment, radio and
diplomacy. The influence of the British Empire is the primary reason for the initial spread of the
language far beyond the British Isles. Following World War II, the growing economic and
cultural influence of the United States has significantly accelerated the adoption of English. A
working knowledge of English is required in certain fields, professions, and occupations. As a
result over a billion people speaks English at least at a basic level (see English language learning
and teaching). English is one of six official languages of the United Nations.

English as a global language
English in computer science and global language Because English is so widely spoken, it has
often been referred to as a "global language", the lingua franca of the modern era. While English
is not an official language in most countries, it is currently the language most often taught as a
second language around the world. Some linguists [attribution needed] believe that it is no longer
the exclusive cultural sign of "native English speakers", but is rather a language that is absorbing
aspects of cultures worldwide as it continues to grow. It is, by international treaty, the official
language for aerial and maritime communications, as well as one of the official languages of the
European Union, the United Nations, and most international athletic organizations Including the
International Olympic Committee English is the language most often studied as a foreign
language in the European Union (by 89% of schoolchildren), followed by French (32%), German
In the EU, a large fraction of the population reports being able to converse to some extent in English. Among non-English speaking countries, a large percentage of the population claimed to be able to converse in English in the Netherlands (87%), Sweden (85%), Denmark (83%), Luxembourg (66%), Finland (60%), Slovenia (56%), Austria (53%), Belgium (52%), and Germany (51%). Norway and Iceland also have a large majority of competent English-speakers. In addition, among the younger generations in the aforementioned countries, competence in English approaches 100%. [Citation needed] Books, magazines, and newspapers written in English are available in many countries around the world. English is also the most commonly used language in the sciences. In 1997, the Science Citation Index reported that 95% of its articles were written in English, even though only half of them came from authors in English-speaking countries.
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AND CULTURE

Intercultural communication
Culture (from the Latin culture stemming from colure, meaning; to cultivate,) generally refers to patterns of human activity and the symbolic structures that give such activities significance and importance. Different definitions of “culture” reflect different theoretical bases for understanding, or criteria for evaluating, human activity.

Defining "culture"
Culture can be defined as all the behaviors, arts, beliefs and institutions of a population that are passed down from generation to generation. Culture has been called "the way of life for an entire society." As such, it includes codes of manners, dress, language, religion, rituals, norms of behavior such as law and morality, and systems of belief as well as the arts and gastronomy.

Terminology: cross- or inter-?
In French the only possible adjective for this field is “intercultural”, where as in English we have both “intercultural” and “cross-cultural”. Many English speakers favor “cross-cultural”, some almost avoiding “intercultural” as if it were a case of vocabulary interference with French. Others use the terms interchangeably.

I have entitled my class “Intercultural Communication”, because like many people involved in this field, I distinguish between these two terms. In our usage, “cross-cultural” applies to something which covers more than one culture.

For example “a cross-cultural study of education in Western Europe” would be a comparison of chosen aspects of education in various countries or regions, but would consider each country or region separately and would not suggest any interaction between the various educational systems.

On the other hand, the term “intercultural” implies interaction. From an intercultural perspective, it would be possible to study the experiences of students or teachers who move from one educational system to another, or to examine the interactions of students from different countries enrolled in a specific class or program. “Culture shock” and “cultural adaptation” are thus intercultural notions.

Cross-cultural
Cross-cultural communication (also frequently referred to as intercultural communication) is a field of study that looks at how people from differing cultural backgrounds Endeavour to communicate.

Interdisciplinary orientation
Cross-cultural communication tries to bring together such relatively unrelated areas as cultural anthropology and established areas of communication. Its core is to establish and understand how people from different cultures communicate with each other. Its charge is to also produce some guidelines with which people from different cultures can better communicate with each other. For example, how does a person from China communicate with a person from America? Furthermore, what underlying mental constructs appear from both parties that allows for constructive communication?

Cross-cultural communication, as in many scholarly fields, is a combination of many other fields. These fields include anthropology, cultural studies, psychology and communication. The field has also moved both toward the treatment of interethnic relations, and toward the study of
communication strategies used by co-cultural populations, i.e., communication strategies used to deal with majority or mainstream populations. The introduction of power as a cultural communication variable leads to a body of critical scholarship

**Interculturalism**

Interculturalism is the philosophy of exchanges between cultural groups within a society. Various states have intercultural policies which seek to encourage the socialization of citizens of different origins. These policies are often ostensibly used as an instrument to fight racism. Interculturalism requires an inherent openness to be exposed to the culture of the "other". Once a person is exposed to an element of a different culture, a dialogue will ensue, where everyone embarks upon understanding the culture of the other, and usually this involves comparisons. Thus, Interculturalism breeds dialogue, in order to be able to look for commonalities between that element of one's culture and the culture of the other. Interculturalism seeks to enhance fusion by looking for commonalities. Hence, various cultures merge. The differences that remain make up the subcultures of the world

**Intercultural communication principles**

Intercultural communication principles guide the process of exchanging meaningful and unambiguous information across cultural boundaries, in a way that preserves mutual respect and minimizes antagonism. For these purposes, culture is a shared system of symbols, beliefs, attitudes, values, expectations, and norms of behaviors. It refers to coherent groups of people whether resident wholly or partly within state territories, or existing without residence in any particular territory. Hence, these principles may have equal relevance when a tourist seeks help, where two well-established independent corporations attempt to merge their operations, and where politicians attempt to negotiate world peace. Two factors have raised the importance of this topic:

- Improvements in communication and transportation technology have made it possible for previously stable cultures to meet in unstructured situations, e.g. the internet opens lines of communication without mediation, while budget airlines transplant ordinary citizens into unfamiliar milieux. Experience proves that merely crossing cultural boundaries can be considered threatening, while positive attempts to interact may provoke defensive responses. Misunderstanding may be compounded by either an exaggerated sensitivity to possible slights, or an exaggerated and over-protective fear of giving offence;
- Some groups believe that the phenomenon of globalization has reduced cultural diversity and so reduced the opportunity for misunderstandings, but characterizing people as a homogeneous market is simplistic. One product or brand only appeals to the material aspirations of one self-selecting group of buyers, and its sales performance will not affect the vast multiplicity of factors that may separate the cultures.

**What can go wrong?**

People from different cultures encode and decode messages differently, increasing the chances of misunderstanding, so The safety-first consequence of recognizing cultural differences should be to assume that everyone’s thoughts and actions are not just like ours. Such assumptions stem from potentially devastating ignorance and can lead to much frustration for members of both cultures. Entering a culture with this type of ethnocentrism, the assumption your own culture is correct, is another byproduct of ignorance and cultural misunderstanding.
Basic Cultural Difference
Cultures can be different not only between continents or nations, but also within the same company or even family (Geographical, ethnical, moral, ethical, religious, political, and historical) cultural affiliation or cultural identity.

Typical examples of cultural differences
• The perception is different and often selective In Arabic countries the odors (of condiments, coffee etc.) are often perceived in more differentiated ways than in, for example, North America
• Behavior and gestures are interpreted differently: Showing the thumb held upwards in the Americas, especially Brazil and the United States, means "everything's ok", while it is understood in some Islamic countries as a rude sexual sign.
• "Everything ok" is shown in western European countries, especially between pilots and divers, with the sign of the thumb and forefinger forming an "O". This sign means in Japan "now we may talk about money", in southern France the contrary ("nothing, without any value"), in Eastern Europe and Russia it is an indecent sexual sign.
• In North America as well as in Arabic countries the pauses between words are usually not too long, while in Japan pauses can give a contradictory sense to the spoken words. Enduring silence is perceived as comfortable in Japan, while in India, Europe and North America it may cause insecurity and embarrassment. Scandinavians, by Western standards, are more tolerant of silent breaks during conversations.
• Laughing is connoted in most countries with happiness - in Japan it is often a sign of confusion, insecurity and embarrassment.
• In the UK and Commonwealth countries the word "compromise" has a positive meaning (as a consent, an agreement where both parties win something); in North America and Ireland it may, at times, have negative connotations (as both parties lose something) (this phenomenon tends to happen highly competitive atmospheres where consensus has broken down).
• If invited to dinner, in some Asian countries it is well- mannered to leave right after the dinner: the ones who don’t leave may indicate they have not eaten enough. In the Indian sub-continent, Europe, South America, and North American countries this is considered rude, indicating that the guest only wanted to eat but wouldn’t enjoy the company with the hosts.
• In Mediterranean European countries, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa, it is normal, or at least widely tolerated, to arrive half an hour late for a dinner invitation, whereas in Germany and in the United States this would be considered very rude. In Africa, Arab cultures, and certain countries in South America[citation needed] (not in Brazil), saying to a female friend one has not seen for a while that she has put on weight means she is physically healthier than before and had a nice holiday, whereas this would be considered an insult in India, Europe, North America and Australia.
• In Africa, avoiding eye contact or looking at the ground when talking to one's parents, an elder, or someone of higher social status is a sign of respect. In contrast, these same actions are signals of deception or shame (on the part of the doer) in North America and most of Europe.

• In Persian culture, if a person offers an item (i.e a drink), it is customary to not instantly accept it. A sort of role play forms with the person offering being refused several times out of politeness before their offering is accepted. This tradition is known as 'tarof' which in Persian literally means 'offer'. A similar exchange happens in many East Asian countries.

• In African, South American and Mediterranean cultures, talking and laughing loudly in the streets and public places is widely accepted, whereas in some Asian cultures it is considered rude and may be seen as a mark of self-centeredness or attention-seeking. In Italy and Guatemala is common for people in gatherings to say goodbye many time when they leave, for example, someone could say goodbye in the living room and the chat for a while, the say goodbye in the door, and chat a little more, finally say goodbye in their car’s door and then chat a little more until people leave.

**Intercultural competence**

Intercultural competence is the ability of successful communication with people of other cultures. This ability can exist in someone at a young age, or may be developed and improved due to willpower and competence. The bases for a successful intercultural communication are emotional competence, together with intercultural sensitivity. Interculturally competent is a person who captures and understands, in interaction with people from foreign cultures, their specific concepts in perception, thinking, feeling and acting. Earlier experiences are considered, free from prejudices; there is an interest and motivation to continue learning.

**The Six Steps to Intercultural Communication**

We live in an increasingly complex world. One element of this complexity is the mixing of different cultures, languages and faiths. Within the business world intercultural communication is vital for success. Effective communication between colleagues from different cultural backgrounds ensures a team is working harmoniously.

The six steps to intercultural communication are basic pointers that all working in intercultural teams should be aware of to ensure culture becomes a vehicle for positive advancement rather than a barrier.

**1. Break Assumptions**

Everyone makes or has assumptions about others. Assumptions are beliefs rather than objective truth and are usually influenced by a number of subjective factors. For intercultural communication to truly work, people need to assess their assumptions and ask themselves why they hold those ideas or beliefs. By doing so and even openly examining them with others, the initial barrier to intercultural communication is overcome.

**2. Empathies**

In order to come to appreciate and understand people from different cultures, empathy is vital. Through putting yourself in someone else's shoes you come to see or appreciate their point of view.
3. Involve
Involving others in tasks or decision making empowers and builds strong relationships. Using intercultural diversity is in essence a more creative approach to problem solving as it incorporates different points of view.

4. Discourage Herd Mentality
Herd mentality refers to a closed and one dimensional approach. Such ways of thinking curbs creativity, innovation and advancement as people are restricted in how to think approach and engage with people or challenges. Intercultural communication can only flourish and therefore contribute if people are encouraged to think as individuals, bring their cultural influences to the table and share ideas that may be outside the box.

5. Shun Insensitive Behaviour
People can and do behave in culturally insensitive ways. By attacking someone's person, you attack their culture and therefore their dignity. This can only be divisive. Intercultural communication is based upon people thinking through words and actions to ensure they do not act inappropriately. When insensitive behaviour is witnessed it is the responsibility of all to shun it and ensure it remains unacceptable.

6. Be Wise
Wisdom is not called wisdom for nothing. People need to be aware how to interact with people with respect and knowledge. Intercultural communication is essentially founded upon wisdom, i.e. showing maturity of thought and action in dealing with people. Through thinking things out and have background knowledge to intercultural differences much of the communication problems witnessed within business could be avoided.
LESSON 11

NEWS MEDIA AND THE FOREIGN POLICY

News media and the foreign policy decision-making process, CNN or Washington

Introduction

There is a great debate about the relationship between the news media and the foreign policy decision-making process, and the impact the former may have on the latter. Two theories have risen to explain this matter, the so-called "CNN effect" and the "manufacturing consent" thesis. But these theories are in conflict, thus, agreement about the direct impact of the media on foreign policy is yet to be achieved. Even though for "many journalists, policy-makers and scholars, there really is little doubt that media profoundly affect the foreign policy process" (Livingston, 1997), recent research about the effects of the media on Western Governments in response to humanitarian interventions "fails to clarify whether or not the news media has (or has not) triggered recent 'humanitarian' interventions"(Robinson, 1999).

This essay will start by analyzing foreign coverage and foreign policy making. The reason for this is that foreign events are dealt by the media through coverage and by foreign policy makers through the creation, modification and implementation of policies. Further on, the findings of several authors, like Livingston (1997), Livingston and Eachus (1995), Jacobsen (1996 and 2000), Gowing (1994) and Mermin (1997) will be reviewed in order to set grounding for the perceived conclusions about the impact of the news media on the foreign policy decision-making process.

Media-Foreign policy decision-making relationship

In order to illustrate how the news media have revolutionized the foreign policy making process, the image of the Soviet missile crisis in Bay of Pigs, during John F. Kennedy's government is often mentioned (Hoge, 1994; Livingston, 1997). During the first six days of the crisis, Kennedy and his advisers had the chance to deliberate in secrecy about which course of action they were to take. The capability of keeping the situation in secret kept foreign policy makers from dealing with "public hysteria"(Livingston, 1997) or media pressures.

Nonetheless, the context has changed considerably since1962. Firstly, due to technological developments, real time news coverage allows information to be broadcasted 24 hours a day from anywhere in the world, with no regards for diplomatic secrecy. Secondly, since the end of the Cold War, the world is no longer bipolar, leading towards a lack of definition of American national interests, for they are no longer constructed around the idea of stopping the spread of communism. The latter leads towards the third point: there is policy uncertainty about foreign affairs. These contextual changes have redefined; it is argued, the relationship between the news media and the foreign policy decision-making process in the West, though there is great debate about its reaches and limitations.

On the one hand is the so-called "CNN effect", which is understood in a variety of ways. It comes from being understood as the capability of the news media (television in particular) to "shape the policy agenda" (Gowing, 1994); the "power" of news journalism "to move governments" (Cohen,1994); "the idea that real-time communications technology could provoke major responses from domestic audiences and political elites to global events" (Robinson, 1999); the argument that "the media drives Western conflict management by forcing Western governments to intervene militarily in humanitarian crises against their will" (Jacobsen, 2000); "elite decision makers' loss of policy control to news media" (Livingston and Eachus, 1995); to the argument that the term "CNN effect" has been used imprecisely, for there are several types of media effects, deriving from different types of policies (Livingston, 1997).
On the other hand, the manufacturing consent theory "argues that the media does not create policy, but rather that news media is mobilized (manipulated even) into supporting government policy" (Robinson, 1999). There are two ways in which manufacturing consent may take place: the executive version, in which there is framing that, conforms to the official agenda; and the elite version, in which news coverage is critical of executive policy as a consequence of elite dissensus (ibid.).

**Media, Foreign Policy and Events**

However, in my opinion, the first question to be asked regarding the impact of the media on foreign policy making decisions concerns how each of these actors, the media and policy Coverage makers, relate to foreign events.

The media relate to events through coverage (or lack of coverage one may add). However, when it comes to foreign news, there are mixed trends. On the one hand, there is a tendency towards cutting back the amount of it as a response to little public interest (Hoge, 1994: 143). But on the other, some media are "expanding their foreign coverage" (idem.). Either way, the attention that media gives to foreign news seems to be focused to "the unusual and the violent" (ibid.). "Film footage of violence is the element of foreign news most likely to leap the hurdles barring entry to the evening news shows' 22 precious minutes of airtime" (Hoge, 1993: 3). Bias against peaceful news is noted.

Jacobsen (2000) divides conflicts in three phases: pre-violence, violence and post-violence. His findings are that during the pre and post-violence coverage is negligible; "Since coverage of conflicts that might explode in violence is unlikely to boost ratings, these conflicts are usually ignored" (ibid: 133). In the pre-violence phase coverage is also minimal, as an example of this, Jacobsen notes "Mine clearing is only news if Princess Diana is doing it" (idem: 138). The coverage during the post-violence phase, however, tends towards the negative; failed projects, corruption, mismanagement, etc. (ibidem). The broad of coverage of a conflict, hence, happens during the violent phase, however, it is decided by "a host of different factors, most of which have nothing to do with humanitarian need such as: geographic proximity to Western countries, costs, logistics, legal impediments (e.g. visa requirements), risk to journalists, relevance to national interest, and news attention cycles" (Jacobsen, 2000: 133).

Thus, foreign news may be concluded, are subject to coverage in relation to its level of violence and general news making and newsworthiness concerns. Girardet (1996) notes that there is a multiplicity of violent conflicts that have not received coverage at all. Conflicts are covered also in relation to their international implications, "It is doubtful that the media would have reported on Rwandans had it "just" been a case of Rwandans killing Rwandans" (ibid: 57). He explains the lack of coverage of violent conflicts comes from the need of the international community to justify concerns "by reacting to something more morally abhorrent than the mundane killing of ordinary human beings -just as Afghans killing Afghans, Sudanese killing Sudanese, or Angolans killing Angolans is apparently insufficient to mobilize more consistent coverage." (ibidem: 58). Girardet (1996) also points out that there is an obsession with the medium, rather than the purpose. The "technological conveniences" that news ICT's bring constitute a threat to quality journalism, since "All too often, information is confused with understanding, and high technology with journalism, so fascinated are the people by the vehicle rather than the purpose". The consequence is an obsession with immediacy, which shortens the journalist's time to fully research and understand the issues at hand”, encouraging, laziness and an over reliance on existent data" (ibid: 59-60).
Gowing (1994) believes that "There is far more real-time war than ever before" (81). Whatever is transmitted is determined by its graphic potential, "the main principle is no pictures, then no serious coverage of a conflict" (idem.).

So far it is understood that foreign news is focused on conflicts; yet, only a few conflicts are covered, and such coverage is determined by a variety of factors independent to their level of humanitarian concerns, such as routine news making and newsworthiness considerations; the quality of the coverage, just as well, is influenced by the use of technologies at hand. However, what drives the attention of journalists in the first place towards a specific conflict? Hoge (1993: 2) believes that "the new media's task has been made more difficult by an absence of clear, steady cues from Washington (...) the press traditionally has covered international affairs from the perspective of America's perceived interests". As Mermin (1997) notes, "American journalists turn to politicians and government officials for guidance in deciding what constitutes news". Furthermore, Washington constitutes a place "where newsworthy information is made public everyday" (ibid.). The same point is made by Livingston and Eachus (1995: 415) when they say that reporters "have been found to routinely turn to officials as news sources (Gans, 1979; Paletz & Entman, 1981; Said,1981; Sigal, 1973), particularly in foreign affairs and national security reporting (Entman, 1991; Hallin, 1989; Livingston, 1994)."

Mermin's research entitled "Television news and American intervention in Somalia" reveals that Washington's decisions were the key to the subsequent coverage of the events, which fluctuated in amount and importance in relation to what was going on in Washington. Just as well, he notes that coverage was also drawn in relation to the priority Somalia played in the American agenda, as an example, he points out that during July of 1992, Somalia was never in the top of the news because it was not in the top of the foreign policy agenda (1997: 395).

In short, the coverage of a foreign conflict is determined by a variety of factors sometimes tangential to the event itself. However, the quality of the coverage, and by this we mean the way reports are fashioned, is also subject of external determinants. News reports about humanitarian crises are claimed to move governments towards action as the CNN effect presumes, or to frame contents in conformity to executive or elitist interests, as suggested by the manufacturing consent theory. This will be returned to later in this essay.

Foreign policy in Western democracies, as is the case of the United States, is drawn upon the idea of a predetermined national interest. With the end of the Cold-War the main concern of USA's national interest, stopping the spread of communism, was over, yet the challenge is now that of a new definition of national interests. As Hoge (1993: 2) describes, "there is not yet an articulated official framework for U.S.foreign policy in a still new post-Cold War world". The Cold War, Hoge (1994: 137) argues, provided a "gauge for determining the importance of events by how much they affected America's security versus its superpower rival". In other words, the Cold War provided Americans with a defined ideological stigmata, and this was revealed in the media: "The parameters of press coverage tended to be those of the country's foreign policy (...) The press was often critical, but of the execution of policy more than the aims." (Hoge, 1994:137).

Joseph Nye (1999: 22) describes that the collapse of the Soviet Union challenges the way America conceives its national interests, since "'national interest' is a slippery concept, used to describe as well as prescribe foreign policy". Samuel P. Huntington argues that "without a sure sense of national identity, Americans have become unable to define their national interests, and as a result sub national commercial interests and transnational and non national ethnic interests have come to dominate foreign policy"(quoted in Nye, 1999: 22).

Nye describes national interests in a democracy as follows: “national interest is simply the shared priorities regarding relations with the rest of the world" (1999: 23). Nye (1999) argues that
policy making is more difficult today because of power complexities; he conceives power as a three-dimensional chessboard: the first dimension is the military and it is uni polar, with the USA on top of the world; the second dimension is the economic, which is multi polar, with the USA, Europe and Japan having the biggest shares; the third dimension is that of transnational relations, with a dispersed structure of power. In conclusion, the USA "is preponderant, but not a dominant power" (Nye, 1999: 24). Therefore, the world did not exactly become uni polar after the Cold War; hence, national interests and foreign policies ought to take other variables into account, like the level of risk U.S. national security faces. Nye establishes three categories in the hierarchy of risks to U.S. national security. The "A" list constituted by threats to American survival (like the one the Soviet Union represented); the "B" list, constituted by imminent threats to U.S. interests (but not to its survival), and the "C" list, formed by "contingencies that indirectly affect U.S. security but do not directly threaten U.S. interests", like Kosovo, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti (Nye, 1999: 26).

Nowadays, Nye (1999) argues, the "C" list predominates in the foreign policy agenda, one explanation of this comes from the disappearance of the threat of the Soviet Union as an "A" list, but another one is that the "C" list is the main concern of media foreign coverage. However, he argues, "A human rights policy is not itself a foreign policy, it is an important part of a foreign policy (...) In the information age, humanitarian concerns dominate attention to a greater degree that before at the cost of diverting attention from "A" list strategic issues" (1999: 31).

However, as many researchers argue, this intrusion of the "C" list in foreign policy priorities product of media coverage, which is one way to describe the CNN effect, is a consequence of the lack of policy clarity (Gowing, 1994; Freedman, 2000; Hoge, 1994; Robinson, 2001). Just as policy clarity is perceived as necessary in determining the way media and foreign policy makers would react to a certain international contingency, political leadership is seen as paramount (Hoge, 1994, 144; Livingston, 1997: 1; Gjelten, 2002, Kohut and Toth, 1994: 58)).

In short, in the USA, foreign policies are drawn around a set of priorities determined in relation to the degree of importance of the perceived national interests, which are also determined by levels of risk to national security. In the post-Cold War world, however, those interests are not clearly defined, in consequence, policies are difficult to determine.

The media is believed to raise importance of tangential matters over more substantial concerns in cases of policy uncertainty, as well as lack of political leadership. Power concentration varies according to the dimension of concern, yet one dimension has repercussions on the other. When it comes to policy-making, those involved in the process posses a different level of power, and to create a policy they must be subjected to a bargaining interaction "between a set of subsystems in the government" (Robinson, 2001: 534).

The relevance of the relationship between the news media and foreign policy makers goes beyond the fact that the former cover foreign events and the latter make policies regarding foreign events. The importance of this relationship, thus, relies on two claims about it: firstly, the claims that the coverage of certain events has the potential to drive the policies that foreign policy makers conduct regarding the events covered (the CNN effect), secondly, the claim that foreign policy makers are the ones who drive media attention towards certain foreign events, and even determine the way those events are being framed (Manufacturing consent).

Case study
Media-Foreign Policy Making, CNN or Washington

When trying to understand the relationship between the media and foreign policy decision-making, both theories, the CNN effect and the manufacturing consent come into contest. In this
part of the essay, the conclusions that different researchers have reached regarding this topic will be reviewed, in order to present a wide scope of the dimensions of their findings.

Jacobsen (2000), as previously mentioned, studied the impact of media coverage on foreign conflict management in relation to the phases of violence of the conflict. He concludes that the direct impact of the media on foreign policy making is negligible in the pre and post-violence phases and limited during the violence phase. He notes that the CNN effect is necessary for interventions, but insufficient to cause them, for they are decided by other factors: action perceived as quick, with low risk of casualties and a clear exit strategy. The "direct impact of the media on Western conflict management is negligible because coverage is limited to a small number of conflicts in the violence phase". The consequent shifting of funds from "cost-effective, long-term measures to short-term relief efforts leading to a high ineffective allocation of resources" is the "invisible and indirect" impact that the media actually have on Western conflict management. This impact, he argues, "exceeds the direct impact generated by the CNN effect by far since the latter only affects a very small number of conflicts" (Jacobsen, 2000).

On the other hand, Livingston (1997) suggests a three-way typology of likely CNN effects. These are conditional on the kind of intervention that is being conducted, of which he recognizes eight types. The three CNN effects are described as follows:

First effect is media as accelerants, in this modality, media are presumed to shorten the time of decision-making response. Yet, the media can also become a "force multiplier", a "method of sending signals" to the opponent (1997: 2-4). This effect is most plausible to appear in conventional warfare, strategic deterrence, and tactical deterrence (ibid, 11).

Second effect is media as impediment; this takes two forms, as an emotional inhibitor, and as a threat to operational security. One likely manifestation of the emotional inhibitor effect is the "Vietnam syndrome" (Livingston, 1997: 4), in which, it is presumed, public support is undermined by the media coverage of casualties. As a threat to operational security, the media are said to compromise the success of an operation by broadcasting it and, thus, revealing strategic information to the enemy, frustrating the success of the operation. This kind of effect, Livingston notes, is likely to appear during conventional warfare, tactical deterrence, SOLIC, peace making and peace keeping operations.

The third likely effect of the media on foreign policy making that Livingston (1997) mentions is that of the media as an agenda setting agent. It is presumed that the coverage of humanitarian crises puts the issue in the foreign policy agenda and drives intervention.

Livingston's typology of likely CNN effects is supported by the findings of other authors; however, the true existence of such effects still remains undetermined, though Livingston (1997) skepticism is more focused towards questioning the ability of the media to set the agenda.

Hoge (1994: 137) describes the quality of media as accelerants as a pressure for politicians to "respond promptly to news accounts". However, Hoge foresees a negative effect of media as accelerants, due to the fact that news accounts "by their very immediacy are incomplete, without context and sometimes wrong" (ibid.). In the case of Somalia, Mermin (1997: 399) believes that media stories may have accelerated the movement in Washington towards intervention, yet those stories were "clearly a product of that movement".

The "Vietnam Syndrome", denominated "bodybag effect" by Freedman (2000) is an important consideration for intervention, even without the media; as Jacobsen (1996) describes, one of the
requirements for intervention is a low risk of casualties. Therefore, it can be concluded that is the fact of the casualties, not the broadcasting of them that has an effect on policy (Luttwak, 1994; Hoge, 1994), since casualties are "unacceptable if suffered for no purpose" (Freedman, 2000).

When it comes to operational security, from a military point of view, Maj. Lafferty, et. al. (1994) finds that during a conflict, media reports increase enemy effectiveness, but only to a certain climatic point, after this, the effectiveness will start decreasing as an outcome of information overload; "Therefore, the U.S. Military must recast its relationship with media and pursue a strategy of information overload to decrease enemy effectiveness" (ibid.).

The ability of the media to function as an agenda setter is the most questioned by Livingston (1997) since the so-called CNN effect has been overestimated. "The majority of humanitarian operations are conducted without media attention (…) furthermore; the eventual media coverage itself was the consequence of official actions." (Livingston, 1997: 7)

In the case of Somalia, Livingston (1997), Livingston and Eachus (1995) and Mermin (1997) conclude that the media were used by powerful elites to put pressure over other officials, and that coverage followed policy makers' actions.

However, Gowing (1994) by interviewing diplomatic and policy insiders finds that they often felt pressured and influenced by media coverage in their performance of foreign policy making. This fact reveals that the relationship between policy makers and the media is not a "one-way" one; rather it is one of reciprocal influence. Despite the influence of media over policy makers, Gowing (1994; 83) notes that media reports "shape the policy agenda, but do not dictate responses. They highlight policy dilemmas, but do not resolve them." In other words, the prerogatives on policy making belong to policy makers, media does not decide for them. Gowing (1994: 84, 85) concludes that in the future real-time television coverage will make no difference to policy making, the most likely situation is that a minor action would be taken just to show that "something" is being done; ultimately, events are what are important to policy makers, not the coverage of them (ibid.). The likely changes on policy strategy product of television coverage would be tactical, but not on the overall strategy (ibid: 89).

One final consideration to review in this part of the essay corresponds to the circumstances under which Western governments are more likely to intervene during humanitarian crises. Jacobsen (1996) finds five conditions for intervention: first, a clear case of humanitarian need where the UN would give its authorization; second, domestic support to the operation; third, CNN effect, which is recognized as necessary but not sufficient to cause an intervention; fourth, linkage to national interests; and fifth, feasibility of success, which also includes a low risk of casualties (the greater the domestic support, the more casualties they are willing to take).

Livingston (1997: 9) suggests that when looking more closely to "post-Cold War U.S. "humanitarian" interventions, one is likely to find equally compelling geo strategic reasons for the intervention.", like it happened during the Kurdish refugee crisis in 1991, where Scowcroft notes that it was the sensibility towards Turkey's anxiety about allowing the Kurds to stay" what fundamentally motivated the action (quoted in Livingston, 1997: 10). Apart from geo strategic concerns, Livingston mentions that a series of strict conditions must be met before the deployment of force, regulated by the Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD25), these include "a clear statement of American interests at stake in the operation, the approval of Congress, the availability of funding for the operation, a fixed date of withdrawal of U.S. forces, and an agreed upon command and control structure" (Livingston, 1997: 10).
In short, what researchers have found the CNN effect to be is the ability of the media to function as accelerants, impediments or agenda-setters. However, the reaches of each of these effects have counterarguments and the implications of these effects, by this we mean how positive or negative they are for foreign policy making, are not yet defined. Just as well, the ability of the media to impact foreign policy is inextricably related to coverage, thus, the greater the coverage, the more direct the impact, however, the indirect impact of the media is also relevant for foreign strategy, since it could deviate efforts from the long-term, cost-effective, high priority concerns towards the short-term, cost-ineffective, low priority contingencies.

Finally, humanitarian intervention is decided by a multiplicity of factors, out of which the CNN effect may be but one.

**Conclusions**

As a not clearly defined phenomenon, the so-called CNN effect appears like a rather simplistic cause and effect explanation of media-foreign policy decision making relationship; almost like a hypodermic needle theory taken to the sphere of policy making. On the other hand, the manufacturing consent theory implies some obscurity, even conspiracy behind the relationship between policy makers and the media. Not only does this imply that both media and audiences are passive entities, easy to manipulate, but also ignorant of the "reality" behind the framing and indexing of the coverage, since critical coverage is conceived only in cases of elite dissensus. Both these theories are in clear confrontation, and they invalidate each other. But as Robinson (2001) notes, the debate about effect vs. non-effect in unconstructive. Rather, new approaches towards understanding more clearly the relationship between media and foreign policy making are to be achieved.

Just as news media coverage is not limited to foreign events, foreign policy making is not limited to the foreign events covered by the media. Thus, it is not likely that the media could drive overall foreign policy for the mere fact that coverage is limited to a selected subset of events. However, it is likely that the media have the potential to lead towards the modification of the policies being conducted regarding the events covered. One way to explain this likely effect of the media on foreign policy understands it as a cycle of dialectic influence in which media reacts to policies and policy makers react to coverage in a continuum. In the long run, however, there is the possibility that dramatic changes would occur; yet the empirical evidence so far is that the policy makers' reaction to coverage of humanitarian crises is usually that of emergency relief. The perceived impact of the media is inextricably related to policy certainty, the greater the certainty the lesser the impact of the media. These points out other indirect effects of the media, such as those detailed by Jacobsen (2000) and Nye (1999).

The main conclusion of this essay is that news media and foreign policy making process influence one another, sometimes directly, others indirectly. The degrees of their mutual influence are proportional to other circumstances, such as newsworthiness from the media point of view, and policy uncertainty, from the foreign policy making perspective. However, the research reviewed is made from a Western point of view, and it is focused on cases of humanitarian intervention, hence it is insufficient to draw general conclusions about the impact of the media on foreign policy making as a whole. Furthermore, the conclusions achieved may not be accurate in the context of non-Western and/or non First World countries. As hinted before, new research is needed that would consider cases different to humanitarian intervention, and contexts outside Western countries in order to draw more accurate conclusions about the impact the news media and foreign policy making have (or may not have) in one another.
Post script
This essay was written in April 2002. Nowadays, the international agenda has been transformed because of the outburst of war in Iraq. Therefore, some of the situations presented in this essay have been modified. For a start, as suggested in the text, the end of the Cold War left the US without a clear definition of its national interests. After September 11th a new enemy emerged, as a result, so did a new international agenda: the war against terrorism, which led towards a military conflict meant to overthrow Sadam Hussain from the government of Iraq. Joseph Nye's distinction of the US power as preponderant, but not a dominant one (Nye, 1999: 24), is now clearer than ever. The US has established the reach of their military power (though the number of mistakes committed so far is remarkable); yet they were unable to convince the U.N. and the rest of the world in general about the legitimacy of their quest (also see Jacobsen's conditions for intervention (1996)).

The discourse about the threat to US national security, following Nye's topology, has fluctuated between "A", "B" and "C" throughout the development of the current conflict against Iraq. The new war in Iraq, however, started from the Executive, and coverage followed it, therefore, there is no CNN effect in that respect. Nevertheless, recent coverage about casualties, both of soldiers and civilians and of prisoners of war, may give room for a CNN effect as an impediment on the fashion of the "Vietnam syndrome" to rise. Just as well, coverage of humanitarian needs of Iraqi people may develop a CNN effect as an accelerant, but presumably on other actors rather than Washington, since one of the justifications given for American intervention was precisely the goal of providing the people of Iraq with a better quality of life. In conclusion, even though there is potential of a CNN effect in the fashion of a "bodybag effect" to happen during the present conflict, it may not be as likely, since this war began as a matter of the "A" list of US national interest, hence, it is presumed that Washington will continue to use the media as a propaganda apparatus, so the framing and indexing of news will conform to the interests and guidance of the Executive, besides, there is great domestic support at the moment, which means the American people will be willing to take an increased number of casualties compared to a humanitarian intervention not so linked to their national interest. Many conclusions and assumptions can be given regarding the theories presented in this paper and the current conflict in Iraq. One thing that is certain, is that this war is a clear demonstration of how both theories of impact of media intervention in foreign policy making, the so-called "CNN effect" and "Manufacturing Consent" collide, and the outcome of this confrontation is yet to be seen.

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THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS

The Clash of Civilizations
By Samuel P. Huntington

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I. THE NEXT PATTERN OF CONFLICT

WORLD POLITICS IS entering a new phase, and intellectuals have not hesitated to proliferate visions of what it will be -- the end of history, the return of traditional rivalries between nation states, and the decline of the nation state from the conflicting pulls of tribalism and globalism, among others. Each of these visions catches aspects of the emerging reality. Yet they all miss a crucial, indeed a central, aspect of what global politics is likely to be in the coming years.

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase of the evolution of conflict in the modern world. For a century and a half after the emergence of the modern international system of the Peace of Westphalia, the conflicts of the Western world were largely among princes -- emperors, absolute monarchs and constitutional monarchs attempting to expand their bureaucracies, their armies, their mercantilist economic strength and, most important, the territory they ruled. In the process they created nation states, and beginning with the French Revolution the principal lines of conflict were between nations rather than princes. In 1793, as R. R. Palmer put it, "The wars of kings were over; the war of peoples had begun." This nineteenth-century pattern lasted until the end of World War I. Then, as a result of the Russian Revolution and the reaction against it, the conflict of nations yielded to the conflict of ideologies, first among communism, fascism-Naziism and liberal democracy, and then between communism and liberal democracy. During the Cold War, this latter conflict became embodied in the struggle between the two superpowers, neither of which a nation state in the classical European was sense nor each of which defined its identity in terms of ideology.

These conflicts between princes, nation states and ideologies were primarily conflicts within Western civilization, "Western civil wars," as William Lind has labeled them. This was as true of
the Cold War as it was of the world wars and the earlier wars of the seventeenth, eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. With the end of the
Cold War, international politics moves out of its Western phase, and its center-piece becomes the
interaction between the West and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western
civilizations. In the politics of civilizations, the people and governments of non-Western
civilizations no longer remain the objects of history as targets of Western colonialism but join
the West as movers and shapers of history.

II. THE NATURE OF CIVILIZATIONS
DURING THE COLD WAR the world was divided into the First, Second and Third Worlds.
Those divisions are no longer relevant. It is far more meaningful now to group countries not in
terms of their political or economic systems or in terms of their level of economic development
but rather in terms of their culture and civilization. What do we mean when we talk of a
civilization? A civilization is a cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities,
religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity. The
culture of a village in southern Italy may be different from that of a village in northern Italy, but
both will share in a common Italian culture that distinguishes them from German villages.
European communities, in turn, will share cultural features that distinguish them from Arab or
Chinese communities. Arabs, Chinese and Westerners, however, are not part of any broader
cultural entity. They constitute civilizations. A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping
of people and the broadest levels of cultural identity people have short of that which
distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such
as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of
people. People have levels of identity: a resident of Rome may define himself with varying
degrees of intensity as a Roman, an Italian, a Catholic, a Christian, a European, a Westerner. The
civilization to which he belongs is the broadest level of identification with which he intensely
identifies. People can and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and
boundaries of civilizations change.

Civilizations may involve a large number of people, as with China ("a civilization pretending to
be a state," as Lucian Pye put it), or a very small number of people, such as the Anglophone
Caribbean. A civilization may include several nation states, as is the case with Western, Latin
American and Arab civilizations, or only one, as is the case with Japanese civilization.
Civilizations obviously blend and overlap, and may include sub civilizations. Western
civilization has two major variants; European and North American and Islam have its Arab,
Turkic and Malay subdivisions. Civilizations are nonetheless meaningful entities, and while the
lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real. Civilizations are dynamic; they rise and fall;
they divide and merge. And, as any student of history knows, civilizations disappear and are
buried in the sands of time.

Westerners tend to think of nation states as the principal actors in global affairs. They have been
that, however, for only a few centuries. The broader reaches of human history have been the
history of civilizations. In A Study of History, Arnold Toynbee identified 21 major civilizations;
only six of them exist in the contemporary world.

III. WHY CIVILIZATIONS WILL CLASH
CIVILIZATION IDENTITY will be increasingly important in the future, and the world will be
shaped in large measure by the interactions among seven or eight major civilizations. These
include Western, Confucian, and Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American
and possibly African civilization. The most important conflicts of the future will occur along the
cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one another. Why will this be the case?
First, differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion. The people of different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy. These differences are the product of centuries. They will not soon disappear.

They are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes. Differences do not necessarily mean conflict, and conflict does not necessarily mean violence. Over the centuries, however, differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts.

Second, the world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations. North African immigration to France generates hostility among Frenchmen and at the same time increased receptivity to immigration by "good" European Catholic Poles. Americans react far more negatively to Japanese investment than to larger investments from Canada and European countries. Similarly, as Donald Horowitz has pointed out, "An Ibo may be . . . an Owerri Ibo or an Onitsha Ibo in what was the Eastern region of Nigeria. In Lagos, he is simply an Ibo. In London, he is a Nigerian. In New York, he is an African." The interactions among peoples of different civilizations enhance the civilization-consciousness of people that, in turn, invigorates differences and animosities stretching or thought to stretch back deep into history.

Third, the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities. They also weaken the nation state as a source of identity. In much of the world religion has moved in to fill this gap, often in the form of movements that are labeled "fundamentalist." Such movements are found in Western Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism and Hinduism, as well as in Islam. In most countries and most religions the people active in fundamentalist movements are young, college-educated, middle-class technicians, professionals and business persons. The "unsecularization of the world," George Weigel has remarked, "is one of the dominant social factors of life in the late twentieth century." The revival of religion,"la revanche de Dieu," as Gilles Kepel labeled it, provides a basis for identity and commitment that transcends national boundaries and unites civilizations.

Fourth, the growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West. On the one hand, the West is at a peak of power. At the same time, however, and perhaps as a result, a return to the roots phenomenon is occurring among non-Western civilizations. Increasingly one hears references to trends toward a turning inward and "Asianization" in Japan, the end of the Nehru legacy and the "Hinduization" of India, the failure of Western ideas of socialism and nationalism and hence "re-Islamization" of the Middle East, and now a debate over Westernization versus Russianization in Boris Yeltsin's country. A West at the peak of its power confronts non Wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways. In the past, the elites of non-Western societies were usually the people who were most involved with the West, had been educated at Oxford, the Sorbonne or Sandhurst, and had absorbed Western attitudes and values. At the same time, the populace in non-Western countries often remained deeply imbued with the indigenous culture. Now, however, these relationships are being reversed. A de-Westernization and indigenization of elites
is occurring in many non-Western countries at the same time that Western, usually American, cultures, styles and habits become more popular among the mass of the people.

Fifth, cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones. In the former Soviet Union, communists can become democrats, the rich can become poor and the poor rich, but Russians cannot become Estonians and Azeris cannot become Armenians. In class and ideological conflicts, the key question was "Which side are you on?" and people could and did choose sides and change sides. In conflicts between civilizations, the question is "What are you?" That is a given that cannot be changed. And as we know, from Bosnia to the Caucasus to the Sudan, the wrong answer to that question can mean a bullet in the head. Even more than ethnicity, religion discriminates sharply and exclusively among people. A person can be half-French and half-Arab and simultaneously even a citizen of two countries. It is more difficult to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim.

Finally, economic regionalism is increasing. The proportions of total trade that are intraregional rose between 1980 and 1989 from 51 percent to 59 percent in Europe, 33 percent to 37 percent in East Asia, and 32 percent to 36 percent in North America. The importance of regional economic blocs is likely to continue to increase in the future. On the one hand, successful economic regionalism will reinforce civilization-consciousness. On the other hand, economic regionalism may succeed only when it is rooted in a common civilization. The European Community rests on the shared foundation of European culture and Western Christianity. The success of the North American Free Trade Area depends on the convergence now underway of Mexican, Canadian and American cultures. Japan, in contrast, faces difficulties in creating a comparable economic entity in East Asia because Japan is a society and civilization unique to itself. However strong the trade and investment links Japan may develop with other East Asian countries, its cultural differences with those countries inhibit and perhaps preclude its promoting regional economic integration like that in Europe and North America. Common culture, in contrast, is clearly facilitating the rapid expansion of the economic relations between the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and the overseas Chinese communities in other Asian countries.

With the Cold War over, cultural commonalities increasingly overcome ideological differences, and mainland China and Taiwan move closer together. If cultural commonality is a prerequisite for economic integration, the principal East Asian economic bloc of the future is likely to be centered on China. This bloc is, in fact, already coming into existence. As Murray Weidenbaum has observed,

Despite the current Japanese dominance of the region, the Chinese-based economy of Asia is rapidly emerging as a new epicenter for industry, commerce and finance. This strategic area contains substantial amounts of technology and manufacturing capability (Taiwan), outstanding entrepreneurial, marketing and services acumen (Hong Kong), a fine communications network (Singapore), a tremendous pool of financial capital (all three), and very large endowments of land, resources and labor (mainland China). . . .

From Guangzhou to Singapore, from Kuala Lumpur to Manila, this influential network - often based on extensions of the traditional clans-- has been described as the backbone of the East Asian economy. Culture and religion also form the basis of the Economic Cooperation Organization, which brings together ten non-Arab Muslim countries: Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. One impetus to the revival and expansion of this organization, founded originally in the 1960s by Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, is the realization by the leaders of several of these countries that they had no chance of admission to the European Community.
Similarly, Caricom, the Central American Common Market and Mercosur rest on common cultural foundations. Efforts to build a broader Caribbean-Central American economic entity bridging the Anglo-Latin divide, however, has to date failed.

As people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are likely to see an "us" versus "them" relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion. The end of ideologically defined states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union permits traditional ethnic identities and animosities to come to the fore. Differences in culture and religion create differences over policy issues, ranging from human rights to immigration to trade and commerce to the environment. Geographical propinquity gives rise to conflicting territorial claims from Bosnia to Mindanao. Most important, the efforts of the West to promote its values of democracy and liberalism to universal values, to maintain its military predominance and to advance its economic interests engender countering responses from other civilizations. Decreasingly able to mobilize support and form coalitions on the basis of ideology, governments and groups will increasingly attempt to mobilize support by appealing to common religion and civilization identity.

The clash of civilizations thus occurs at two levels. At the micro-level, adjacent groups along the fault lines between civilizations struggle, often violently, over the control of territory and each other. At the macro-level, states from different civilizations compete for relative military and economic power, struggle over the control of international institutions and third parties, and competitively promote their particular political and religious values.

**IV. THE FAULT LINES BETWEEN CIVILIZATIONS**

The fault lines between civilizations are replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed. The Cold War began when the Iron Curtain divided Europe politically and ideologically. The Cold War ended with the end of the Iron Curtain. As the ideological division of Europe has disappeared, the cultural division of Europe between Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on the other, has reemerged. The most significant dividing line in Europe, as William Wallace has suggested, may well be the eastern boundary of Western Christianity in the year 1500. This line runs along what are now the boundaries between Finland and Russia and between the Baltic States and Russia, cuts through Belarus and Ukraine separating the more Catholic western Ukraine from Orthodox eastern Ukraine, swings westward separating Transylvania from the rest of Romania, and then goes through Yugoslavia almost exactly along the line now separating Croatia and Slovenia from the rest of Yugoslavia. In the Balkans this line, of course, coincides with the historic boundary between the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires.

The peoples to the north and west of this line are Protestant or Catholic; they shared the common experiences of European history --feudalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution; they are generally economically better off than the peoples to the east; and they may now look forward to increasing involvement in a common European economy and to the consolidation of democratic political systems. The peoples to the east and south of this line are Orthodox or Muslim; they historically belonged to the Ottoman or Tsarist empires and were only lightly touched by the shaping events in the rest of Europe; they are generally less advanced economically; they seem much less likely to develop stable democratic political systems. The Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe. As the events in Yugoslavia show, it is not only a line of difference; it is also at times a line of bloody conflict.
Conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations has been going on for 1,300 years. After the founding of Islam, the Arab and Moorish surge west and north only ended at Tours in 732. From the eleventh to the thirteenth century the Crusaders attempted with temporary success to bring Christianity and Christian rule to the Holy Land. From the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Turks reversed the balance, extended their sway over the Middle East and the Balkans, captured Constantinople, and twice laid siege to Vienna. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries at Ottoman power declined Britain, France, and Italy established Western control over most of North Africa and the Middle East. After World War II, the West, in turn, began to retreat; the colonial empires disappeared; first Arab nationalism and then Islamic fundamentalism manifested themselves; the West became heavily dependent on the Persian Gulf countries for its energy; the oil-rich Muslim countries became money-rich and, when they wished to, weapons-rich. Several wars occurred between Arabs and Israel (created by the West). France fought a bloody and ruthless war in Algeria for most of the 1950s; British and French forces invaded Egypt in 1956; American forces returned to Lebanon, attacked Libya, and engaged in various military encounters with Iran; Arab and Islamic terrorists, supported by at least three Middle Eastern governments, employed the weapon of the weak and bombed Western planes and installations and seized Western hostages. This warfare between Arabs and the West culminated in 1990, when the United States sent a massive army to the Persian Gulf to defend some Arab countries against aggression by another. In its aftermath NATO planning is increasingly directed to potential threats and instability along its "southern tier."

This centuries-old military interaction between the West and Islam is unlikely to decline. It could become more virulent. The Gulf War left some Arabs feeling proud that Saddam Hussein had attacked Israel and stood up to the West. It also left many feeling humiliated and resentful of the West's military presence in the Persian Gulf, the West's overwhelming military dominance, and their apparent inability to shape their own destiny. Many Arab countries, in addition to the oil exporters, are reaching levels of economic and social development where autocratic forms of government become inappropriate and efforts to introduce democracy become stronger. Some openings in Arab political systems have already occurred. The principal beneficiaries of these openings have been Islamist movements. In the Arab world, in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces. This may be a passing phenomenon, but it surely complicates relations between Islamic countries and the West. Those relations are also complicated by demography. The spectacular population growth in Arab countries, particularly in North Africa, has led to increased migration to Western Europe. The movement within Western Europe toward minimizing internal boundaries has sharpened political sensitivities with respect to this development. In Italy, France and Germany, racism is increasingly open, and political reactions and violence against Arab and Turkish migrants have become more intense and more widespread since 1990.

On both sides the interaction between Islam and the West is seen as a clash of civilizations. The West's "next confrontation," observes M. J. Akbar, an Indian Muslim author, "is definitely going to come from the Muslim world. It is in the sweep of the Islamic nations from the Meghreb to Pakistan that the struggle for a new world order will begin." Bernard Lewis comes to a regular conclusion: "We are facing a need and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations -- the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both".
Historically, the other great antagonistic interaction of Arab Islamic civilization has been with the pagan, animist, and now increasingly Christian black peoples to the south. In the past, this antagonism was epitomized in the image of Arab slave dealers and black slaves. It has been reflected in the on-going civil war in the Sudan between Arabs and blacks, the fighting in Chad between Libyan-supported insurgents and the government, the tensions between Orthodox Christians and Muslims in the Horn of Africa, and the political conflicts, recurring riots and communal violence between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria. The modernization of Africa and the spread of Christianity in Nigeria. The modernization of Africa and the spread of Christianity are likely to enhance the probability of violence along this fault line. Symptomatic of the intensification of this conflict was the Pope John Paul II's speech in Khartoum in February 1993 attacking the actions of the Sudan's Islamist government against the Christian minority there.

On the northern border of Islam, conflict has increasingly erupted between Orthodox and Muslim peoples, including the carnage of Bosnia and Sarajevo, the simmering violence between Serb and Albanian, the tenuous relation between Bulgarians and their Turkish minority, the violence between Ossetians and Ingush, the unremitting slaughter of each other by Armenians and Azeris, the tense relations between Russians and Muslims in Central Asia, and the deployment of Russian troops to protect Russian interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Religion reinforces the revival of ethnic identities and restimulates Russian fears about the security of their southern borders. This concern is well captured by Archie Roosevelt: Much of Russian history concerns the struggle between Slavs and the Turkish peoples on their borders, which dates back to the foundation of the Russian state more than a thousand years ago. In the Slavs' millennium-long confrontation with their eastern neighbors lies the key to an understanding not only of Russian history, but Russian character. To understand Russian realities today one has to have a concept of the great Turkic ethnic group that has preoccupied Russians through the centuries.

The conflict of civilizations is deeply rooted elsewhere in Asia. The historic clash between Muslim and Hindu in the subcontinent manifests itself now not only in the rivalry between Pakistan and India but also in intensifying religious strife within India between increasingly militant Hindu groups and India's substantial Muslim minority. The destruction of the Ayodhya mosque in December 1992 brought to the fore the issue of whether India will remain a secular democratic state or become a Hindu one. In East Asia, China have outstanding territorial disputes with most of its neighbors. It has pursued a ruthless policy toward the Buddhist people of Tibet, and it is pursuing an increasingly ruthless policy toward its Turkic-Muslim minority. With the Cold War over, the underlying differences between China and the United States have reasserted themselves in areas such as human rights, trade and weapons proliferation. These differences are unlikely to moderate. A "new cold war," Deng Xiaoping reportedly asserted in 1991, is underway between China and America. The same phrase has been applied to the increasingly difficult relations between Japan and the United States. Here cultural difference exacerbates economic conflict. People on each side allege racism on the other, but at least on the American side the antipathies are not racial but cultural. The basic values, attitudes, behavioral patterns of the two societies could hardly be more different. The economic issues between the United States and Europe are no less serious than those between the United States and Japan, but they do not have the same political salience and emotional intensity because the differences between American culture and European culture are so much less than those between American civilization and Japanese civilization.
The interactions between civilizations vary greatly in the extent to which they are likely to be characterized by violence. Economic competition clearly predominates between the American and European sub civilizations of the West and between both of them and Japan. On the Eurasian continent, however, the proliferation of ethnic conflict, epitomized at the extreme in "ethnic cleansing," has not been totally random. It has been most frequent and most violent between groups belonging to different civilizations. In Eurasia the great historic fault lines between civilizations are once more aflame. This is particularly true along the boundaries of the crescent-shaped Islamic bloc of nations from the bulge of Africa to central Asia. Violence also occurs between Muslims, on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbs in the Balkans, Jews in Israel, Hindus in India, Buddhists in Burma and Catholics in the Philippines. Islam has bloody borders.

V. CIVILIZATION RALLYING

THE KIN-COUNTRY SYNDROME GROUPS OR STATES belonging to one civilization that become involved in war with people from a different civilization naturally try to rally support from other members of their own civilization. As the post-Cold War world evolves, civilization commonality, what H. D. S. Greenway has termed the "kin-country" syndrome, is replacing political ideology and traditional balance of power considerations as the principal basis for cooperation and coalitions. It can be seen gradually emerging in the post-Cold War conflicts in the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia. None of these was a full-scale war between civilizations, but each involved some elements of civilization rallying, which seemed to become more important as the conflict continued and which may provide a foretaste of the future.

First, in the Gulf War one Arab state invaded another and then fought a coalition of Arab, Western and other states. While only a few Muslim governments overtly supported Saddam Hussein, many Arab elites privately cheered him on, and he was highly popular among large sections of the Arab publics. Islamic fundamentalist movements universally supported Iraq rather than the Western-backed governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Forswearing Arab nationalism, Saddam Hussein explicitly invoked an Islamic appeal. He and his supporters attempted to define the war as a war between civilizations. "It is not the world against Iraq," as Safar Al-Hawali, dean of Islamic Studies at the Umm Al-Qura University in Mecca, put it in a widely circulated tape. "It is the West against Islam." Ignoring the rivalry between Iran and Iraq, the chief Iranian religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, called for a holy war against the West: "The struggle against American aggression, greed, plans and policies will be counted as a jihad, and anybody who is killed on that path is a martyr. "This is a war," King Hussein of Jordan argued, "against all Arabs and all Muslims and not against Iraq alone." The rallying of substantial sections of Arab elites and publics behind Saddam Hussein called those Arab governments in the anti-Iraq coalition to moderate their activities and temper their public statements. Arab governments opposed or distanced themselves from subsequent Western efforts to apply pressure on Iraq, including enforcement of a no-fly zone in the summer of 1992 and the bombing of Iraq in January 1993. The Western-Soviet-Turkish-Arab anti-Iraq coalition of 1990 had by 1993 become a coalition of almost only the West and Kuwait against Iraq. Muslims contrasted Western actions against Iraq with the West's failure to protect Bosnians against Serbs and to impose sanctions on Israel for violating U.N. resolutions. The West, they allege, was using a double standard. A world of clashing civilizations, however, is inevitably a world of double standards: people apply one standard to their kin-countries and a different standard to others.
Second, the kin-country syndrome also appeared in conflicts in the former Soviet Union. Armenian military successes in 1992 and 1993 stimulated Turkey to become increasingly supportive of its religious, ethnic and linguistic brethren in Azerbaijan. "We have a Turkish nation feeling the same sentiments as the Azerbaijanis," said one Turkish official in 1992. "We are under pressure. Our newspapers are full of the photos of atrocities and are asking us if we are still serious about pursuing our neutral policy. Maybe we should show Armenia that there's a big Turkey in the region." President Turgut Ozal agreed, remarking that Turkey should at least "scare the Armenians a little bit." Turkey, Ozal threatened again in 1993, would "show its fangs." Turkey Air Force jets flew reconnaissance flights along the Armenian border; Turkey suspended food shipments and air flights to Armenia; and Turkey and Iran announced they would not accept dismemberment of Azerbaijan. In the last years of its existence, the Soviet government supported Azerbaijan because its government was dominated by former communists. With the end of the Soviet Union, however, political considerations gave way to religious ones. Russian troops fought on the Side of the Armenians, and Azerbaijan accused the "Russian government of turning 180 degrees" toward support for Christian Armenia.

Third, with respect to the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, Western publics manifested sympathy and support for the Bosnian Muslims and the horrors they suffered at the hands of the Serbs. Relatively little concern was expressed, however, over Croatian attacks on Muslims and participation in the dismemberment of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the early stages of the Yugoslav breakup, Germany, in an unusual display of diplomatic initiative and muscle, induced the other 11 members of the European Community to follow its lead in recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. As a result of the pope's determination to provide strong backing to the two Catholic countries, the Vatican extended recognition even before the Community did. The United States followed the European lead. Thus the leading actors in Western civilization rallied behind its coreligionists. Subsequently Croatia was reported to be receiving substantial quantities of arms from Central European and other Western countries. Boris Yeltsin's government, on the other hand, attempted to pursue a middle course that would be sympathetic to the Orthodox Serbs but not alienate Russia from the West. Russian conservative and nationalist groups, however, including many legislators, attacked the government for not being more forthcoming in its support for the Serbs. By early 1993 several hundred Russians apparently were serving with the Serbian forces, and reports circulated of Russian arms being supplied to Serbia. Islamic governments and groups, on the other hand, castigated the West for not coming to the defense of the Bosnians. Iranian leaders urged Muslims from all countries to provide help to Bosnia; in violation of the U.N. arms embargo, Iran supplied weapons and men for the Bosnians; Iranian-supported Lebanese groups sent guerrillas to train and organize the Bosnian forces. In 1993 up to 4,000 Muslims from over two dozen Islamic countries were reported to be fighting in Bosnia. The governments of Saudi Arabia and other countries felt under increasing pressure from fundamentalist groups in their own societies to provide more vigorous support for the Bosnians. By the end of 1992, Saudi Arabia had reportedly supplied substantial funding for weapons and supplies for the Bosnians, which significantly increased their military capabilities vis-à-vis the Serbs.

In the 1930s the Spanish Civil War provoked intervention from countries that politically were fascist, communist and democratic. In the 1990s the Yugoslav conflict is provoking intervention from countries that are Muslim, Orthodox and Western Christian. The parallel has not gone unnoticed. "The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has become the emotional equivalent of the fight against fascism in the Spanish Civil War," one Saudi editor observed. "Those who died there are regarded as martyrs who tried to save their fellow Muslims."
Conflicts and violence will also occur between states and groups within the same civilization. Such conflicts, however, are likely to be less intense and less likely to expand than conflicts between civilizations. Common membership in a civilization reduces the probability of violence in situations where it might otherwise occur.

In 1991 and 1992 many people were alarmed by the possibility of violent conflict between Russia and Ukraine over territory, particularly Crimea, the Black Sea fleet, nuclear weapons and economic issues. If civilization is what counts, however, the likelihood of violence between Ukrainians and Russians should be low. They are two Slavic, primarily Orthodox peoples who have had close relationships with each other for centuries. As of early 1993, despite all the reasons for conflict, the leaders of the two countries were effectively negotiating and defusing the issues between the two countries. While there has been serious fighting between Muslims and Christians elsewhere in the former Soviet Union and much tension and some fighting between Western and Orthodox Christians in the Baltic States, there has been virtually no violence between Russians and Ukrainians.

Civilization rallying to date has been limited, but it has been growing, and it clearly has the potential to spread much further. As the conflicts in the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia continued, the positions of nations and the cleavages between them increasingly were along civilizational lines. Populist politicians, religious leaders and the media have found it a potential means of arousing mass support and of pressuring hesitant governments. In the coming years, the local conflicts most likely to escalate into major wars will be those, as in Bosnia and the Caucasus, along the fault lines between civilizations. The next world war, if there is one, will be a war between civilizations.

VI. THE WEST VERSUS THE REST

THE WEST IS NOW at an extraordinary peak of power in relation to other civilizations. In superpower opponent has disappeared from the map. Military conflict among Western states is unthinkable, and Western military power is unrivaled. Apart from Japan, the West faces no economic challenge. It dominates international economic institutions. Global political and security issues are effectively settled by a directorate of the United States, Britain and France, world economic issues by a directorate of the United States, Germany and Japan, all of which maintain extraordinarily close relations with each other to the exclusion of lesser and largely non-Western countries. Decisions made at the U.N. Security Council or in the International Monetary Fund that reflect the interests of the West are presented to the world as reflecting the desires of the world community. The very phrase "the world community" has become the euphemistic collective noun (replacing "the Free World") to give global legitimacy to actions reflecting the interests of the United States and other Western powers. Through the IMF and other international economic institutions, the West promotes its economic interests and imposes on other nations the economic policies it thinks appropriate. In any poll of non-Western peoples, the IMF undoubtedly would win the support of finance ministers and a few others, but get an overwhelmingly unfavorable rating from just about everyone else, who would agree with Georgy Arbatov's characterization of IMF officials as "neo-Bolsheviks who love expropriating other people's money, imposing undemocratic and alien rules of economic and political conduct and stifling economic freedom." Almost invariably Western leaders claim they are acting on behalf of "the world community." One minor lapse occurred during the run-up to the Gulf War. In an interview on "Good Morning America," Dec. 21, 1990, British Prime Minister John Major referred to the actions "the West" was taking against Saddam Hussein. He quickly corrected himself and subsequently referred to "the world community." He was, however, right when he erred. Western domination of the U.N. Security Council and its decisions, tempered only by occasional abstention by China, produced U.N. legitimation of the West's use of force to drive
Iraq out of Kuwait and its elimination of Iraq's sophisticated weapons and capacity to produce such weapons. It also produced the quite unprecedented action by the United States, Britain and France in getting the Security Council to demand that Libya hand over the Pan Am 103 bombing suspects and then to impose sanctions when Libya refused. After defeating the largest Arab army, the West did not hesitate to throw its weight around in the Arab world. The West in effect is using international institutions, military power and economic resources to run the world in ways that will maintain Western predominance protect Western interests and promote Western political and economic values. That at least is the way in which non-Westerners see the new world, and there is a significant element of truth in their view. Differences in power and struggles for military, economic and institutional power are thus one source of conflict between the West and other civilizations. Differences in culture, that is basic values and beliefs, are a second source of conflict. V. S. Naipaul has argued that Western civilization is the "universal civilization" that "fits all men." At a superficial level much of Western culture has indeed permeated the rest of the world. At a more basic level, however, Western concepts differ fundamentally from those prevalent in other civilizations.

Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures. Western efforts to propagate each idea produce instead a reaction against "human rights imperialism" and a reaffirmation of indigenous values, as can be seen in the support for religious fundamentalism by the younger generation in non-Western cultures. The very notion that there could be a "universal civilization" is a Western idea, directly at odds with the particularism of most Asian societies and their emphasis on what distinguishes one people from another. Indeed, the author of a review of 100 comparative studies of values in different societies concluded that "the values that are most important in the West are least important worldwide." In the political realm, of course, these differences are most manifest in the efforts of the United States and other Western powers to induce other peoples to adopt Western ideas concerning democracy and human rights. Modern democratic government originated in the West. When it has developed colonialism or imposition.

The central axis of world politics in the future is likely to be, in Kishore Mahbubani's phrase, the conflict between "the West and the Rest" and the responses of non-Western civilizations to Western power and values. Those responses generally take one or a combination of three forms. At one extreme, non-Western states can, like Burma and North Korea, attempt to pursue a course of isolation, to insulate their societies from penetration or "corruption" by the West, and, in effect, to opt out of participation in the Western-dominated global community. The costs of this course, however, are high, and few states have pursued it exclusively. A second alternative, the equivalent of "band wagoning" in international relations theory, is to attempt to join the West and accept its values and institutions.

The third alternative is to attempt to "balance" the West by developing economic and military power and cooperating with other non-Western societies against the West, while preserving indigenous values and institutions; in short, to modernize but not to Westernize.

VII. THE TORN COUNTRIES

In the future, as people differentiate themselves by civilization, countries with large numbers of people of different civilizations, such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, are candidates for dismemberment. Some other countries have a fair degree of cultural homogeneity but are divided over whether their society belongs to one civilization or another. These are town
countries. Their leaders typically wish to pursue a bandwagon strategy and to make their countries members of the West, but the history, culture and traditions of their countries are non-Western. The most obvious and prototypical torn country is Turkey. The late twentieth-century leaders of Turkey have followed in the Attaturk tradition and defined Turkey as a modern, secular, Western nation state. They allied Turkey with the West in NATO and in the Gulf War; they applied for membership in the European Community. At the same time, however, elements in Turkish society have supported an Islamic revival and have argued that Turkey is basically a Middle Eastern Muslim society. In addition, while the elite of Turkey has defined Turkey as a Western society, the elite of the West refuses to accept Turkey and such. Turkey will not become a member of the European Community, and the real reason, as President Ozal said, "is that we are Muslim and they are Christian and they don't say that." Having rejected Mecca, and then being rejected by Brussels, where does Turkey look? Tashkent may be the answer. The end of the Soviet Union gives Turkey the opportunity to become the leader of a revived Turkic civilization involving seven countries from the borders of Greece to those of China. Encouraged by the West, Turkey is making strenuous efforts to carve out this new identity for itself.

During the past decade Mexico has assumed a position somewhat similar to that of Turkey. Just as Turkey abandoned its historic opposition to Europe and attempted to join Europe, Mexico has stopped defining itself by its opposition to the United States and is instead attempting to imitate the United States and to join it in the North American Free Trade Area. Mexican leaders are engaged in the great task of redefining Mexican identity and have introduced fundamental economic reforms that eventually will lead to fundamental political change. In 1991 a top adviser to President Carlos Salinas de Gortari described at length tome all the changes the Salinas government was making. When he finished, I remarked: "That's most impressive. It seems to me that basically you want to change Mexico from a Latin American country into a North American country." He looked at me with surprise and exclaimed: "Exactly! That's precisely what we are trying to do, but of course we could never say so publicly." As his remark indicates, in Mexico as in Turkey, significant elements in society resist the redefinition of their country's identity. In Turkey, European-oriented leaders have to make gestures to Islam (Ozal's pilgrimage to Mecca); so also Mexico's North American-oriented leaders have to make gestures to those who hold Mexico to be a Latin American country (Salinas' Ibero-American Guadalajara summit).

Historically Turkey has been the most profoundly torn country. For the United States, Mexico is the most immediate torn country. Globally the most important torn country is Russia. The question of whether Russia is part of the West or the leader of the Slavic-Orthodox civilization has been a recurring one in Russian history. That issue was obscured by the communist victory in Russia, which imported a Western ideology, adapted it to Russian conditions and then challenged the West in the name of that ideology. The dominance of communism shut off the historic debate over Westernization versus Russification. With communism discredited Russians once again face that question. President Yeltsin is adopting Western principles and goals and seeking to make Russia a "normal" country and a part of the West. Yet both the Russian elite and the Russian public are divided on this issue. Among the more moderate dissenters, Sergei Stankevich argues that Russia should reject the "Atlanticist" course, which would lead it "to become European, to become a part of the world economy in rapid and organized fashion, to become the eighth member of the Seven, and to particular emphasis on Germany and the United States as the two dominant members of the Atlantic alliance." While also rejecting an exclusively Eurasian policy, Stankevich nonetheless argues that Russia should give priority to the protection of Russians in other countries, emphasize its Turkic and Muslim connections, and promote "an appreciable redistribution of our resources, our options, our ties, and our interests in favor of
Asia, of the eastern direction." People of this persuasion criticize Yeltsin for subordinating Russia's interests to those of the West, for reducing Russian military strength, for failing to support traditional friends such as Serbia, and for pushing economic and political reform in ways injurious to the Russian people. Indicative of this trend is the new popularity of the ideas of Petr Savitsky, who in the 1920s argued that Russia was a unique Eurasian civilization. More extreme dissidents voice much more blatantly nationalist, anti-Western and anti-Semitic views, and urge Russia to redevelop its military strength and to establish closer ties with China and Muslim countries. The people of Russia areas divided as the elite. An opinion survey in European Russia in the spring of 1992 revealed that 40 percent of the public had positive attitudes toward the West and 36 percent had negative attitudes. As it has been for much of its history, Russia in the early 1990s is truly a torn country. Sergei Stankevich, "Russia in Search of Itself," The National Interest, Summer 1992, pp. 47-51; Daniel Schneider, "A Russian Movement Rejects Western Tilt," Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 5, 1993, pp. 5-7.

To redefine its civilization identity, a torn country must meet three requirements. First, its political and economic elite have to be generally supportive of and enthusiastic about the move. Second, its public has to be willing to acquiesce in the redefinition. Third, the dominant groups in the recipient civilization have to be willing to embrace the convert. All three requirements in large part exist with respect to Mexico. The first two in large part exist with respect to Turkey. It is not clear that any of them exist with respect to Russia's joining the West. The conflict between liberal democracy and Marxism-Leninism was between ideologies which, despite their major differences, ostensibly shared ultimate goals of freedom, equality and prosperity. A traditional, authoritarian, nationalist Russia could have quite different goals. A Western democrat could carry on an intellectual debate with a Soviet Marxist. It would be virtually impossible for him to do that with a Russian traditionalist. If, as the Russians stop behaving like Marxists, they reject liberal democracy and begin behaving like Russians but not like Westerners, the relations between Russia and the West could again become distant and conflictual. Owen Harries has pointed out that Australia is trying (unwisely in his view) to become a torn country in reverse. Although it has been a full member not only of the West but also of the ABCA military and intelligence core of the West, its current leaders are in effect proposing that it defect from the West, redefine itself as an Asian country and cultivate close ties with its neighbors. Australia's future, they argue, is with the dynamic economies of East Asia. But, as I have suggested, close economic cooperation normally requires a common cultural base. In addition, none of the three conditions necessary for a torn country to join another civilization is likely to exist in Australia's case.

VIII. THE CONFUCIAN-ISLAMIC CONNECTION

THE OBSTACLES TO non-Western countries joining the West vary considerably. They are least for Latin American and East European countries. They are greater for the Orthodox countries of the former Soviet Union. They are still greater for Muslim, Confucian, Hindu and Buddhist societies. Japan has established a unique position for itself as an associate member of the West: it is in the West in some respects but clearly not of the West in important dimensions. Those countries that for reason of culture and power do not wish to, or cannot, join the West compete with the West by developing their own economic, military and political power. They do this by promoting their internal development and by cooperating with other non-Western countries. The most prominent form of this cooperation is the Confucian-Islamic connection that has emerged to challenge Western interests, values and power. Almost without exception, Western countries are reducing their military power; under Yeltsin's leadership so also is Russia. China, North Korea and several Middle Eastern states, however, are significantly expanding their military capabilities. They are doing this by the import of arms from Western and non-Western
sources and by the development of indigenous arms industries. One result is the emergence of what Charles Krauthammer has called "Weapon States," and the Weapon States are not Western states. Another result is the redefinition of arms control, which is a Western concept and a Western goal. During the Cold War the primary purpose of arms control was to establish a stable military balance between the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies. In the post-Cold War world the primary objective of arms control is to prevent the development by non-Western societies of military capabilities that could threaten Western interests. The West attempts to do this through international agreements, economic pressure and controls on the transfer of arms and weapons technologies.

The conflict between the West and the Confucian-Islamic states focuses largely, although not exclusively, on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles and other sophisticated means for delivering them, and the guidance, intelligence and other electronic capabilities for achieving that goal. The West promotes nonproliferation as a universal norm and nonproliferation treaties and inspections as means of realizing that norm. It also threatens a variety of sanctions against those who promote the spread of sophisticated weapons and proposes some benefits for those who do not. The attention of the West focuses, naturally on nations that are actually or potentially hostile to the West.

The non-Western nations, on the other hand, assert their right to acquire and to deploy whatever weapons they think necessary for their security. They also have absorbed, to the full, the truth of the response of the Indian defense minister when asked what lesson he learned from the Gulf War: "Don't fight the United States unless you have nuclear weapons." Nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and missiles are viewed, probably erroneously, as the potential equalizer of superior Western conventional power. China, of course, already has nuclear weapons; Pakistan and India have the capability to deploy them. North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Algeria appear to be attempting to acquire them.

Atop Iranian official has declared that all Muslim states should acquire nuclear weapons, and in 1988 the president of Iran reportedly issued a directive calling for development of "offensive and defensive chemical, biological and radiological weapons."

Centrally important to the development of counter-West military capabilities is the sustained expansion of China's military power and its means to create military power. Buoyed by spectacular economic development, China is rapidly increasing its military spending and vigorously moving forward with the modernization of its armed forces.

It is purchasing weapons from the former Soviet states; it is developing long-range missiles; in 1992 it tested a one-megaton nuclear device. It is developing power-projection capabilities, acquiring aerial refueling technology, and trying to purchase an aircraft carrier. Its military buildup and assertion of sovereignty over the South China Sea are provoking a multilateral regional arms race in East Asia. China is also a major exporter of arms and weapons technology. It has exported materials to Libya and Iraq that could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons and nerve gas. It has helped Algeria build a reactor suitable for nuclear weapons research and production. China has sold to Iran nuclear technology that American officials believe could only be used to create weapons and apparently has shipped components of 300-mile-range missiles to Pakistan. North Korea has had a nuclear weapons program under way for some while and has sold advanced missiles and missile technology to Syria and Iran. The flow of weapons and weapons technology is generally from East Asia to the Middle East. There is, however, some movement in the reverse direction; China has received Stinger missiles from Pakistan.

A Confucian-Islamic military connection has thus come into being, designed to promote acquisition by its members of the weapons and weapons technologies needed to counter the military powers of the West. It may or may not last. At present, however, it is, as Dave McCurdy has said, "a renegades' mutual support pact, run by the proliferators and their backers." A new
form of arms competition is thus occurring between Islamic-Confucian states and the West. In an old-fashioned arms race, each side developed its own arms to balance or to achieve superiority against the other side. In this new form of arms competition, one side is developing its arms and the other side is attempting not to balance but to limit and prevent that arms build-up while at the same time reducing its own military capabilities.

IX. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST

THIS ARTICLE DOES not argue that civilization identities will replace all other identities, that nation states will disappear, that each civilization will become a single coherent political entity, that groups within a civilization will not conflict with and even fight each other. This paper does set forth the hypotheses that differences between civilizations are real and important; civilization-consciousness is increasing; conflict between civilizations will supplant ideological and other forms of conflict as the dominant global form of conflict; international relations, historically a game played out within Western civilization, will increasingly be de-Westernized and become a game in which non-Western civilizations are actors and not simply objects; successful political, security and economic international institutions are more likely to develop within civilizations than across civilizations; conflicts between groups in different civilizations will be more frequent, more sustained and more violent than conflicts between groups in the same civilization; violent conflicts between groups in different civilizations are the most likely and most dangerous source of escalation that could lead to global wars; the paramount axis of world politics will be the relations between "the West and the Rest"; the elites in some torn non-Western countries will try to make their countries part of the West, but in most cases face major obstacles to accomplishing this; a central focus of conflict for the immediate future will be between the West and several Islamic-Confucian states.

This is not to advocate the desirability of conflicts between civilizations. It is to set forth descriptive hypotheses as to what the future may be like. If these are plausible hypotheses, however, it is necessary to consider their implications for Western policy. These implications should be divided between short-term advantage and long-term accommodation. In the short term it is clearly in the interest of the West to promote greater cooperation and unity within its own civilization, particularly between its European and North American components; to incorporate into the West societies in Eastern Europe and Latin America whose cultures are close to those of the West; to promote and maintain cooperative relations with Russia and Japan; to prevent escalation of local inter-civilization conflicts into major inter-civilization wars; to limit the expansion of the military strength of Confucian and Islamic states; to moderate the reduction of counter military capabilities and maintain military superiority in East and Southwest Asia; to exploit differences and conflicts among Confucian and Islamic states; to support in other civilizations groups sympathetic to Western values and interests; to strengthen international institutions that reflect and legitimate Western interests and values and to promote the involvement of non-Western states in those institutions.

In the longer term other measures would be called for. Western civilization is both Western and modern. Non-Western civilizations have attempted to become modern without becoming Western. To date only Japan has fully succeeded in this quest. Non-Western civilization will continue to attempt to acquire the wealth, technology, skills, machines and weapons that are part of being modern. They will also attempt to reconcile this modernity with their traditional culture and values. Their economic and military strength relative to the West will increase. Hence the West will increasingly have to accommodate these non-Western modern civilizations whose power approaches that of the West but whose values and interests differ significantly from those of the West.
This will require the West to maintain the economic and military power necessary to protect its interests in relation to these civilizations. It will also, however, require the West to develop a more profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations and the ways in which people in those civilizations see their interests. It will require an effort to identify elements of commonality between Western and other civilizations. For the relevant future, there will be no universal civilization, but instead a world of different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to coexist with the others.
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LESSON 13

MUSLIM PORTRAY ON WESTERN MEDIA

Islam and the West - looking back on history
Increasing anti-Muslim sentiment in the Western media, particularly in the United States, is an inevitable backlash created in the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. For decades the Soviets provided a convenient scapegoat. When Public Enemy Number One became a new-found friend, the Europeans and Americans, through their media, looked around for a replacement, which they found in fundamentalists, a word all too frequently used as a synonym for Muslims. This has led to a surge of anti-Arab, anti Muslim, racist attitudes. The average western is friendly but wary when meeting a foreigner. Europeans and Americans in general are particularly ethnocentric and anything different is viewed with suspicion. The virtual geographical isolation of the United States has contributed to American insularity. The bombing of the World Trade Centre was not only a direct strike at the financial heart of the country but also a blow at the American nervous system. When word got out that Egyptians had been arrested in connection with the bombing, Americans reacted with fear - a fear born of ignorance and self righteousness. Mosques were vandalized, homes and businesses of Muslims targeted. The anti-Muslim violence was contained but the seed for racial hatred has been sowed. This week, a young Muslim policeman in New York reportedly committed suicide because of racial taunts. Disney was finally forced to remove part of racist lyrics in its opening theme song from its new film "Aladdin" after protests from Arab-Americans.

The media has contributed heavily to the negative image of Muslims. Naive interpretations of Muslim laws and customs are reported out of context. Arabs are equated with terrorists and Muslims with fundamentalists. Islam, in general, is perceived as a Middle East phenomenon with Pakistan thrown in for good measure. This is not a recent trend. Biased and negative reporting has tainted media reports on Lebanon and Iran for years. But when a prestigious international news magazine like Newsweek chooses to run a cover story on the rise of "militant Islam" to the exclusion of most other aspects of the faith, it becomes the recurrent image in most people's eyes. Rarely, these days, will you find articles in mainstream magazines or newspapers on Islamic art, architecture, philosophy or poetry.

There is little mention of the fact that there are Muslims all over the world, from all racial groups. While the majority of Muslims may trace their roots to the Middle East, the Bosnian Muslims are white, the Indonesians and Malaysians are oriental and Senegalese and Sudanese are black. Until the past few years, "Muslim fundamentalists" were "Shiite" and geographically limited to Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan and a few scatterings in some other countries. What the West is now faced with is Sunni Islam that transcends all national boundaries. "The News", a Pakistani International newspaper published in London, very clearly pointed out in its editorial:

"The Western media can continue to react to Islam with hostility, fear and ignorance. Or it can try to understand the faith, its traditions and its history. Instead of portraying Muslims and Islam in derogatory terms, the West should seek to explore the positive. There is so much they would appreciate and learn."

Muslim portray on western media
Time, people, culture, society, and the environment we are surrounded by, can produce the formation of many perspectives regarding an issue that we see in today’s society.

One of many controversial topics is Islam and the Muslim. Many questions and generalizations are often formed in the minds of many non-Muslims in regards to the concepts behind the Islam through the influence of the media. Throughout the years of conflict between the "West" and
"Islam\textsuperscript{c}, the media has strongly altered the minds of non-Muslims by negative exploitation of Islam, and Muslims, in particular on Muslim women and hijab. Misconceptions such as, "Are you bald underneath" "Do you go to sleep with that on?" to the association of "terrorism" that contrasts to what Muslim women believe the Hijab represents.

A common misconception is "the Islamic Hijab is something cultural, not religious". The use of the word "cultural" is faulty when describing the Hijab as it implies that it is a result of customs and practices that are something separate from Islam. The cultural dress is referred to the ancient Pre-Islamic Era (Jahiliyah). It is the veil from the Pre-Islamic Era that is considered as "traditional" which stops women from contributing in society. On the contrary, the Islamic Hijab is not considered as an informal tradition, nor does it lower her self-respect. The Hijab is aimed at presenting women with poise and equality in society. An example of Pre-Islamic era in our modern world is the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Taliban are a party who regard such activities un-Islamic for women, who are prohibited from exercising their primary rights. The Taliban have banned women from employment outside the home, apart from the health sector, and have terminated education for girls. Prophet Mohammad (peace & blessings be upon him) said, "Seeking knowledge is incumbent upon every Muslim". Even Henry VIII forbids women to study the Bible when the first English translations began to appear. It’s an irony although the Taliban claim their guiding philosophy on women are in place to ensure the physical protection and self-respect of women, where as, many Afghan women have been killed, beaten and publicly hung. For many Afghan women fear of being severely punished by the Taliban is their main security concern.

Another misconception is "Muslim women have no right in Islam". Islam gave women rights over 1400 years ago, which is still ignored by many Muslims and non-Muslims today. Firstly, Islam has given women the basic right to freedom of speech. In the early days of Islam, the leaders of the Islamic state regarding legal issues consulted women. Rights that were appointed to Muslim women since the beginning of time are only just surfacing for non-Muslims. In Islam, a woman is free to be whom she is inside, and protected from being portrayed as a sex symbol and lusted after. Islam praises the status of a woman by commanding that she “enjoys equal rights to those of man in everything, she stands on an equal footing with man” (Qur’an, Nadvi: 11) and both share mutual rights and obligations in all aspects of life.

Many women are treated in ways far from Islamic ideals, yet in the name of Islam. The Taliban is an example of a cultural and political name that has been branded with Islam. There is no freedom for women if they are imprisoned in their home in the name of the Hijab and Islam. Moreover, the veil of Islam is not associated with the veil of oppression. Women that are regaining their identity and role in society are now wearing the Hijab and are embracing its concept of liberation. They are taking their lawful places that Islam had awarded them fourteen hundred years ago. In fact, the western women had no rights nor did they have rights over their husband. Not only were woman the property of their husband but so were their possessions. In 1919 women in England fought for their rights to be elected to parliament. Because of their demands, they were imprisoned by the government and suffered greatly. It was not until the late nineteenth and early twentieth century when women were given these rights.

A quote from the Qur’an in Surah 2: 26 states: "And for women has rights over men, similar to those of men over women." The background history between Islam and the West will shed some light as to why Muslims are portrayed so negatively in the media. Some strong contributing factors are the medieval western conflict, the crusades, the oil crisis of the 1970’s, the Lebanese civil war, the Iranian revolution, the Gulf war, and the explosive Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the September 11 bombings, the Bali Massacre and the London bombings. All these events have
caused Islam to be consistently associated with violence and unresolved conflict. Furthermore, the view of Muslims as being violent typically explains why Muslims are seen to establish a threat to the West. One of the most effective ways the media attempts to somehow prevent Islam being seen in a positive frame is to develop propaganda against Muslims and Islam.

The media is able to use the Hijab as a means of exploiting Muslim women, and degrading them. The media assumes, in some cases, that the actions of one Muslim are representations of the general Muslim population. This is generalization. This sets an example for members of society to abuse and degrade them. An image of a Muslim woman wearing the chador was labeled as "like death out for a walk" in the Australian Magazine, 25-26 Jan. 1995 issue. The media implied to locate the position of women in Islamic society as dominated. The image also portrayed the difference between Muslim and Western Women in today’s society.

In current affair programs, people watching are bombarded with images of Muslims as savage terrorists, killing innocent people with no remorse. What results from this is the viewer of these programs, recognize and accept only the labels, and therefore with Islam immediately associating it with negative images.

I asked a resident from Parameter, who wished to be kept anonymous if "the September 11th bombings altered their mind about Islam and Muslim women?" He said "I never knew Islam and the Qur'an preached terrorism. It has made me aware of Islam and the teachings. It increased my awareness of the complexities of Islam and politics in the Middle East including the veiling of Muslim women". This answer shows how influential the media is towards its viewers.

Throughout the western society, the practice of Muslim women wearing the Hijab has resulted in extreme points of view towards their so-called "oppression" and lack of freedom. Despite the obvious portrayal of Muslim women and myths that surround it such as; "Muslim women are oppressed", there continues to be an abundance of Western women reverting to Islam. What Islam uses to protect women is the Hijab. This is ironic because the Western media often portray the Muslim veil as a suppressive force in a woman's life. Every Muslim woman is required to wear a scarf or some sort of head covering and loose-fitting, modest attire. This is not a means of controlling a woman's sexuality or suppressing her but rather, a means for protection. It implies by dressing this way she will not be seen as a mere sex symbol but will be appreciated for her intellect. Furthermore, it will not subject her to harassment. It is interesting to state the head covering for women is not an Islamic innovation but was also practiced by Judeo-Christian women centuries earlier, and yet is laughed at by the West today.

Naima Omar, a student of University of Western Sydney says"It is funny to say the same veil worn by catholic nuns for God is despised and presented as a symbol of subjection and domination when it is worn by Muslim women for the intention to protect themselves and devoting themselves to God".

The term Islam means “submission to the will of Allah” and “peace”. Muslims believe Islam is not a religion but a gift that has been awarded to them. They believe Islam is the way of life and that is harmonious however the media portrays the opposite.

Maria Moskovakis, 18, a Greek Orthodox says "yes of course Muslims are presented negatively in the news. An action by one Muslim is presented with so much bias. If one Muslim commits a crime, it is not the person but the religion presented that goes to trial. What we hear and see is all controlled.

As El-Gharib (1996-97) noted, television, books, newspapers, and magazines are used to present Islam as being a backward and barbaric religion. It has been seen as oppressive and unjust; and
more than this, it is seen as being most oppressive to women. These various forms of media misrepresent Islam in different ways; however largely achieve the same negative result – the creation of a growing barrier of misunderstanding and hostility between Islam and its followers, and the West.

Muslims have an obligation to fulfil which is to educate themselves, their children to gain knowledge which is ordained upon them regardless of their race, gender and marital status etc. A Hasan Hadith narrated by Ibn Majah in the Qur’an states: “Seeking knowledge is a duty on every Muslim” and therefore gaining knowledge is regarded as an act of worship. Stopping any Muslim from gaining an education regardless of age and sex is not Islamic.

Dr Homer of Sweden was asked by the United Nations in 1975 to study the status of Women in the Arab countries and said: "It is the Swedish woman who should demand her freedom, as the women in the Arab countries has already reached the peak of her freedom under Islam.” From Status of Women in Islam”.

Many have become used to believing the false information that they are spoon fed every time they turn on the screen, listen to the radio or open a newspaper.

**Questions asked in this study are:**
How has the Western media generally covered Islam and Muslims? What are the concerns about media reporting and why does representation matter? What action do Muslims expect the government to take to remedy any unfairness?

**Background Studies.**

It is truly ironic that when Christian extremists in the West do something weird, they are called a 'lunatic fringe' of the Christian faith. But when an Islamic extremist does likewise, Islam is termed lunatic and not the extremist. In a recent report entitled The Status of Muslim Civil Rights in the United States prepared by the Council on American-Islamic Relations, a Washington based Islamic advocacy group, it was stated that during 1996 there was a threefold rise in anti-Muslim bias in the United States compared to a year earlier. Although this was not an audit of anti-Muslim incidents, and, mercifully, none of them terribly violent, they did highlight the experience of five million Muslims now living in the multicultured U.S. Society. While Muslims are growing in number, diversity and visibility in America, there remains among them a strong undercurrent of anxiety about living in a culture that many may treat Islam as foreign, mysterious or something to fear.

Who is responsible for this popular stereotype of all Muslims as "terrorists", or at least, as "fundamentalist fanatics"? No doubt, world events like the taking of American hostages in Iran in 1979, the Gulf War in 1991 and the World Trade Centre bombing in 1994 contributed to this paradigm, but there are also deeper undercurrents for this Western intolerance of Islam.

Bernard Lewis' Islam and the West, Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations and lesser known Robert Allison – of Harvard's History of American Civilization Program in his dubious book The Crescent Obscured portray a simplistic East-West conflict between Islam and the so-called West throughout history. In these books we are reminded of deep hostilities that go back to the Arab conquests of the Middle East in the seventh and eighth centuries and later the hundreds of years of threat from the Ottoman Empire, though those scholars conveniently forget the European counter attacks like the Crusades and the Western commercial, diplomatic and colonial domination during the last two hundred years. Thus many Western scholars, who should know better, depict Islamic western relations as a story of centuries of confrontation between two great but exclusive civilizations where each finds the other as the final enemy. Hardly any reputable Western scholar ever mentions that the message of Islam conveyed by Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) is essentially the same as the messages of a long line of prophets like
Abraham, Moses, John the Baptist and Jesus (a.s.). Today, Islam is portrayed by the popular Western media as a triple threat to the West -- political, civilizational and demographic. For example, despite Iran's dismal failure in exporting its revolution abroad, it is still viewed as a global threat. The French writer Raymond Aron and right-wing politicians like Jean Marie LePen's paranoiac warnings of a revolutionary war by Islamic powers, Charles Krauthammer's categorization of Islam as "an ancient rival to our Judaeo-Christian and secular West" (The New Crescent of Crisis: Global Intifada) is only matched, specially after the Trade Centre bombing, in the audacity by the portrayal of Islam as a demographic threat from recent Muslim immigrants in Europe and the USA.

The question therefore arises: Is there really an Islamic threat to the West? Does this grand apocalyptic vision of some "Orientalist" scholars accurately define the truth of our times? Or does this remind us of the overblown, preposterous threat the peasant guerrillas known as Sandinistas once posed to the USA? Of course, there are anti-West Muslim movements in the world today, but hundreds of millions of Muslim peoples are also friends of the West. How would one otherwise classify a majority of Muslim populations of Pakistan, Morocco, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Kuwait, Jordan, Bangladesh, and Egypt? What about millions of Muslim masses who dream Western dreams? Why have millions of these people chosen to migrate to England, France, Germany, Italy, Australia, Sweden and the USA if they are enemies of the Christian West? And what will be the outcome of this huge migration of the late twentieth century? What difference will this make in the Islamic-Western relations? Given this scenario, orientalist scholars' interpretation of neither a stereotype millennial confrontation, nor the erroneous common anxiety about the threat of "Islamic Fundamentalism" can resolve the future at hand. The old glib explanations are no longer the key to the much more complex contemporary situation. The fact of the matter is that Islam and its late twentieth century movements have been badly interpreted and misunderstood in the West. To begin with, politicized Islam in the 1990s is not alone. At the end of the 20th century, religion, by and large, has become an energetic force for change world-wide. Buddhists in East Asia, Catholics in Eastern Europe and Latin America, Sikhs and Hindus in India and Jews in Israel have seen their religions provide legitimacy to define their goals and to enable them to mobilize. Need we add to this list the names of Jerry Falwell of the Moral Majority and Ralph Reed of the Christian Coalition in the USA?

Despite the growing body of evidence to the contrary, Islam is still widely and wrongly perceived in the West as inherently extremist and monolithic. For the last three decades Islamic societies have been considered by these Westerns scholars to be in need of "modernization". Indeed, in one of many Civil Service Academy papers in Lahore in the 1960s, I vividly recall the assignment: "Can Islam be reconciled to the spirit of the 20th century?" As a result in the West, for the right, Islam represented uncouth barbarism; for the left, it was equivalent to a medieval theocracy and for the centre a kind of distasteful exoticism.

Such a reductive view of Islam is a deliberate and gross simplification so as to realize several manipulative aims. In the USA today, grade school history text books, comic strips, TV series, films and cartoons show only caricatures of Muslims as oil suppliers, terrorists or as bloodthirsty mobs. For example, saturation coverage was given to Muslims who vociferously supported Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa against Salman Rushdie compared to a minimal exposure to the majority of Muslims who opposed it. Any Islamic high school student can tell you that Muslim law does not permit a man to be sentenced to death without trial and has no jurisdiction outside the Muslim world. At the Islamic Conference of March 1989, 44 out of 45 members’ states unanimously rejected Ayatollah’s fatwa. But this received only slight attention in the British media and no mention of it at all in the American. It is truly ironic that when Christian extremists
in the West do something weird, they are called a "lunatic fringe" of the Christian faith. But when an Islamic extremist does likewise, Islam is termed lunatic and not the extremist. Marshall Hodgson, the distinguished historian of Islam, points out that feminists frequently condemn Islam for the custom of female circumcision. This despite the fact that it is really an African practice and is never even mentioned in the Qur'an. Similarly, the various recent Islamic movements are often erroneously called "fundamentalist" in the West. The truth is that neither this word nor the concept exists in Arabic or is ever mentioned in the Qur'an. Actually, "fundamentalism" is a Christian code word meaning born again (and refers to beliefs held by some American Protestants who insist on literal truths of the Bible). Furthermore, fundamentalism generally urges passive adherence and does not advocate change of the social order which as already discussed is not the agenda of the contemporary dynamic Islamic movements.

Beyond this distorted and ignorant coverage of Islam in the Western media is the larger question that why it is that Islam is a threat but not Hinduism Judaism or Confucianism? Although Huntington does include Confucianism along with Islam on the fault lines of his great clash of civilizations, the media in general only singles out 'Islamic Fundamentalism' as the quintessential menace to Western interests. One reason usually given is that after the fall of Communism and the Soviet Union, a 'threat vacuum' has given rise to search for new enemies. For some Americans, the challenge is from Japan or the European Community or even in the long run from China. For others, looking for a bogeyman, it is the Islamic world with its one billion Muslims mostly living in poverty in more than 48 countries and a rapidly growing minority in Europe and America. This demonization of Islam in Western thought is firmly rooted in the idea that Islam is medieval and dangerous. It is part of the cultural canon now and the task of changing this thinking is very urgent indeed. Witness for example what happened with the Algerian situation. The stunning victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the 1990 municipal elections in Algeria was a great triumph of democracy in an Islamic state which had been dominated for decades by a one party dictatorship under the National Liberation Front (FLN). Despite the arrest of FIS leaders like Abbasi Madani and Ali Belhadj and indulging in other corrupt practices, the ruling party failed to prevent an even more stunning victory of the FIS in parliamentary elections in 1991. As the world of Islam celebrated its democratic victory, the Algerian military intervened, arresting FIS leaders, imprisoning 10,000 people in camps and outlawing FIS. What did the West, the great champion of democracy, do? In face of blatant repression, it stood silent. The U.S. State Department "regretted" the suspension of the democratic process and did nothing else. Several European governments allowed the junta's representatives to pay official visits to explain their plans. A consortium of European and American banks provided 1.45 billion dollars to help the dictatorship in Algeria to spread out the servicing of its debt.

For the Muslim world this was a clear signal of Western prejudice and antagonism against Islam. Not only did the Algerian situation show that Islam could be democratic, but the West did not want it to be so. A barbaric, medieval image of Islam was suited more to its purpose. Above all, it was a test whether the West could reconcile with Islam and not the other way round because the Algerian Muslims had already tried to reconcile to Western democratic ideals. Obviously, the West failed the test. As someone remarked: "The White House prefers a police state to an Islamic Democracy". Not only in Algeria but in Central Asia, the West has taken a confrontational stand on Islam. For someone like me, who admires the West and has indeed come to live here and raise his children in the USA, it is shocking to see the ignorance about Islam. One sixth grader I know read a passage in her school book about Muslims when they kneel to pray. According to the textbook, they are supposed to rub their faces in the sand while praying.” Daddy," the sixth grader told her father, "we've got to get some sand in the house". In
the middle ages it was understandable that a Muslim was regarded as the real enemy. John Victor Tolan's excellent work Medieval Christian Perceptions of Islam details the military, intellectual, economic and theological superiority of the Islamic world. No wonder, under those circumstances, the founder of Islam was treated as a manifestation of the Anti-Christ and in popular propaganda like Chanson de Roland; the Saracen Zaragoza is shown worshiping a trinity of Golden idols: Mahomet, Apollin, and Tervegant. But that was the eleventh century when Embricio of Mainz and Gauthier de Compiegne wrote false biographies of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) preaching lechery and incest, staging bogus miracles and putting Christians to death who opposed him. Those demonic myths about Islam and its founder were firmly established in the Western mind at about the same time as the myths of Charlemagne, King Arthur and Robin Hood. But from the 20th century success of Rushdie's Satanic Verses which resonates deeply with those long established Western fantasies of the myth of Mahmoud, and school textbooks are still circulated in the USA, one would think the West never outgrew its medieval, schizophrenic conception of Islam.

Today we must realize that in the West the history of knowledge about Islam has been too closely tied to conquest and war and, it is sad to say, to the Crusades of the middle Ages. As Umerto Eco stated in his Essay Dreaming of the Middle Ages: "In fact both Americans and Europeans are inheritors of the Western legacy, and all the problems of the Western world emerged in the Middle Ages: modern languages, merchant cities, capitalist economy are inventions of medieval society... As Karen Armstrong, one of the few objective Islamic scholars in the West pointed out succinctly, we could add Islam to this list. The time has now come to sever this connection between Western medieval phobias and Islam completely. It must be understood that it is a mistake to imagine that Islam is an inherently violent and fanatical faith. Islam is a universal religion and there is nothing extremist, monolithic and anti-western about it. Doctrinally, Islam is as blameless as other of the great Universal religions. In fact, Islam shares many of the ideals and visions that have inspired both Jews and Christians. Its main faults too, were the same as those of the Western Church, namely, pride, greed, violence and the lust for power.(1) And let me add, that Islam is not only a rational creed but it is also pro-democracy. When Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) proclaimed that he was the last in the line of God's prophets on earth what did he mean by that? Was he signaling that from then on there would be no more 'dictated' messages from God in the form of Divine revelations like the Bible and the Qur'an and that the Age of Reason had been born? In fact in 1730 Henri, Comte de Bouhainvilliers, published a rare book in the West entitled Vie de Mahomed portraying the founder of Islam as a forerunner of the Age of Reason. In continuation of this thought, Ah Shariati in the 20th century explained in his Sociology of Islam that the Qur'an looks upon not chance, not historical determinism, not powerful persons, not even Divine will as the motor of history. Actually, the Qur'an seesal-nas or the masses as wholly responsible for shaping history. Chapter XIII Verse 11 of the Qur'an (Eng. Tr. Yusuf Ali) says: Verily never will God change the condition of a people until they change it themselves.

Thus Islam proclaims man as God's vice-regent on earth and its concept of Tawhid as a world view looks upon the whole universe as a unity: there is no separation between this world and the Hereafter, between the natural and the supernatural, between God, nature and man.In its desperately needed re-evaluation and positive understanding of Islam, the West should not ignore the struggle in Islamic societies today between the modernist reformers and the orthodox clergy. Indeed, it was the West which promoted the clergy and financed their activities because they constituted the first line of defense against world communism. Today, with the disappearing cash flow, the same orthodox clergy that opposed communism is rejecting American capitalism. It is the modernist Muslim thinker who is ready to accommodate Western ideas on their merits. During the last two hundred years, Muslim reformers like Jamaluddin Afghani, Muhammad
Iqbal in India, Muhammad Abduh in Egypt, Abdurrahman Wahid in Indonesia, Nawal Sadawi in North Africa, Chandra Muzaffar in Malaysia and Abdullahi A Na'im in New York have boldly tried to "reconstruct Islam" along modernist lines. Indeed millions of Muslims world-wide are quietly living secularized lives. In the USA, for instance, it is estimated that only five to ten per cent of the Muslim community participates in organized religion. Indonesia, with the world's largest Muslim population, has a secular system of government. Yvonne Haddad, author of Islamic Values in the United States, lists how both in the West and in their homelands the majority of Muslims accept the principle that religion is a private affair between man and his Creator.

In fact, examined critically, Modernism and Liberalism are nothing new in Islamic culture. The liberal thrust of a brilliant civilization in Muslim Spain was an early triumph over conservatism, the result of the teachings of Muslim sages like Ibn Sin (Avicenna) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes). Egypt in the 10th century emerged as a pluralist society with Christians, Jews and Muslims enjoying comfortable lives under the Shi'ah rulers, the Fatimids, who not only built Cairo but also the world's oldest University, Al-Azhar. The Safavid renaissance in Iran and Central Asia was interestingly similar to the Italian renaissance. Both expressed themselves in art and paintings and creatively re-visited the pagan roots of their older cultures. Mughul Emperor Akbar's 16th century efforts in India to synthesize Islam and Hinduism into a hybrid humanistic religion called Din-e-Ilaahi was a modern liberal message to the entire world some hundreds of years before its time.

While Muslims like Akbar were seeking understanding with people of other faiths, the Christian West demonstrated in 1492 when Ferdinand and Isabella conquered Granada in Spain, that it could not even tolerate proximity with the two other religions of Abraham. Not only were the Muslims expelled from Spain which had been their home for 800 years, but Christian occupation was fatal for the Jews also. In this century, the strongest force for Islamic secularism was the emergence of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in Turkey. He embraced all things Western and turned the Aya Sofia mosque into a museum. Today the West and Islam have reached a watershed in their relationship. The next few years are crucial to the development of Islamic-Western reconciliation. The clash of the past 20 years or so between the USA and Iran should be discarded as a paradigm. The West should press Muslim countries toward political pluralism and then accept the results of free and fair elections. The history of the last fifty years clearly shows that although, theoretically, the West has preached the virtues of democracy to third world countries, sometimes, in practice, tended up promoting totalitarianism instead. Now is the time to encourage and not obstruct democracy in Islamic countries, especially where feudalism and autocratic governments still hold power and religious exploitation is still the name of the game.

Finally, when millions of Muslims have migrated to Europe and America and need to be equal partners in the Western culture, it is imperative that the West outgrows its intolerant and negative attitude towards Islam. At the same time, Muslims world-wide have to rediscover the liberal roots of their Islamic tradition which Japanese Islamologist Sachiko Murata defines as "gentleness, love, compassion and beauty". As mankind approaches the end of the millennium, people all over the world must widen their horizons beyond their geographical, cultural and religious boundaries. Already a few are finding inspiration in more than one religion and these few have adopted the faith of another culture. For centuries, the Jewish people suffered at the hands of Christian Europe and were exiled from city to city and country to country, but finally the anti-Semitic prejudices seem to have been overcome after Hitler's Nazism and the Holocaust. "The fundamental weakness of Western civilization," wrote Wilfred Smith in 1956 "is its inability to recognize that it shares the planet not with inferiors but with equals. Unless the West learns to treat others with fundamental respect, it will have failed to come to terms with the 20th century." From the time of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), Muslims have recognized that Islam and
the West share a common tradition, but the West has failed to do so. No doubt, the Muslim peoples need to set their houses in order and resolve their manifold domestic ideological, political and economic problems. The West, too desperately needs to rid itself of its ancient hatreds and prejudices. In the long run, Christians and Muslims are friends not antagonists.

A review of existing theories of analysis was undertaken including basic theories and concepts of representation; representation theories including the (i) reflective approach, (ii) intentional approach (iii) constructionist approach.

According to these media representation is strongly linked to actual reality, structures of power that inform not only cultural considerations but can and do affect concrete power structures and power relations between societal actors with regards to power relations between majorities and minorities. More specific attention was given to the idea of ideological representation as the basis through which those represented are rendered powerless and through which domination of the majority is enforced not only in the media but across society. Such representation includes discourses of: ethnocentrism; domination and; demonisation.

**Muslim Perception of the media**
Corroborated by a variety of studies, there is a dominant perception amongst Muslims that the media does indeed portray them and their religion in an inaccurate and derogatory manner. Effectively then, what the public understand about Muslims in general and British Muslims in particular is understood to deeply related to ‘British Muslim representation’ not only in the media but also in the whole social systems of the West. Representation is not only about perception, the position of the reader and audience is very critical. That is why non-west Muslims and west Muslims do not have a similar understanding of Muslim representation in the media (Hill, 1981, Fregoso, 1993 and Hall, 1997).

**Research Findings**
TV News, Film and Literature these analyses from the outset sought to recognize the many examples of good practice in the media, in particular TV and print media attempts at key times to educate audiences about Islam and Muslims. However the overall analysis highlighted institutionalized prejudice that was so embedded that anti-Muslim prejudice did not need to be maliciously motivated or intentional as it was structural.

**TV News Analysis**
A two-week content analysis of four mainstream news programmes of BBC News, News night, ITV News and Channel 4 News were undertaken prior and subsequent to the events of 7 July 2005. The language of news media was particularly focused on throughout the analyses. The frequency of selected words was tabulated and presents comparisons between the various news programmes. Examples include:

**Asylum and Immigration**
As one of the dominant themes during the 7/7 and post 7/7 coverage, debates around asylum and immigration were constantly referred, yet most suspected bombers were of British Origin leading to the reinforcement of the view of ‘others’ and Muslims as one.

**Loyalty and belonging**
Media depicted the 7/7 suspects as well integrated (normal upbringing, education, job etc.) upon their (re)discovery of Islam, they were led away from normality into something extreme and
sinister. Therefore implying that Muslims in general have a potential to develop such extreme views and behaviour regardless of their being integrated in society or their political stance. The findings showed that despite often ‘good intentions’ in addressing anti-Muslim issues, the TV News analyzed showed a limited framework within which Muslims and Islam were discussed.

Media surveys

• **Muslim Representation in Cinema**
  For this analysis, a range of film genres were examined, including action thrillers (The Siege: 1998, Executive Decision: 1996), drama (House of Sand and Fog: 2003, East is East: 1999) and children’s cartoons (Aladdin: 1992), for their representation of Islam, Muslims and Arabs. It was evident from all genres that they contained negative stereotypes about Islam and Muslims/Arabs. The thrust of these differed as did the actual manifestation, nevertheless, they all exhibited examples of Islam phobic discourses, including dual discourses of racism and Islamophobia, where the ethnicity of the character was understood to be irredicibly Muslim.

• **Representation in English Literature**
  Both fiction and non-fiction biography were looked at in this section with titles including Jane Eyre, Bridget Jones’ Diary, Princess and Reading Lolita in Tehran examined. Recurring stereotypes, as well as the reduction of Muslim experiences of trauma and genocide to comic asides were examined within an Orientalist tradition in English literature. Such discursive strategies are not simply autonomous or independent acts of cultural production. They occur within particular political and social contexts and, in turn, they reinforce and sometimes help shape those contexts. The material examined fits in well with patterns existing within the more global and explicitly political Orientalist discourse.

• **Representation of Muslims in the British media**
  Some respondents feel that British media to has an Orientalist mindset by producing negative images about Muslims today.

• **Portrayal of British Muslims and non-British Muslims**
  According to the respondents’ accounts the media employ the same demeaning views in reporting issues that describe Muslims in Britain and Muslim in other countries. However, a few of the respondents think that media is more ruthless in portraying the Muslims who live in Muslim countries since they are not able to raise their voice.

• **Islamophobia in Hollywood and British movies**
  The accounts of the respondents indicate that the negative portrayal of Muslims is heavily presented in the films that are produced in both the UK and US. Films portray Muslims mostly as terrorists who randomly kill people (usually innocents) or blow things up (including themselves), hijackers, misogynistic or stupid. Some respondents believe that the film industry is used as a tool in the foreign policy by the Western countries in terms of demonizing and gaining public support against a fashioned enemy. An illustration of this: USSR was at the brunt of deionization during the Cold War era.

• **Different representations in the different forms of Media**
  Auditory media is seen as less harmful by some respondents than visual media since using images in the wrong context could be far more manipulative. Some have even suggested television is better since the audience is able to examine the given evidence with its own eyes others felt that the Internet is the most reliable source of information because of its wider range
of choices. Yet, by some, it is accused as being the chief perpetrator of Islam phobia in the media. Regardless of the varying forms of media, a general consensus amongst the respondents is that the media present the same negative image of Muslims. The unreliability of mainstream media has led to some respondents using alternative media sources, both Muslim and non-Muslim.

- **Complaints and responses**
  Media alike another interesting finding of the interviews is that most of those who are distressed with the negative portrayal of Muslims in the media showed no interest in complaining about them. When they are asked why their answers highlight their alienation from society. However, hopefully, some respondents were encouraged by the IHRC interviews and said that they would take part in campaigning in the future. The accounts of those who did complain about the negative portrayals support the pessimism of those who have never made any complaint. Almost all of them failed to get a response.

- **Ideological Representation:Encoded messages about Muslims**
  According to respondents, Islam is the fastest growing religion in the world and this fact is worrying the capitalist West since this would diminish Western hegemony. Yet, some held the idea that the reason was fear fuelled by ignorance. Since the Western public is ignorant of Islam, it is afraid of it. • Phobic representation of Muslims: Intercultural Consequences many respondents felt the media portrayal of Muslims is psychologically scarring on Muslims, who face constant Islam phobic elements in their daily life i.e. verbal and physical assault, humiliation, discrimination. Some respondents even went as far as feeling that Muslim youth suffered most from Islam phobic propaganda in the media.

- **Impacts on the Non-Muslims**
  Respondents believe anti-Islamic sentiments flourish as a result of negative representation in the media and causes profound polarization and conflict in British society.

- **Responsibility of Media towards Islam phobia**
  All respondents unanimously pointed to media as being the chief instrument of Islam phobia and expressed their discontent regarding the role of the media in inter-faith and inter-community relations. They initially acknowledged the leading role of the media in inter-faith and inter-community relations; however, they came to the conclusion that media somehow abuses this role and widens already existing divisions. In coverage of issues concerning Muslims some words i.e. terrorism, bombing, hijacking, extremism, are deliberately inserted which manipulate the public to believe that all Muslims are related to or are supporters of these activities.

- **Do the media give enough opportunity to Muslims?**
  Many respondents believe that the media did not give enough opportunity to Muslims to represent themselves and also felt that the Muslim figures that appear in the media are the ones who held extremist views or are marginalized Muslims who do not represent the Muslim community at all.

- **Muslim expectations from the media and the government**
  The report concludes with proposals for the government, policy makers and media alike to consider as a direct result of deionization of Islam and Muslims in the media.

- **Expectations of the media**
*Just and reliable representation of Muslims and Islam – the media must be fair and objective towards Muslims. There is a need for reliable reporters who are well versed with the Islamic belief system and cultures or Muslim reporters who can understand their subjects:

* A balanced approach - the media should be balanced in its approach and try to understand what is going on in the minds of the Muslim population and convey it as it is.

* Coverage regarding other aspects of Islam - instead of bringing up political issues, other aspects of Islam should be covered by the media i.e. art, culture, science and civilization

* Giving more opportunities to Muslims in the media - Muslim should be given more opportunities in the media so they could represent themselves better.

- **Expectations of the Government**

Legal Protection – The government should take steps to protect Muslims from biased coverage and prosecuting those inciting hatred against Islam by the form of legislation.

**Recommendations**

- Tackling Institutional Islamophobia
  Monitoring representation of Muslims both government and media institutions need to make studies and assess how Muslims and minorities are alienated through media representation.

- Tackling overt vilification and demonisation of Muslims
  Ensuring more effective forms of recourse and redress

- Cultural Change in the Attitude of British Politicians
  Due to disparity of access to the media political comments cannot be countered and debated in a way that includes minority groups. As such the media becomes a destructive force and a blunt instrument to force minorities into certain positions. Dealing with problematic content.

- Creating effective watchdogs
  This requires government to enact relevant legislation to create watchdogs “with teeth”.

- Creating Structures of Accountability for the Political Use of Media.
  Including provisions for accountability in the ministerial and parliamentary codes of conduct could be an effective way of dealing with the acts of politicians who misrepresent minorities in the media.

- Requiring balance
  Creating a regulatory system that understands and requires balance reporting.

- Taking action against worst offenders
  The relevance of non-discriminatory anti-discrimination as used by media producers in assessing the effect on some ethnic and religious communities is one that needs to be broadened to cover other ethnic and religious minorities.

- Accountability

- Understanding Muslim standpoint(s)
➢ Contextualizing reporting of Islam

➢ Wide and effective consultation with the Muslim communities

Reference
http://www.ihrc.org.uk/show.php?id=2493
http://muslim-canada.org/intolerance.html
INTRODUCTION

Communication technologies were crucial in the establishment of European domination of the world during the era of colonial empires. The new technologies of the nineteenth century 'shattered traditional trade, technology, and political relationships, and in their place they laid the foundations for a new global civilization based on Western technology' (Headrick, 1981: 177). If trains and ships facilitated the movement of manufactured products from one part of the world to another, fiber optics, satellites and the Internet can trade information, instantly, and across the globe. From telegraph to telephone, from radio to television, from computer and direct dial telephony and DBS to the Internet, international communication has been greatly affected by technological innovation. The convergence of telecommunication and computing and the ability to move all type of data - pictures, words, sounds - via the Internet have revolutionized international information exchange. At the same time, information processing has become far cheaper and faster, resulting in what the Business Week has called the dawn of 'the Internet age' (Business Week, 1999d).

The digitalization of all forms of data - text, audio and video, words sounds and pictures - has increased exponentially the speed and volume of data transmission compared with analogue systems. At first the introduction of digital communication was closely linked to the laying down of new fiber optic cable for telephones and television but even this constraint has been removed with the move to wireless transmission via satellite. Digitalization has had a major impact on international telephony: by 1997, for example, 89 per cent of telephone lines among the world's most industrialized countries were digital. In the use of fiber optic cable, the USA leads the way with 19.2 million cable miles deployed by 1997 (OECD, 1999). The impact on capacity can perhaps be most easily seen in television with the numbers of channels increasing from units to hundreds. Combined with the exponential growth in computing capacity and concomitant reduction in costs, the convergence of computing and communication technologies opens up potential for global interconnectedness such as that offered by the Internet. As Craig Barrett, Intel's Chief Executive points out, 'We are moving rapidly towards one billion connected computers. This does not just represent an online community: it represents the formation of a "virtual" continent' (quoted in Taylor, 1999a).

The dawn of the Internet age

The origins of the Internet lie in the US Department of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (APRANET), created in 1969 as a communication network linking top defence and civilian branches of the US administration in case of a Soviet nuclear attack. In 1983, APRANET was divided into military and civilian sections, with the latter giving rise to the Internet. For the next decade this operated as a network among US universities and research foundations (Hafner and Lyons, 1996). The explosion in the use of the Internet took off with the establishment of the World Wide Web (WWW) in 1989, which began as a network of servers using a set of common interface protocols developed by a British computer specialist Tim Berners-Lee of CERN in Geneva. Any individual using these protocols could set up their own "home page" on the web. This involved giving each page or website a unique address or URL (universal resource locator) and using the hypertext transfer protocol (http) which enabled the standardized transfer of text audio and video files, while the hypertext mark-up language (html) inserted links from one document to another anywhere on the web (Berners-Lee and Fischetti, 1999).
In the history of communication, it took nearly 40 years for radio to reach an audience of 50 million and 15 years for television to reach the same number of viewers - but it took the WWW just over three years to reach its first 50 million users (Naughton, 1999). By 2000, it had become a global medium, with 320 million users. According to a 1999 survey of the World Wide Web by US-based Inktomi, there were one billion unique Web pages. The instantaneous and relatively inexpensive exchange of text, sound and pictures has made a huge impact on international communication. The Internet, 'the fastest-growing tool of communication', with the number of users expected to grow from 150 million in 1999 to more than 700 million by 2001, is making this possible. As Figure 7.1 shows, the growth of the Internet has been remarkable.

At the end of the 1990s, IP (Internet Protocol) traffic was rising by 1000 percent a year, compared to a growth of less than 10 per cent on the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), and if new technologies can meet the demand for bandwidth, IP traffic will surpass PSTN traffic. The proposed Internet 2, backed by major communications companies such as IBM, will give more speed to global communication and thus a boost to e-commerce -trade that takes place over the Internet. A much higher data transmission

Figure 7.1 Growth of the Internet, 1989-99

Source: Internet Software Consortium (http://www.isc.org/)
Capacity will enable Internet 2 users to communicate at speeds as much 1000 times faster than regular Internet users (Taylor, 1999a). Telephone networks took more than 130 years to reach one billion subscribers, at the current rate of growth, the mobile industry will take just over two decades to reach that many subscribers. By the late 1990s, it had emerged as an industry in its own right, with revenues of around $155 billion and more than 300 million subscribers around the world, up from just 11 million in 1990. In 1998, mobile cellular accounted for one-third of all telephone connections - there were almost twice as many new mobile subscribers as fixed ones and, by 2005, according to ITU forecasts,* the number of mobile cellular subscribers will surpass conventional fixed lines (ITU, 1999e). As Tables 7.1 and 7.2 demonstrate, major global operators of mobile telephony and its equipment manufacturers, are concentrated among the world's richest countries.

Third-generation mobile systems will enable Internet access at high speeds, and with the huge demand for mobile access to data services, this is creating a new industry (ITU, 1999f). In 1999, Motorola, the world's biggest manufacturer of mobile telephone equipment, announced an alliance with leading network equipment company Cisco Systems to invest more than $1 billion over the next four years to build a wireless Internet. The two companies will develop hardware and software to simplify connection of wire devices to the Internet. Microsoft has an alliance with British Telecom to create a wireless Internet service,

Table 7.1 The world's top ten mobile equipment manufacturers in 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Mobile revenue ($ billion)</th>
<th>Foreign sales (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motorola (USA)</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nokia (Finland)</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ericsson (Sweden)</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucent (USA)</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nortel (Canada)</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEC (Japan)</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualcomm (USA)</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsushita (Japan)</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siemens (Germany)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcatel (France)</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on data from ITU

Table 7.2 The world's top ten mobile 2 cellular operators in 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Subscribers (millions)</th>
<th>Revenue ($ bn)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NTT DoCoMo (Japan)</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIM (Italy)</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AirTouch (USA)</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vodafone (UK)</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAM (USA)</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BellSouth (USA)</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT&amp;T (USA)</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBC (USA)</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Telecom (China)</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omnitel (Italy)</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
based on devices using Microsoft's Windows CE operating system. Ericsson, the world's third largest mobile phone maker, has also joined forces with Microsoft to develop an Internet web browser and e-mail access from mobile phones and hand-held computers. Ericsson, along with Motorola, Nokia and Matsushita, is involved in the Symbian venture, which is working on the next generation of smart mobile phones and palm-top computers with Internet access. To make this a success, the wireless and computer companies have collaborated with major corporations like Microsoft in the Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) Forum in order to develop a common protocol that allows users to gain easy access to the WWW (Wooldridge, 1999).

Many international telecom companies have joined forces to exploit the potential of a global communications system based on mobile satellites. Global Mobile Personal Communications by Satellite (GMPCS) systems will allow users to make and receive calls via mobile handsets from virtually anywhere in the world. Satellites in Low-earth Orbits (LEOS), 500-1200 miles above Earth, can be reached by a new generation of mobile phones with a much smaller aerial. As they do not remain stationary relative to the earth, like geostationary orbits, LEO satellites will not experience delay in routing calls from one LEO satellite to another. In 1999, the US-based cable company NTL merged with Cable and Wireless of Britain and towards the end of the year the German mobile giant Mannesmann merged with the British company Orange in the race to become a long-distance operator. The most significant corporate development in this area was the takeover in February 2000 of Mannesmann by Britain's Vodafone, creating a 'global telecommunication behemoth' with a market capitalization of $340 billion (Wallace, 2000: 72).

In 1999, BT and AT&T entered into an alliance to integrate their services and networks so that mobile phone users could send and receive voice and other data using the same handset on both sides of the Atlantic (Baker et al, 1999). Transnational telecom corporations are most interested in the so-called B2B (business to business) transactions, as businesses are by far the biggest data users and mobile wireless communication offers a cheap and speedy way for remote offices to connect to their corporate centers. In early 2000, Hughes announced that its focus would be on wireless broadband opportunities and the emphasis on business-to-business communication, to cater to what, in industry jargon, is called 'enterprise' customers. Space way, backed by Hughes, is a two-way, interactive broadband service providing high speed data communications, beginning in 2002 (Matlack et al., 1999). By the late 1990s, US telecom giant MCI WorldCom was spending one billion dollars per year to link businesses to high-speed networks that circle the globe (Baker, et al, 1999). Motorola, along with other telecommunication giants, such as Boeing and Microsoft, have started Teledesic, which plans a network of 200 satellites, at the cost of $10 billion each, to become operational by 2004.

In the new wireless world, the electronic organizer, personal computer and mobile phone will all be combined into one portable gadget connected to the Internet via satellite, enabling users to buy or sell shares, book tickets, shop online, listen to music, watch a video, receive the latest news or play online games. By early 2000, Japan's top mobile communications operator NTT DoCoMo was offering i-mode cellular phones with many such services. With interactive digital television, consumers can dial up the programme of their choice or a film they have missed in the cinema and pay for what they watch. Or if they are watching a live sporting event they will be able to pause and get instant replay at any time. Electronic programme guides will select and inform viewers about programmes in which they might be interested. Tapeless VCRs, where images are 'streamed' onto the computer, can also be set to record the user's favourite programmes or programme on particular subjects, even without the user's knowledge. Although this will offer viewers greater choice and freedom to use television in a more active way, such technology will also make consumers vulnerable to exploitation by direct marketing and advertising as well as having implications for security and privacy.
Another, quicker and cheaper technology for delivering multimedia information is the Data Broadcasting Network (DBN), which allows data services to use the existing infrastructure of DTH satellite broadcasters to distribute electronic content directly to personal computers. It uses a DBS broadcasters' extra satellite transponder space to broadcast content into the home via the consumer's satellite dish. With the satellite's footprint, many subscribers can be reached from just one transmission, making Data Broadcasting cheaper-than upgrading the public telephone networks to be able to provide the high bandwidth required for multimedia services. This also opens up possibilities for DTH operators of new revenue streams. At the heart of the technological push to provide seamless communications is the potential use of the Internet as a global marketplace.

From A 'Free Flow Of Information' To 'Free Flow Of Commerce'
Technological developments, combined with the liberalization in trade and telecommunications, have acted as catalysts for e-commerce. This has been made possible largely because of the opening up of global markets in telecommunications services and information technology products that are 'the building blocks for electronic commerce' as a result of the WTO agreements discussed in Chapter 3. Trade on the Internet has taken hold very quickly - in 1998, companies did $43 billion in business with each other over the Internet (Business Week, 1999d). So important had e-commerce become by 1999, that the American business magazine Fortune had started The Fortune e-50 index, to be published every quarterly, unlike its annual fortune 500 listing of the world's biggest corporations.

The growth of electronic commerce has outpaced even the most optimistic predictions and is now expected to exceed $1.4 trillion by the year 2003, according, to a 1999^report from the US Government (US Government, 1999). Though electronic-payments made up only about 1 per cent of all consumer settlements in 1999, the predictions were that they would grow to 5 per cent by 2005. The top 300 companies doing business on the Internet in 1999 had an average market capitalization of $18 billion (McLean, 1999) (see Table 7.3).

Tabic 7.3 Trading-on the Net (selected industries)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>E-business in 1999 (S billion)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Computing and electronics</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retailing</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial services'1'</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications*</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: " Business-to-business only
Source: Based on data from Business Week, (1999d)

The Internet has dramatically lowered transaction costs and facilitated online transnational retail and direct marketing. The 'e-corporations' operating in a 'net-centric world' break every business free of its geographic moorings (Hamel and Sander, 1998). According to Business Week, in 1998 corporations did $43 billion worth of business with each other over the Internet, predicted to rise to $1.3 trillion by 2003, or nearly 10 per cent of total business-to-business sales. The Internet is still in its 'Stone Age' and the scope for colonizing cyberspace is virtually limitless, as
AOL chairman Steve Case admitted after his company bought Time Warner: 'We're still scratching the surface' of the Internet's potential (Waters, 2000). As Table 7.4 shows, major web-based corporations have reached respectable revenue levels within a surprisingly short period of time, as the date of their Initial Public Offering (IPO) demonstrates.

Table 7.4 The world's top E-companies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company name</th>
<th>1998-99 revenue (S million)</th>
<th>IPO date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>America Online (on-line services)</td>
<td>4777</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Schwab (Stock trading)</td>
<td>4113</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazon.com (e-retailing)</td>
<td>1015</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E*Trade Group (financial services)</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knight/Trimark Group (stock trading)</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yahoo! 1996 (Most important portal)</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on data from Fortune, 6 December 1999

Though most of e-trading is between businesses, it is also having a profound effect on the retail market - on-line business is undermining off-line transactions. Increasingly, global trade in computer software, entertainment products, information services and financial services is taking place using the Internet. In 1999, 39 million Americans shopped on-line and computer software, airline tickets and books were among the main products bought. The so-called 'webonomics' favours the world's rich countries. Nearly 75 per cent of all e-commerce in 1999 took place within the USA, which also accounted for 90 per cent of commercial websites (Peet, 2000). As monetary transactions via the Internet become more secure and new services are offered, e-commerce is set to go global. Already, cyber loyalty schemes are in operation, such as Beenz, ipoints and flloz, which pay customers who visit Internet sites in credits which can be spent on-line.

One of the biggest potential growth areas for e-commerce is in Asia, which had just over 14 million people on-line in 1998, but by 2000 their estimated numbers had reached nearly 40 million, with Singapore, China, Japan and South Korea having the highest net penetration in the continent. On-line advertising was predicted to grow in Asia at an unprecedented rate - from $10 million in 1998 to $1.5 billion in 2001 (Fannin, 1999b). China, in particular, is emerging as a major market for e-commerce. The Chinese economy has been steadily growing for last two decades, and by 'joining the 'WTO and integration with the global economy, it is set to become an important global player. China is the world's fifth largest PC market and Internet use in the country has jumped from 1 600 in 1994 to an estimated six million in 2000.

In recognition of this, US corporations have struck deals with Chinese companies - Yahoo!, the most popular portal in China, launched a Chinese site in 1998, while News Corporation has been involved in developing two websites, ChinaByte and CSeek. In 1999, the most popular Chinese-
language portal Sina was backed by Goldman Sachs, Sohu by Intel and Dow Jones, while China.com was supported by AOL (Einhorn and Roberts, 1999: 28). Youjing Zheng, Director of the Centre for Information Infrastructure and Economic Development in Chinese Academy of Social Sciences argued: 'Informatisation is the foundation for China's economic modernization; information resources is one of the most basic and important inputs for modern economic development; information industry should become the fundamental sector of China's economy' (quoted in Tan, 1999: 264). In 1998, China merged all the information and telecommunication related regulatory institutions into one single regulator - the Ministry of Information Industry (Tan, 1999).

**Media on-line**

According to the industry outlook for 2000 published in Business Week, the Internet was the fastest-growing part of the media sector. With the reducing cost of computers and telephone networks, more and more people are connecting to the Internet, making it a major source of revenue. A 1999 survey by Publishers Weekly of the on-line bookselling market, covering four major e-retailers, reported that on-line "book sales rose 322 per cent in 1998 to $687 million. The largest on-line bookseller, Amazon.com, had total sales of $610 million, while the fastest-growing site was Barnesandnoble.com, where sales jumped 419 per cent to $61.8 million (Milliot, 1999).

With the convergence between the Internet and television, media corporations are developing strategies that include the new electronic media. For example, News Corporation's TV Guide, (the bestselling US television listing magazine), in its deal with United Video Satellite Group (provider of electronic and interactive programme guides), has created a leading television news and listings service, operating across multiple platforms. In the future the TV Guide Channel will become a portal, similar to that of existing Internet search engines. News Corporation's US new media unit, News America Digital Publishing, is providing high speed Internet access and also delivering FOX news and sports content. Its E-Direct develops databases of customer information, opening up the e-commerce opportunities in book, video and 'merchandise sales already flowing from this knowledge are enormous1 (News Corporation, 1999).

The creation of an Internet-based media giant valued at around $350 billion, a result of the merger of America Online and Time Warner, is indicative of the commercial potential of this new medium. Signed just weeks into the new millennium, the deal marks the coming of age of the Internet as the next stage of communication, bringing together television, film, radio, publishing and computing into one accessible medium. In this marriage of the old and the new media, AOL will provide its Internet subscriber service via Time Warner's huge cable network, while the media giant will use AOL's customer base to gain new consumers for its various media products.

Time Warner's extensive fiber-optic cable networks in the USA mean that AOL can offer a service 100 times faster than traditional phone lines, cutting the time needed to download movies, music and 3-D graphics. Coupled with Time Warner's enormous stock of information and entertainment products, the new group is poised to dominate global communication. AOL-Time Warner can draw from the huge library of more than 5 700 Warner Bros, feature films, or thousands of record labels produced by Warner-EMI, the world's second biggest music company. For children it offers Cartoon Network and for sports fans, the leading magazine Sports Illustrated. In the area, of news and current affairs, the group has such global brands as CNN, Time as well as Fortune.

Founded only in 1985, America Online has become the world's biggest Internet Company, whose stock value has increased from just $5 billion in 1996 to $164 billion at the beginning of the
twenty-first century. Already America's largest Internet service provider (ISP), AOL also-owns another well-known ISP, CompuServe, as well as Netscape, the most widely used browser among 'net-izens' worldwide. Its informal style helped to make AOL famous, promoting on-line 'chat rooms' for people looking for romance. It gave the world the message 'You've got mail!', later the title of a successful Hollywood film about a love story blossoming in virtual space. Not surprisingly, the Warner Bros, film was extensively promoted by AOL to its 20 million subscribers.

With the number of Internet users expected to rise rapidly, all the major media and communication companies are scrambling to get on-line. By sharing their resources, AOL and Time Warner can dominate the cyber-world and encroach on the market share of rivals in media, entertainment and the Internet access business.

The world's top media corporations see the potential of using the new medium to exploit synergies between their print, broadcast and on-line operations in a multimedia environment, in which cross-promotion is the norm. According to Bob Eggington, editor of BBC Online, in global terms, the three major news websites were CNN, BBC and Yahoo!, the last, though not a primary news provider, but a 'news aggregator', which acquires news content from world's top news agencies, newspapers and other organizations (Eggington, 2000). The BBC on-line service is trying to exploit the BBC brand to develop e-commerce revenue around the world (Barric, 1999). The BBC World Service has steadily extended its on-line presence with plans to operate interactive websites in twelve languages. Its first interactive programme, Talking Point, which enables Internet and radio audiences to join live debates, is becoming popular globally.

Within a year of the development of the WWW, most major newspapers in the USA had started a web edition and all the major broadcasters had a presence too on the Internet. In the initial years these were seen more as a supplement to the main newspaper or magazines rather than entities in their own right, though apart from the Wall Street Journal no newspaper on the web has as yet made a profit (Katz, 1999). By 2000, this had become a normal phenomenon and a web presence was an integral part of media organizations, not only in the media-rich North but increasingly across the world. As in other sectors of the media, major corporations such as CNN also dominate on-line journalism. CNN Interactive, for example, had eleven web sites in 2000: CNN.com, CNNSI.com, a CNN and Sports Illustrated sports news site, CNNfn.com, a unit of CNN Financial News, AllPolitics.com, a US political news site operated in conjunction with Time and Congressional Quarterly, Custom News, CNN's news personalization product with Oracle and CNN's web sites in Swedish, Spanish, Portuguese, Norwegian, Danish and Italian.

With mobile telephones linked to the Internet, news has become instant and personalized. Now the news will come to subscribers rather than the other way round. With the arrival of WAP, phones can offer direct access to the Internet, making the newsroom redundant. CNN, which gave the world the concept of Headline News, launched in 1981 in the USA to update viewers on news issues every 30 minutes, has taken the lead again by providing a personalized service through its alliance with Nokia to offer news that has been specifically designed for phones. In 1999, CNN was running my CNN, a personalized news service. Other Internet content providers too are tailoring their products for phone users and 'distilling long-winded news stories into the bald facts' (Wooldridge, 1999: 14). Already question are being raised about the relevance of traditional journalism 'in an online world where brevity and speed seem far more important than elegance or intelligence' (Katz, 1999: 2). By 2000, Ananova, the world's first virtual newscaster which CNN called 'a personality designed to rival flesh and blood anchors', had already become a feature of on-line media. In the digital media age the future of newspaper itself was in doubt, with the US company Xerox announcing in 1999 that it will be producing electronic paper - which unlike ordinary paper can be scrubbed and reused.
In the new media environment the boundaries between advertising and programming are constantly blurring. The growth of cable and satellite television has already made the task of selling products less cumbersome and the development of interactive television and on-line retailing means that advertisers will no longer have to conduct expensive and time-consuming market research but will have access to relevant information about individuals' leisure and consumption habits. In the age of narrowcasting, the consumers are self-selected on such specialist channels as MTV, ESPN, Disney or CNN and their purchasing patterns and predilections will in the future be relatively easy to monitor for advertisers.

The international media survive on advertising. Programme production on television would be prohibitive if it were dependent on subscribers only, while newspapers and magazines would have to double their cover price if they were not supported by advertising. However, advertising on the Internet can be more complex. Surfers may just ignore the advertisers' logos on the margins of the screen, unlike TV, where advertisement breaks in the middle of movies or TV programmes are the norm. Not surprisingly, Internet revenue from advertising was just 0.2 per cent of all media advertising in 1999 (see Table 7.5).

Despite accounting for a very small proportion of global advertising, the growing commercialization of the Internet and its increasing use among consumers is likely to make it a sought-after advertising medium. Already, 'dot.com advertising' has become a regular feature on television and print - in 1999 the on-line magazine Salon launched a $4 million TV campaign (Eisenberg, 1999). Given the nature of the Internet, on-line advertising can be used by corporations to record not only every transaction but also which advertisement the consumer clicks on and how long they stay on it (Peet, 2000). Apart from making one-to-one marketing possible, this type of information has security and privacy implications since it can also be misused by corporations or governments. By being able to monitor and record pattern of Internet use, the governments can control citizens' political activities while businesses can have access to private information - about bank accounts, insurance details and spending habits of consumers, which can be traded for marketing purposes.

The Internet as a political tool

Once hailed as a democratizing and even subversive communication tool, the commercialization of the Internet is perceived by some as betraying the initial promise of its potential to create a 'global public sphere' and an alternative medium. In its early days, the Internet was seen as a mass medium whose fundamental principles were based on access to free information and a decentralized information network. For many the Internet had opened up possibilities of digital dialogues, across the world (Negroponte, 1995), and given freedom of speech its biggest boost since the US Constitution got its first amendment (Naugnton, 1999). As the Time magazine wrote in 1994: Most journalism to down, flowing from a handful of writers to the masses of readers. But on the Net, news is gathered from the bottom up - the many speaking to many - ai it bears the seeds of revolutionary change' (Elmer-Dewitt, 1994: 56).

However, the Internet has also provided a platform for extremist organizations. In the USA, for example, supremacist groups have created bulletin boards such as Aryan Nation Liberty Net, which has created international links with other such groups in Europe and other parts of the world, electronically transmitting hate literature. The British National Party's sil offer essays on far-right issues, Nazi merchandising and hate propaganda (Ryan, N., 1999). Others, such as radical Palestinian groups, operate anti-Zionist websites, while the Tamil Tigers continue their battle with the Sri Lankan government on to cyberspace through such sites as Eelam.com, Tamilnet.com and Tamileelam.net. The world's 'first informational guerrilla movement' was the Zapatista National Liberation Army which fought for self-rule in Mexico's Chiapas state. Subcommandante Marcos, the leader of the uprising in 1994, became something
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of an international hero. This status was largely gained through the movement's use of the Internet to promote their cause (Castells, 1997).

Internationally, the most significant political role that the Internet has played is in promoting links between community groups, non-governmental organizations and political activists from different parts of the world. One major success of such activism was the use of the Internet to mobilize international support against Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). The MAI, which was being discussed within the OECD, if approved, would give extraordinary powers to TNCs, especially with regard to freedom to move capital from one country to another. Through a concerted international effort which included flooding the relevant ministries of the OECD governments, major TNCs and other intergovernmental organizations with e-mails, the activists were able to stop the agreement to go ahead (Kobrin, 1998). The Internet also played a major role in organizing and publicizing the very public opposition to growing corporate control of global trade, leading to the scuppering of the WTO's ministerial meeting in Seattle in November 1999. This type of activism has been termed by the US military as 'social netwars' being used by NGOs, though they also fear the involvement of computer-hacking 'cyboteurs' (Vidal, 2000).

The Internet has influenced the mass media in a substantial way: not only has it provided a new platform for media organizations to reach consumers but it has also changed the time frame of news production and distribution. In an era of real-time news, journalists are under increasing pressure to provide up-to-minute information, while ordinary citizens now can access the world's top news organizations - news agencies, 24-hour news channels, once available only to journalists - without being mediated by editorial control of news organizations. During the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia the Internet was widely used by both sides. The independent Serbian radio station B-92 used its website to provide information about the war, free of Yugoslav government control and the Voice of America website became very active during the first days of bombing - between March 21 and 28, over one million hits were registered, nearly four times the normal.

The Internet has also greatly influenced the speed with which news is disseminated, making it more difficult for governments or corporations to suppress information. One key example of this was the 1998 revelation about US President Bill Clinton's affair with a White House intern Monica Lewinsky on The Drudge Report, which catapulted US journalist Matt Drudge into global spotlight. Within hours of the story breaking on the Internet, millions of Americans had knowledge of what turned out to be the one of the biggest sexual scandals in US political history, leading to the impeachment of the President. The story had become so widespread that the mainstream media had little option but to cover it. The Internet was instrumental in the publication in late 1998 of the report by President Prosecutor Kenneth Starr, which was made available first on the Internet, and thus to 55 million people, even before its official release. So pressured were the media to cover it live that networks like CNN had a correspondent reading it straight from text scrolling on the screen. This was an early example of how Internet had the potential to loosen, if not abandon, editorial control over media content.

It is undoubtedly the case that the Internet has been an extraordinary source of information for journalists - from government documents, to TNC annual reports, to NGO viewpoints - all are available to journalists with computer and telephone access. This has meant that they can research a story at greater detail, and given the global nature of the Internet, they can also investigate an issue taking on board 'foreign' views. Most major media organizations now regularly provide background information on contemporary issues through their webpages.

The new medium has also contributed to journalists becoming connected to each other, reading about other countries through websites or watching their television channels. This can happen both in a regional and an international context. The information about the October 1999 military coup in Pakistan was posted by an anonymous person on a website for Indian media.
professionals, eight days before General Parvez Musharraf seized power in Islamabad (Chakraborty, 1999). Another significant development was the publication in January 2000 by the US-based International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, exposing the involvement of the London-based British American Tobacco, the world's second largest cigarette company, in illegally selling cigarettes to Latin America. The detailed reports on 'duty not paid tobacco' were also carried by The Guardian (Leigh, 2000).

The downside of the new journalism is its stress on speed, with the danger that in the race to be first with the news, a news organization may sacrifice depth in a story. Already journalists are being criticized for their often superficial and sensationalist slants on news stories (Postman, 1985; Franklin, 1997). The competitive multimedia environment is likely to make news more prone to infotainment. Even as well established a newspaper as The Financial Times was considering revamping its web edition after the US-based TheStreet.com, an on-line financial newspaper described 'as a combination of news agency and financial newspaper produced in real time', was launched in London in 1999 (Snoddy, 1999).

Corporate consolidations such as AOL with Time Warner and new types of synergies that will inevitably follow are likely to increase; triggering concerns among consumer groups about reduction of choice, as a few megacorporations control all forms of media content and their delivery systems. There are enough indications to show that this is already happening.
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION - CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

One recurring theme in this study of international communication has been the continued domination of the global information and entertainment industries (both hardware and software), by a few, mainly Western nations and the transnational corporations based in these countries. From Marconi to Microsoft, a continuity can be detected in how mainly Western technology has set the agenda of international communication, whether it was cabling the world, broadcasting to an international audience or creating a virtual globe through the Internet. The rest of the world, by and large, has followed the dominant ideology promoted by major powers through their control of international channels of communication - telegraph, radio, television and the Internet. The expansion of European capitalism in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries could not have been possible without the creation of a global communication infrastructure. The post-Second World War US hegemony was built on the use of its 'soft power' to supplement its military supremacy. Much of the Cold War was fought over the airwaves, though in the South it was more often hot, claiming over 20 million lives in conflicts related to superpower rivalry for global domination. In the post-Cold War era, the international media, especially television, have become a conduit for legitimizing the free market ideology, dominated by corporate capitalism. What distinguishes the new form of capitalism from its colonial predecessor is its emphasis on the almost mythical powers of the market and its use of mediated entertainment rather than coercion to propagate this message. It would appear that a 'global feel good factor' is being promoted through the myriad of television channels in partnership with the international entertainment industry, which though a fast-growing business, is still in an 'entrepreneurial stage of development'. In 1998, for example, Time Warner, then the world's biggest media conglomerate, had a market capitalization of $52 billion, compared with $180 billion for oil giant Exxon. The total global entertainment market stood at $500 billion, with the USA accounting for half of that market, followed by Europe at about 26 percent (The Economist, 1998).

Although international entertainment has been driven by TNCs, the governments of the countries where these are based play an active part in the promotion of their products. The Los Angeles-based Motion Picture Association, also referred to as 'a little State Department', for example, lobbies for greater access for US film and television programming in international markets. Similarly, TV France International, a trade association of 134 French companies, created in 1994 to promote French television globally, is supported by the Centre National de la Cinematographic (The National Centre for Cinema) and the Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

With the growing volume of electronic commerce, including entertainment, questions about its regulation will become more pressing. There is a call for greater self-regulation by private sector groupings such as the Global Business Dialogue on Electronic Commerce, a consortium of TNCs, while the UN Commission on International Trade Law has introduced a voluntary Model Law on Electronic Commerce. Will electronic commerce lead to standardization of international currencies? A type of financial globalization was operational in the form of the gold standard in the twentieth century. In a 'borderless' globalized world the demand for a single currency has been expressed. 'Would fewer currencies make more sense?' asked the US journal Foreign Policy on the cover of its Fall 1999 issue containing a series of articles about what it called 'a debate over dollarization'. 'A world of 100 floating currencies,' wrote one commentator, is unlikely to be 'compatible with globalisation' (Hausmann, 1999: 78).

It has been argued that an ethical dimension should be added to international communication to make it more equitable (Hamelink, 1983; Mowlana, 1997), while others have emphasized the
need to reinvent NWICO to bring issues of information inequality back onto the global agenda (Vincent et al., 1999). Idealists feel that improved communication between and among nations will not only help make the world smaller but also enable a more just and equitable global society (Cairncross, 1997; World Bank, 1999). However, given the global disparity in access to information and communication technologies, how is this to be achieved?

There have been some worthwhile suggestions. UNESCO's World Commission on Culture and Development regards the airwaves and space as part of 'the global commons', a collective asset that belongs to all humankind. Commercial regional or international satellite interests which use the global commons free of charge, it counsels, should pay 'property rights' and thus 'contribute to the financing of a more plural media system. New revenue could be invested in alternative programming: UNESCO and UNDP has ensured that the communication revolution is truly global, the UNDP has also suggested a 'bit tax' on data sent through the Internet. A tax of one US cent on every 100 lengthy e-mails, according to its estimates, would generate more than $70 billion a year (UNDP, 1999). It has been argued that if proper policies are adopted, globalized liberalism can strengthen protection of 'global public goods' - environment, health, knowledge or peace (Kaul et al., 1999). Yet such promises co-exist with a trend towards the monopolization of media and communication power, reflected in the rise of global media tycoons - Murdoch and Turner, and regional oligarchs such as Berlusconi in Italy, Subhash Chandra in India and Boris Berezovsky in Russia. These unelected power centres can set the parameters of public debate in the media.

As military confrontations between the world's major powers, which defined international interactions for most of the twentieth century, recede, to be replaced by regional and 'ethnic' wars, the focus of global conflict is likely to shift towards the South, the region of 'failed states' with dubious sovereignty (Krasner, 1999). If one were to believe the dominant view in the USA, the global South is also the region from which 'threats' to the Western way of life are likely to emerge, from religious fundamentalism, to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism. According to an authoritative survey of US public opinion, the 'critical threat' to US vital interests in the minds of the American public was international terrorism (Rielly, 1999). The decline in overseas reporting among the main television channels in the USA (Utley, 1997) and Britain (Stone, 2000) and the proliferation of 'docusoaps', replacing serious factual programming, have implications for the level of public understanding of global affairs, especially those concerning the South.

Under such conditions of an apathetic public and a pliant media, the world's major powers can justify military 'intervention' to defend their definitions of 'security', at a time when US domination is celebrated unabashedly, even on the pages of prestigious international journals. 'The benevolent hegemony exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world's population,' proclaimed one commentator (Kagan, 1998: 26). Such supremacy can legitimize the undermining of political, economic and cultural sovereignty. One example of this was NATO's precedent-setting bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 - the first conflict in which the world's most powerful military alliance intervened in the internal affairs of a the twentieth century, which set the strategic agenda for the twenty-first century, was presented by US-dominated global media as a 'humanitarian intervention', while the fundamental change in the nature of NATO - from ajde fence alliance to an offensive peatmen forcing organization - was largely ignored (Lepgold, 1998; Chomsky, 1999; Deutch et al. 1999).

Despite exaggerated claims about the capacity of the free market and new technologies to empower and liberate individuals and create a 'global civil society', capitalism's contradictions are sharper at the beginning of the third millennium than ever before (Amin, 1999). As corporations strengthen their control over the portals of global power while a majority of the
world's population is excluded from the benefits of the emerging electronic economy, the potential for social unrest is enormous. If global peace and prosperity for all have to go beyond merely being platitudes, international communication will have to be harnessed to promote people-centre capitalism to check the corporate colonization of the planet.